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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is three-fold. First, in contrast to developed exporting countries
such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Middle East oil exporting countries are
years behind achieving the prerequisites for oating exchange rate and Ination Targeting
monetary regime. On the other hand, their performance under xed exchange rate (to the
US dollar) has brought them some painful experience such as the Dutch Disease and high
ination. For a sample of ve of these countries Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE we conduct a set of counterfactual experiments. We empirically simulate
government consumption expenditure, under a hypothetical peg to a nominal anchor (oil
price in either the radical or moderate version) or to a basket (containing the US Dollar,
Yen and the Euro) and compare this simulation with whatever exchange rate regime each
country actually followed. We nd that lower volatility of real oil price in local currency
causes lower volatility in government expenditure and scal balance as a share of GDP.
Hence, we face a less volatile economy.
Second, we determine the equilibrium exchange rate (using BEER) of these ve oil
exporting countries in the Persian Gulf which depend heavily on exports of oil, natural
gas and oil products. We employ a new data set for the real e¤ective exchange rate of
these countries which is updated annually and covers the period from 1980 to 2011. Given
the limited length of the sample (32 years) and low power of individual country by country
tests for unit root and cointegration, estimating separate equations for each country (time
series) does not provide us with precise results; therefore, to increase the e¢ ciency of
the estimators, we employ panel analysis. We apply the pooled mean-group (PMG) of
Pesaran et al. (1999) and four more panel estimators for a robustness check. All estimators
strongly support the positive e¤ect of real oil price on the real e¤ective exchange rate
(i.e. higher real oil price leads to appreciation of the real e¤ective exchange rate) which
is consistent with theoretical predictions and with previous studies for commodity (oil)
exporting countries. The productivity deferential elasticity is 0.10 which is consistent with
the results of the related literature such as the studies of MacDonald and Ricci (2004) for
South Africa, and of Lee et al. (2008) for 48 countries over 1980-2004. The BEERs of
Qatar, Kuwait and (to some extent) the UAE follow their real e¤ective exchange rates.
From 2000, with the increase in oil price, the BEERs appreciate while the real exchange
rate of Oman and Saudi Arabia decline; therefore, the Saudi Arabian and Omani currencies
get undervalued.
Third, employing a new data set of Canadian commodity price indices, we revisit
the Canada Bank Equation and introduce a new version with more fundamentals. We
present a similar equation for Australia as one of the other developed commodity exporting
countries. Using cointegration and the rst di¤erences analysis between real exchange rate
and fundamentals, we investigate the SVECM and SVAR frameworks to decompose the
variance of real exchange rate of Canada and Australia. In the SVECM analysis, the
productivity di¤erential and commodity price are the main contributor to the variance
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of the real exchange rates of Australia and Canada. For the SVAR analysis, we conrm
that, as in the literature, demand shock is the dominant force in explaining the variance
of real exchange rates of both countries. This result does not change even by adding the
commodity price shock to the SVAR framework.
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Part I
Thesis Introduction
Oil is still the most important source of energy for our world and is a political commodity. Most
of the developed or developing countries, whether oil importer or exporter, are concerned about
its availability and price. On the demand side, increasing oil consumption in India, China, and
some other emerging economics, pushes the oil price upward. On the supply side, the Middle
East has been a major source of oil supply for decades. The timing of the Peak Oil Theory,1 if
not rejected, has been postponed by the US expansion of oil production. Based on the British
Petroleum Projection, the US will be energy self-su¢ cient by 2030 and become the biggest oil
producer by 2020, outpacing Saudi Arabia. The US crude oil daily production jumped 14 per
cent between 2008 and 2011, from 5 million to 6 million barrels.2 On the other hand, in the
Middle East, Iraq aims to increase its daily oil export to 7 million barrels by 2018, and Saudi
Arabia keeps pumping oil into the market at a constant level of 7 to 9 million barrels per day.
In 2012, the Iranian oil export declined due to sanctions but it has been substituted by Iraq,
the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile an agreement at the Iranian nuclear talks may mean
the removal of sanctions and the possibility of more Iranian oil coming into the market after
summer 2015. With this positive projection on the supply side of the oil market, the Middle
East will still be a major oil exporter, with its economy linked tightly to the oil market.
The Middle East is best known as for its position as a strategic energy supplier to the world,
and its geopolitical role in the world economy is undeniable. Table 1 reports the estimated oil
reserves, daily oil production, daily oil export, population and the GDP of the oil exporting
countries in the Middle East. The cost of oil extraction in the Persian Gulf oil exporting
countries is among the cheapest in the world. In 2012, they held 57 per cent of the world oil
reserves, 44 per cent of the world oil export and 32 per cent of the world oil production.3
1Peak oil is the point in time when the maximum rate of oil extraction is reached, after which the rate of
production is expected to decline.
2The World Energy Outlook 2012, International Energy Agency (IEA).
3The OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2012.
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Table 1- Some Statistics of the Persian Gulf Oil Exporting Countries - 2011
Country Oil reserves Daily Oil production Daily oil export Population GDP
Kuwait 104 2.6 1.8 2.7 166
Oman 5.5 0.888 0.738 3.154 90.66
Saudi Arabia 267 9.311 7.2 27 740
Qatar 25.38 0.833 0.588 2 189
UAE 97.8 2.56 2.142 5.4 271
Iran 154 3.5 2.5 79 997
Notes: Oil reveres are in Billion Barrels, daily production and export in Million Barrels, GDP is
PPP in Billion Dollars and Population in Millions.
Oil revenue is the backbone of these economics; for example, in Kuwait, oil accounts for
nearly half of the GDP, 90 per cent of export revenues, and 95 per cent of government income.
Qatars proved reserves of natural gas are nearly 26 trillion cubic metres, about 14 per cent of
the world total gas reserves and the third largest in the world (after Russia and Iran). In Qatar,
oil and gas account for more than 50 per cent of GDP; 70 per cent of government revenues and
85 per cent of export revenue. With 267 billion barrels of oil (one-fth of the worlds proven
total petroleum reserves) and 7.2 million barrels in daily export, Saudi Arabia is a major oil
supplier to the world. Oil accounts for 75 per cent of its government revenue, 90 per cent of
export revenue and 45 per cent of GDP. Oman exports around 700 thousand barrels of oil per
day. Among all these countries, only the UAE has partially reduced the oil dependency of its
economy, but 45 per cent of its total export is still oil related.4
On the other hand, these countries Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates have some of the fastest growing populations in the world. An Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) report indicates that by 2020 the total population of these countries will
grow by 34 per cent to 53 million with the majority under 25 years of age. In comparison to their
energy sector, their manufacturing and service industries are tiny. These economies are heavily
subsidized and they have almost no tax revenue; a large proportion of their service industries
depends on foreign labour; they have free health and education, and subsidized energy, food
and housing. Their governments are faced with very high domestic energy consumption which
constrains their oil exports in the long term; therefore, it appears most likely that the current
oil price just manages to cover the increased government spending to handle all the current
subsidies and to continue the development plans for now. However, with the high population
growth rate, any sustained drop of oil price may be devastating. This would cut the public
4For the UAE export, we should consider the huge volume of re-export to Iran. In recent decades, the UAE
has been Irans intermediary to the world economy.
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spending and subsidies, speed the depletion of cash reserves and may consequently lead to
political instability.
In recent decades the Middle East economic and political performance has been a mix of
major failures and some successful attempts. Most of the countries in the region have tried to
diversify their economies. They are open to imported labour and are rentier states with massive
unemployment, high ination, and non-democratic government. The decline of oil price in the
1980s hurt their economies hard; although, between the 1960s and the 1980s, the massive oil
revenue reduced poverty and established some infrastructures. In addition to the economic
issues, the Middle East su¤ers from political turmoil.
In a Middle East where the political atmosphere is poisoned by various conicts and tensions,
religious extremists and lack of trust, peace, democracy and political stability are prerequisites
for prosperity. Political and social reforms are out of the scope of this thesis; therefore in
two chapters we focus solely on the macroeconomic challenge, its consequences, solutions and
especially on the proper monetary policy and on the equilibrium real exchange rate for these
oil exporting countries facing swings in oil price.
For these oil exporting countries, almost all of which have their currencies pegged to the US
dollar,5 uctuations in the world oil price and their exchange rate against the major currencies
are an important source of macroeconomic instability. In recent decades, they have faced some
episodes when their anchor currency (the currency to which they are pegged) has moved in
one direction while the price of their principal export commodities has moved in the opposite
direction. Figure 1 shows the example, in the 1990s, of a weak oil price coinciding with a strong
anchor currency (the US dollar).
Apart from some developed commodity exporting countries (such as Norway, Australia and
Canada), most of the commodity exporting countries have experienced a long history of high
ination which has undermined their central bank credibility. To ght against ination, in the
absence of credible monetary intuitions, some economies import credibility by pegging their
currency to an anchor currency such as the US dollar. In a world of diversied trade, this
policy helps them to control ination to some extent but it means that they are hostage to the
uctuation of their anchor currency against the other major currencies and to the volatility of
commodity price. As Figure 2 presents, the primary problem for these ve countries is the high
ination in the region which coincides with high oil price and depreciation of the US dollar
against other major currencies, such as the Euro and Yen, of their main trading partners.
5Since 2007, Kuwait has pegged its currency to a basket of Euro and US dollar. The main reason for this
decision announced by the Kuwaiti government was the depreciation of the US dollar against the other major
currencies, which caused inationary pressures
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In the face of uctuations in oil price and in the value of the US dollar against other major
currencies, these economics have been damaged through two channels. The rst channel is
imported ination. The larger part of these countriesimports are from non-US markets such
as those of Europe and Japan. With a weak US dollar, their imports are more expensive; under
the dollar peg, adjustment can only be expected to take place through the ination which is
experienced by most of these countries. As MacDonald (2010) argues, this process is slow and
boosts inationary expectations which can cause further misalignment6 in the real exchange
rate, hurting competitiveness and long term growth.
The Impossible Trinity7 explains the second channel. With an open capital market and
a currency pegged to the US dollar, these countries cannot follow an independent monetary
policy to ght against ination. The hands of their central bank are tied; therefore, they cannot
apply a domestic monetary policy while their nominal interest rate closely follows the interest
rate in the USA. Consequently, the high ination causes a negative real interest rate which
increases aggregate demand which in turn expands inationary pressures. Hence, the peg to
the US dollar links their monetary policy to that of the US while their business cycles may not
be correlated with the US. Indeed, as oil exporters, their needs and the shocks they face are
completely di¤erent from those of the US as an oil importer.8
In their development process, these economies have gone through major structural changes;
therefore, a perfect exchange rate regime (to constantly perform miracles) does not exist. Ac-
cording to Frankel (1999), no single exchange rate regime is right for all countries at all times.
The choice of the right exchange rate regime depends on the circumstances of the country in
question, at any one time. As most policy makers in the region conrm, in recent decades,
pegging to the US dollar has worked for some of the Persian Gulf oil exporting countries but
recently most governments in the region have acknowledged the aw in this regime choice.
The current popular monetary policy regime recommended by many monetary economists
and adopted by some countries (such as Australia, Chile, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Sweden,
Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Korea, and South Africa) is Ination Targeting which comes
with a oating exchange rate regime. The currency crises of the 1990s and early years of the 21st
century have proved the failure of the peg exchange rate regime. In fact, all proposed anchors in
monetary economics do the same job: they stabilize prices. As Cashin and McDermott (2001)
6An exchange rate is called misaligned if its movements are not linked to the movements of the fundamentals.
7Impossible Trinity or Triangle of Impossibility: we cannot simultaneously have xed exchange rate, free
capital ow and independent monetary policy. A country must select two out of the three. It can x its
exchange rate, and have its own monetary policy, but only by maintaining controls on capital ows (as China
has done); it can leave capital movement free and adopt an independent monetary policy, but only by letting the
exchange rate uctuate (as the UK or Canada have done); or it can go for free capital ow and xed exchange
rate, but only by a dependent monetary policy (as in Argentina from 1991 to 2002).
8By the increase in the US oil production, this may change in the future.
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argue, if the Middle East oil exporting countries go for Ination Targeting, there is the danger
that uctuations in oil price may cause large volatility9 in exchange rates and that this may
lead to volatility in ination and in non-oil output.
On the other hand, these economies have not satised the prerequisites for a functioning
exible exchange rate regime with Ination Targeting. First, they do not have independent cen-
tral banks. Second, they do not have developed nancial markets. Third, the implementation
of the oating exchange rate regime in their thin foreign exchange markets is not applicable
e¢ ciently. In the long term, they may be proper candidates for a exible exchange rate regime
with Ination Targeting, if they satisfy these prerequisites. However, at this stage Ination
Targeting with the CPI as the target is not a proper option.
The CPI is the usual target in the Ination Targeting framework, but this may not be
the best choice especially for developing commodity exporting countries. Most commodity
exporting countries su¤er from swings in the price of their commodities which cause severe
business cycles; these large booms and busts hurt the health of the economy. The developed
commodity exporting countries such as Canada, Australia and Norway have already managed
this problem. They have diversied their economics, and commodities are only one part of their
extensive exports unlike the Middle East oil exporting countries where commodities make up
the major part of their economies. Frankel (2011a) points out that several commodity exporters
such as Canada, Australia and Chile have suitable monetary and scal policies to moderate the
adverse e¤ect of the variability of commodity prices. In these countries the procyclicality issue
is a historical and not a current phenomenon.
Often in the developing world, particularly in the developing commodity exporting coun-
tries, macroeconomic policy is procyclical rather than countercyclical or acyclical. The Persian
Gulf oil exporting countries have also faced the procyclicality of scal policy. Their xed ex-
change rate regime and their openness to the international capital market have constrained
their monetary policy; this has left scal policy as the main contributor to stabilizing their
economies. There are two major reasons for this procyclicality: the swings in commodity price;
and the mismanagement of their monetary and scal policies. For these countries, as Husain et
al. (2008) argue, the link between oil price and scal policy is well documented and the scal
policy is the major channel to transfer volatility from the oil price to the economy. Therefore,
government expenditure increases when they face high oil prices and decreases when oil prices
go down. As indicated by the literature, the establishment of institutions is the main solution
for a procyclical scal policy. Chile, as a commodity exporting country, is a good example.
It assigned a committee, not inuenced by any political party, to predict the copper price
9Devereux and Lane (2003), Rose (2000) and Klein and Shambaugh (2010) dene volatility of exchange rate
as the standard deviation of the monthly percentage change.
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and to control government spending. This helped Chile to go through the 2008-2009 recession
smoothly.
In the absence of functioning scal institutions, a proper exchange rate regime may smooth
oil prices in the local currency, and may reduce the volatility of government expenditure. There-
fore, in chapter two, by introducing an alternative exchange rate regime, we aim to decrease
the volatility of the scal policy and consequently enhance welfare and economic growth.
The second chapter of this thesis introduces an index of export prices instead of the CPI.
We empirically test a new monetary regime for developing commodity exporting countries. The
context is the oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf which are heavily dependent on their
oil windfall revenue and are price taker small economies. The choice of monetary regime should
be based on the structural characteristics of these countries; and, in particular, the role of oil
as the main part of their GDP, export and government revenue should be recognized.
The questions to be examined in the second chapter are as follows: what is the appropriate
exchange rate regime for a developing oil exporting country? Does the choice of anchor make an
important di¤erence? Which nominal variable is the best candidate for an anchor in monetary
policy? A contribution of this chapter is that, within the Ination Targeting framework, we
consider other possible anchors instead of the CPI. In our proposed target, oil has much more
weight in comparison to the fuel in the CPI.
For the Persian Gulf oil exporting countries, this chapter o¤ers a peg to a nominal anchor
(oil price, in either the radical or moderate version) which may work. We test the possibility and
consequences of using oil price in a basket of major currencies as an anchor for monetary policy
in the oil exporting countries. We evaluate and compare the performance of the counterfactual
pegs to the actual regime in place. We do a set of counterfactual experiments, determining
(for each these oil exporting countries) how the volatility of government expenditure and would
have changed if they had pegged their currencies to oil prices; to a basket of oil, US dollar,
Yen and Euro; or to a basket of those three currencies as compared to a peg to the US dollar
exchange rate regime which they actually follow.
In addition to criticizing the peg exchange rate regime, there has been another growing
debate regarding monetary union (currency union) in the region.10 Although a single currency
for these countries would encourage trade and investment, there are doubts as to whether
these Persian Gulf oil exporting countries are an "Optimum Currency Area",11 as they still
10Currently, there are ve examples of monetary union in the world. Three of them are in Africa, one in the
Caribbean and one in Europe.
11The Optimum Currency Area is a geographical region where adopting a single currency, in comparison
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do not satisfy the prerequisites for a monetary union. Reviewing the EU process of monetary
union, it is evident that a high volume of trade within the economic region is an important
factor in favour of a monetary union; however these ve countries do not have enough intra
trade, political convergence and the proper institutions to establish currency union. Even after
satisfaction of currency union requirements, for each of these countries, an important question
is the proper real exchange rate or equilibrium exchange rate to enter a Euro style monetary
policy. The determination of equilibrium real exchange rates involves substantial uncertainties
such as: the time frame (short, medium or long-run); the choice and denition of the dependent
variable (real exchange rate or real e¤ective exchange rate); the selection of the model, and of
the econometric method.
The concept of equilibrium exchange rate has been a key element of the annual IMF rec-
ommendations for all countries. On the national level; it is one of the important components
of an economic policy which promotes economic growth. A misaligned exchange rate adversely
a¤ects the domestic economy thorough an overvaluation or undervaluation. On the other hand,
it is also on the global agenda, because it is linked to the global imbalance phenomenon which
is an international debate.
In the third chapter, we review the equilibrium exchange rate literature. This is a vast
research area which has expanded with the introduction of the Euro and questions about the
right value of the Chinese currency. Using the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER)
approach of Clark and MacDonald (1998), for these ve oil exporting countries in the Persian
Gulf and applying di¤erent time series and panel estimation techniques, this chapter assesses
the equilibrium exchange rates and misalignments (between the actual and the equilibrium
exchange rates) from 1980 to 2011. Furthermore, we present the fundamentals which drive the
real exchange rates of these countries.
Allocating chapters two and three to the real exchange rate of developing commodity ex-
porting countries, in chapter four, we investigate the dynamic of real exchange rates for two
developed commodity exporting countries: Canada and Australia. These countries have inde-
pendent central banks and the proper institutions to implement exible exchange rate regime
and ination targeting. The research in this chapter can shed light on the nature of real ex-
change rate in these developed commodity exporting countries. On the other hand, the results
in this chapter should help developing commodity exporting countries to see where they will
be in the long term and also their challenges in future.
The fourth chapter contributes to two types of literature: that of the long run equilibrium
to several currencies, could benet the economy. The theory evaluates whether or not a region is ready for
monetary union. See Frankel and Rose (1998, 2002) and Rose (2000).
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relationship between real exchange rate and fundamental variables; and that of variance de-
composition of real exchange rate. Monetary authorities should monitor the real exchange rate
uctuations. In theory, for any change in real exchange rate which is linked to the movements
of fundamentals, they need not take action; however, if the real exchange rate movement is
driven by non-fundamental factors such as speculative forces, then monetary authorities should
dampen the e¤ect of these shocks in order to control the volatility of exchange rate and its
adverse e¤ect on domestic economy.
For the long run relationship between real exchange rate and fundamental variables, we
conrm the results of the original Canada Bank Equation and introduce a new version with
three modications: rst, our quarterly data set covers an extended period, 35 years (1980-
2014). Second, in addition to the commodity price indices of energy and non-energy, we add
other fundamentals. Third, to our knowledge, this is the rst study which employs the new
Canada commodity price indices to check the robustness of the Canada Bank Equation. In
contrast to the old data set used by Amano and van Norden (1995) which was a xed weight
index of commodity prices, the new one contains a broader set of commodities and production
weights which are annually updated; therefore it considers the dynamic of the composition
of commodity production in Canada. For comparison purposes we introduce a very similar
long run relationship between the real exchange rate of Australia and its fundamentals. For
Canada and Australia, we observe di¤erent reactions for demand and supply shocks, but the
same pattern for a commodity price shock.
This chapter proceeds to SVECM and SVAR analysis. For the variance decomposition of
real exchange that is in the SVECM framework, we consider the long run conintegration between
real exchange rates and fundamentals. Productivity di¤erential and commodity prices are the
two main contributors to explain the variance of real exchange rate of both countries: Australia
and Canada. For the SVAR analysis, when we consider the rst di¤erences of variables, we
conrm the stylized fact in the literature that the main contributor to the variance of real
exchange rate is demand shock. For Canada and Australia, adding commodity price index to
the analysis does not change the results: demand shock is still the main factor in explaining
the variance of the real exchange rates of both countries for the di¤erent periods.
In sum, the hope is that this thesis o¤ers a useful contribution to the elds of international
nance generally and exchange rate in developing and developed commodity exporting countries
specically. Findings are clear and well dened and open up a number of potential avenues for
future research.
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Part II
A Monetary Policy for the Persian
Gulf Oil Exporting Countries
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1 Introduction
The macroeconomic performance of the oil exporting countries and their role in the world
economy closely depend on the price of oil in the international market. In the last decades,
high oil price has been linked to the large current account imbalances across the world, the
signicant shifts in the wealth of countries, and the possession of the bulk of the global current
account surplus by the Middle East oil exporting countries. Therefore the economics of these
countries, and in particular their exchange rate regimes, are interesting subjects. In this chapter,
we focus on the exchange rate regime of ve oil exporting countries in the Middle East: Qatar,
Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman.12
These counties have common characteristics. All these non-democratic kingdoms are small
open economies which follow an exchange rate regime pegged13 to the US dollar. They do not
have sound institutions and independent central banks; they do not have their own developed
nancial markets and are vulnerable to swings in oil price. However, the peg to the US dollar has
given them some benets. It has reduced uncertainty, costs of trade and nancial transactions
and encouraged investment. At the same time, in contrast to some successful Asian economies,
they have not been able to successfully diversify their economies to cope with the high rate
of unemployment. Except for the UAE, in all of these countries, most of their export is still
energy commodities.
Although, the currencies of these countries are pegged to the US dollar, most of their trade
is with Europe and Japan. Therefore, any movement of the US dollar against the Euro and Yen
can directly inuence these economies. The uctuation in oil price and the US dollar uctuations
against the other major currencies are the two main channels to hurt these economies. Although
a weak US dollar may promote their non-oil exports and tourism industry, they do not have
a mature and developed non-oil sector; therefore, the imported ination could overtop all the
benets of the peg exchange rate. The primary motivation for this chapter is the high ination
in the region which has coincided with high oil price and depreciation of US dollar against other
major currencies.
Frankel (2003a) describes the vulnerability of these countries in the 1980s and 1990s when
12The oil exporting countries in this study are: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries excluding
Bahrain. The GCC was formed in 1981 to create economic, scientic and business cooperation among its
oil-exporting Arab members in the Persian Gulf region. The GCC consists of six members: The Kingdom of
Bahrain, Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE).
13We use the terms xed or peg exchange rate regime to refer to any regime in which a monetary authority
announces buying and selling its currency in terms of a foreign currency (anchor) at constant rate.
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they were exposed to three shocks simultaneously: weak commodity prices; scarce international
nance; and a strong dollar.14 If, during these periods, their currencies had been pegged to their
principal export commodity price (rather than to the US dollar) they may have gained export
competitiveness at precisely the time when their balance of payments was under pressure. This
observation leads to the proposal of this chapter for these Middle East oil exporting countries
which are a major supplier of energy to the world economy.
The proposal tested in this chapter is that of a monetary policy for the commodity exporting
countries in general and the oil exporting countries in particular which do not have their own
sound institutions and independent central bank, and are hurt by swings in the oil price. In long
term, these countries should diversify their exports, establish the proper institutions15, and then
they should be able to adopt other policies of developed commodity exporting countries such
as the Ination Targeting with a oating exchange rate regime. In the meantime, the monetary
policy proposed in this chapter may smooth their transition. The proposal is an exchange rate
regime in the Ination Targeting framework, but with di¤erent price index. Therefore, these
countries should depart from their current exchange rate regime (the peg to the US dollar) to
a currency basket, constituted by their major trade partners, which could possibly contain the
price of oil.
The rest of the chapter is set out as follows. The second section, "Characteristics of Com-
modity Exporting Countries" elaborates on the characteristics of these countries. We go over
concepts such as the Natural Resource Curse, procyclicality and the adverse e¤ect of volatil-
ity in government spending. The third section, "Di¤erent Nominal Anchors for a Monetary
Regime" surveys possible nominal anchors for a monetary policy and their advantages and
disadvantages. The fourth section, "Classication of Exchange Rate Regimes" discusses frame-
works for classication of exchange rate regimes. In the fth section, we investigate the real
e¤ect of di¤erent exchange rate regimes. Section six reviews the theories of exchange rate
regime choice and, in section seven, we review the proposal, "Peg to Commodity Price" as an
alternative anchor for commodity exporting countries. Sections eight and nine describe the
Data and the Model. Sections ten and eleven contain Data Analysis and Empirical Strategy.
In Sections twelve and thirteen, the Empirical Results and Conclusion are presented.
14As Cline (1984) describes, one of the reasons for the international debt crisis of 1982 was the combination of
an appreciating dollar with weak world market conditions for the commodities exported by developing countries.
15In resource-rich countries, Arezki and Gylfason (2011) show that institutions which can limit the misman-
agement of natural resources play a major role in moderating the e¤ect of volatility on economic growth.
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2 The Characteristics of Commodity Economies
The developing world, especially the commodity exporting countries, usually has less developed
institutions, a non-competitive banking sector, high ination and lower central bank credibility.
Such countries are price takers and face exogenous terms of trade shocks. In contrast, the
developed countries face uctuations in their terms of trade the relative price of exports in
terms of imports which are both smaller and less likely to be exogenous. Another common
problem of the developing commodity exporting countries is the mismanagement of their wealth;
they cannot get the best out of their natural resources.16
Contrary to the countries rich in natural resources which cannot benet from this wealth,
there are some countries rich in natural resource such as Botswana and Norway which are able to
use it successfully. Unlike other developing commodity exporting countries, Botswana (which
has mined diamonds for several decades) has not su¤ered the adverse e¤ects of its wealth.
There, tribal traditions and good political leadership encourage broad political participation
and promote democracy. As for Norway, before discovering oil it already had developed the
proper institutions and mechanisms for accountability. In contrast, the oil exporting countries
in the Middle East started their oil extraction much earlier than Norway, at a time when they
did not have proper institutions and even in some cases a national government.17 Since that
time, they have been faced with an unstable ow of revenue which has hurt their welfare;18
they require proper policies based on the characteristics and structure of their economies.
Desirable policies for the Middle East oil exporting countries are: reducing the size of
the public sector; prompting non-oil exports; and stabilizing government spending. During a
boom, when oil revenue ows to the area, the governments usually ignore these policies. The
windfall oil revenue increases government consumption which usually causes higher wages and
expands the public sector. These changes are very rigid and not easily reversible. During the
1970s, by the dramatic rise in oil prices, most oil exporters in the region su¤ered from the
Natural Resource Curse.
16For more details, see Fraga, Goldafjn and Minella (2003).
17In the Middle East, the rst oil well to enter into production was in Iran (Persia) in 1908 and 30 years later
in Saudi Arabia.
18See Fatás and Mihov (2003); Afonso and Furceri (2010) and Loayza et al. (2007) for their investigations
into the welfare e¤ect of volatility in government expenditure on growth or consumption.
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2.1 The Natural Resource Curse
Perhaps surprisingly, the economic performance of most countries with oil, natural gas, or other
natural resources does not always seem very promising. Auty (1993, 2001) is widely accepted as
the rst economic commentator to coin the phrase "The Natural Resource Curse" to describe
this phenomenon.19 It appears, on average, that countries with large endowments of natural
resources perform worse economically than countries with fewer natural resources. Without
natural resources, advanced economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have achieved
the highest standards of living while many countries rich in natural resources, such as Nigeria
and Angola, still are among the poorest. In general, this negative relationship observed by
Auty has been subsequently conrmed, however there does remain some controversy about its
existence.
In two extensive studies along similar lines, Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) show that
economic dependence on exporting oil and mineral is correlated with slow economic growth.
Conrming the Natural Resource Curse, they argue that their result is not easily explained
by other variables.20 Consequently, the Middle East oil exporting countries as the developing
commodity exporters su¤er from the Resource Curse which could a¤ect the economy through
three channels: the volatility of oil price, the political channel and the Dutch Disease.
First, the volatility of oil price (rather than the price trend of the commodity) hurts
an economy.21 Due to low elasticity of supply and demand with respect to price in oil markets,
small uctuations in demand or supply make oil prices volatile. These uctuations in oil price
can create a dangerous cycle in which governments increase their spending when they face a
high price of oil and cut spending when facing a decline in oil price.22 In the bust phase, the
governments hands are tied and many projects are unnished; the government is forced to cut
investment which results in decline in growth. On the other hand, oil revenue makes up the
bulk of the GDP and export of these countries; therefore, the volatility in oil price inuences
the whole economy adversely. In a volatile economic environment, investments are not stable,23
labour is not e¢ cient and the transaction costs of cyclical shifts of resources may hurt the
economy. In the boom phase, the size of the government sector grows, more mega projects are
started and employees expect higher wages. On the other hand, in the bust phase, there is
a lot of resistance against any modication (especially cutting spending on education, public
wage and health). Hence, these changes are rigid and not easily reversible. As Reinhart and
19Humphreys et al. (2007) and Collier (2007) are two primary source books on the Natural Resource Curse.
20For more information on the Natural Resource Curse see Ross (2001); Kaldor et al (2007); and Subramanian
and Sala-i-Martin (2003).
21See Blattman et al. (2007) and Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2007).
22See Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Montiel and Serven (2005).
23See Caballero (1991), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a review of the negative e¤ects of volatility on investment.
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Reinhart (2009) and Perry (2009) describe, booms in the form of capital inows and currency
overvaluation are usually followed by busts in the form of capital outow, severe depreciation,
and recession. In another study, Arezki and Ismail (2010) conrm the cycles and show that
government spending increases in boom phase, but it is sticky in the bust phase. Unfortunately,
the high price of the commodity is not permanent and, when the downward swing comes,
the government cannot handle its wage bill, the ine¢ cient employees and the white elephant
projects.
The second channel is the political argument. Governments who rely on tax revenue are
usually more responsible to the public than those who control the revenue of the exporting
commodity. The corruption and mismanagement of the oil revenue should therefore be less
if there is a mechanism to hold government accountable. Mahdavy (1970) was the rst to
suggest that Middle Eastern governmentsaccess to oil revenue makes them independent of taxes
from their people. Arezki and Brückner (2010) show that, in autocracies a rise in commodity
exporting prices boosts government spending and external debt, but not in democracies. The
oil revenue being in the governments hand without any accountability tends to discourage
democracy; the state does not need to tax people and has no incentive to promote democracy
and encourage the development of a strong private sector. On the other hand, citizens do not
have any mechanisms by which to hold authorities responsible. These two channels damage
the establishment of political institutions and the accountability process. Ross (2012) argues
that the oil revenue is against democratization and even could cause a "Political Curse". In
an underdeveloped society without proper institutions with all oil revenue in the control of the
government, any change or promotion of political freedom is improbable.24
The third channel, the Dutch Diseaseregards inappropriate scal policy. The term was
coined in 1977 by The Economist magazine to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector
in the Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas eld in 1959. It explains the e¤ect
of large inow of foreign currency on an economy. In most cases, this ow of foreign currency
is because of the increase in the revenue of the exporting commodity. However, in a small
economy, inow of foreign assistance and foreign direct investment can do the same. The ow
of foreign currency appreciates the real exchange rate. This reduces the competitiveness of the
manufacturing sector.25
Krugman (1987) explains why this phenomenon is a disease: during and after a rise
in commodity price, the Dutch Disease hits the manufacturing sector by moving production
24After Mahdavy (1970), Luciani (1987) and Vandewalle (1998) study the political argument of the Natural
Resource Curse. In another study, Ross (2001) shows that there is a link between economic dependence on oil
and mineral with authoritarian governments. For more on the political e¤ect of natural resources, see Jenson
and Wantchekon (2004), and Ross (2006).
25Other primary studies on the Dutch Disease are Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984).
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resources out of the economy, and it becomes a disease when the manufacturing sector does not
rise after the boom. On the other hand, in the industrialization process of a country, the Dutch
Disease severely hurts the "learning by doing e¤ect" which is one of the factors in promoting
the non-commodity sectors of the economy.
The Dutch Disease is a common phenomenon for the countries with high export price
volatility. De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) build the theoretical model for the e¤ect of terms of
trade on the real exchange rate. In this model, an improvement in the terms of trade appreciates
the domestic currency. The model is based on an economy with two di¤erent sectors: one
sector produces exportable goods (oil) and the other one non-traded goods. The increase of
the commodity price (the terms of trade shock) in the international market  exogenous to
the domestic economy increases the wage in the commodity sector. The wages in the two
sectors are equal, thus wages and prices in the non-traded section go up, and the country faces a
real exchange rate appreciation. The appreciation in the real exchange rate encourages factors
of production to transfer to the non-tradable goods. This expands the non-tradable services,
crowding out the manufacturing (de-industrialization) and the non-export commodity traded
goods.
There is a vast literature of the e¤ect of commodity price on real exchange rate. For
Canada, Amano and Norden (1995) nd that the non-energy commodity price has a positive
impact on the real exchange rate of Canada while the energy commodity price has a negative
one. In another study, Chen and Rogo¤ (2003) detect a positive stable relationship between
the non-energy commodity price and the real exchange rate of Australia and New Zealand.
Concentrating on 58 developing countries, Cashin et al. (2004) investigate this relationship and
show that (in 19 of these countries) there is a long run relationship between the real exchange
rate and real commodity price.
Habib and Kalamova (2007) investigate the e¤ect of real oil price on the real exchange rate
for three oil exporters: Russia; Norway; and Saudi Arabia. Their results support a positive
long run relationship between real exchange rate and real oil price for Russia but not for the
other two countries. Using non-stationary panel techniques robust to cross-sectional dependence
and focusing on a large sample of developing countries, Bodart et al. (2012) show that real
exchange rate appreciates when commodity price increases. In contrast to other studies, they do
not use indices for the commodity prices of each country, but instead the price of the dominant
commodity.
These ve papers suggest that small developing countries heavily specialized in the
export of one commodity are vulnerable to the e¤ects of the Dutch Disease. This is exactly
the case with oil exporting countries in the Middle East. In the case of commodity exporters
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with xed exchange rate regime such as the Persian Gulf oil exporters, the real currency ap-
preciation is transmitted through ination. For the other commodity exporters, such as South
Africa, Chile, Mexico or Russia, which follow oating exchange rate regime, this appreciation
works through change in their nominal exchange rate. Studying the Middle East oil exporting
countries, the subsidized price of food and fuel may make it di¢ cult to observe clear empirical
evidence for the Dutch Disease. Although the government subsidises these prices heavily, they
obtain this subsidy by cutting something else. This high subsidising expenditure put more
pressure on scal sustainability over the long term. For oil exporting countries with a xed
exchange rate regime, this chapter proposes an alternative exchange rate regime to limit the
Resource Curse.
A wide range of policies have been proposed to limit the Resource Curse. Some, such as the
privatizing of oil resources in Russia and the oil fund in Venezuela, have failed. There have been
some successful ones, such as the Norway oil fund26 and the countercyclical scal policy in Chile.
In the Norway case, advanced political institutions have been able to avoid the Dutch Disease
and isolate the economy against uctuations of oil price. Therefore, the sound institutions and
rule of law appear to be a prerequisite for implementing e¤ective policies against the Resource
Curse. Unfortunately most commodity exporting countries in developing world do not have
these requirements.
Birdsall and Subramanian (2004) suggest another remedy for the Resource Curse in an oil
exporting country. In the case of Iraq, they propose transferring the oil revenue directly to the
people. This was tried in Alaska and the Canadian province of Alberta. In both cases, the
interest from the oil fund was distributed and not the revenue itself. Birdsall and Subramanian
(2004) justify this recommendation as follows: with the lack of proper institutions and in an
unstable political environment such as Iraq, distribution of oil windfall to the public keeps the
oil money out of the hands of an undemocratic government; therefore, it is welfare enhancing.
The direct distribution of oil revenue has its own problems: it is likely to put more pressure on
the demand side of the economy and cause higher ination; handing the money to the people
then taxing them to provide for government expenditure and public investment nance may
not be very e¢ cient. Perhaps, as Frankel (2011a) recommends, a mix of the Chilean style scal
policy and a monetary policy based on the proposal of this chapter may be a proper solution
for the Resource Curse.
26There are some investing funds (sovereign wealth funds) in GCC countries, such as: the Abu Dhabi In-
vestment Authority (ADIA) which is owned by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (one of the United Arab Emirates);
Foreign Holdings of Saudi Arabia (SAMA); The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA); and The Qatar Investment
Authority (QIA).
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2.2 The Macroeconomic Volatility and Procyclicality
In any assessment of macroeconomic volatility, developing countries are among the most volatile
economies. Loayza et al. (2007) describe three main reasons for this. First, this volatility may
be in the form of terms of trade shock for goods markets or a sudden suspension of capital
ow for nancial markets. Second, these countries are faced with internal shocks because of
policy mistakes and inconsistency in their development plans. Third, the lack of proper shock
dampening policies or tools may accelerate the volatility. Here, the nancial markets cannot
function the way they do in the developed world and usually macroeconomic policies, instead
of stabilizing and moderating volatility, increase volatility.
Often in the developing world, particularly in the developing commodity exporting coun-
tries, macroeconomic policy is procyclical (which is destabilizing) rather than countercyclical
or acyclical. Some part of this procyclicality is because of the swing in the commodity export
price of these countries in the international market, but the other part of the problem is their
mismanagement of their monetary and scal policies.27 One of the common characteristics of
these countries is the procyclicality of capital ow, scal policy and monetary policy. The cap-
ital market in these countries is imperfect. In theory, in a perfect capital market, countries can
borrow from the international nancial market and pay it back later. However, in an imperfect
capital market, which is the case for all the developing countries, they are not able to smooth
consumption and investment by borrowing during temporary downturns.28
Gavin and Perotti (1997) show that scal policy in the developing world generally is pro-
cyclical. Montiel and Serven (2005) calculate the correlation of government spending growth
and GDP growth as 0.5 for a typical developing country and zero for a G7 country. In another
study, using a sample of 56 countries, Talvi and Végh (2005) show that scal policies in the
US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and the UK are more acyclical while in those of
developing countries are procyclical. The two explanations in the literature for the procycli-
cality of scal policy are the imperfect capital market and political distortions. During bad
times, because of an imperfect capital market,29 spending must be cut. During good times, the
governments of these countries are under great pressure to increase spending.
The main reason for the procyclicality of scal policy is the political distortions which are
an institutional problem. Governments, especially the more populist ones, cannot resist the
temptation and the pressure from their people to spend more. Alesina et al (2008) investigate
the procyclicality of scal policy with a political agency problem. When voters see a boom,
27For example see Perry (2009).
28For more details see Kaminsky et al. (2005) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2009).
29See Gavin and Perotti (1997); Riascos and Vegh (2003).
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they ask for more public goods, services and lower taxes. This forces scal policy to be more
procyclical. According to their empirical results, the procyclicality of scal policy is more likely
to happen in more corrupt regimes. In a paper entitled "The Voracity E¤ect" Tornell and Lane
(1999) show that scal policies in many countries are determined by powerful interest groups.
They argue that, rst, lack of political institutional infrastructure and the illegal competition
of multiple powerful groups cause the voracity e¤ect which leads to lower economic growth.
Second, a positive shock to commodity price causes a more-than-proportionate increase in
scal redistribution.
Medas and Zakharova (2009), and Gavin et al. (1996) show that procyclicality of
scal policy is more intense in developing commodity exporting countries. Ossowski et al
(2008) conrm the major e¤ect of weak institutions for the procyclicality of scal policy in
the commodity exporters. Many other authors compare scal policy in the developing and
developed countries and document the procyclicality of scal policy in the developing world.30
The Persian Gulf oil exporting countries, as developing commodity exporting nations, have
also faced the procyclicality of scal policy. Their monetary policy has been constrained by
the xed exchange rate regime and open capital market; this leaves scal policy to manage the
major burden of macroeconomic stabilization. Figure 3, from Frankel et al. (2011c), shows
the correlation between government spending and GDP for 94 countries over the period 1960-
1999.31 It shows data for 73 developing countries (white bars) and 21 developed countries
(black bars). A negative correlation conrms a countercyclical scal policy and a positive
correlation a procyclical scal policy. As shown in Figure 3, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
are top on the list among all these countries in the procyclicality of their scal policy. The scal
policy in the UAE is less procyclical, and Kuwait is the only country among these ve Middle
East oil exporting countries with a countercyclical scal policy. The decade of the 2000s has
observed a major shift in the scal policy of some developing countries from procyclicality to
countercyclicality.
Figure 4 is the updated version of Figure 3, for 2000 to 2009, from Frankel et al. (2011c). We
see more white bars on the left side of the Figure which means a shift from positive correlation
(the procyclical scal policy) to negative correlation (the countercyclical scal policy) in a
number of countries. Among these are Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE. The establishment
30Tornell and Lane (1999), Kaminsky et al. (2005) and Ilzetski and Vegh (2008). Kaminsky et al. (2005)
in their study "When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies" based on a
sample of 104 countries, document the procyclicality of scal policy in developing world and in particular in
commodity exporting countries. Ilzetski and Vegh (2008) building a quarterly dataset for 49 countries covering
the period 1960-2006 conrm the procyclicality of scal policy in developing world, and support the idea of
"When It Rains, It Pours".
31More precisely, excluding the longer-term trends, it shows the correlation between the cyclical components
of spending and GDP. It is other version of evidence presented in Kaminsky et al. (2005).
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of sovereign wealth funds in these countries may explain this shift. Kuwait, surprisingly, shifts
from countercyclical scal policy to procyclicality. Qatar still follows a procyclical scal policy
during the 2000-2009 period, as it had done during the 1960-1999 period.32
As it indicated by the literature, the main remedy for a procyclical scal policy is the
implementation of the right institution. Frankel et al. (2011d) show that the cyclicality of
a scal policy is inversely correlated with a countrys institutional quality in terms of such
parameters as bureaucracy quality, measures of law and order and corruption. Christiano et
al. (2011) show in a stochastic model that, with sticky prices, the optimal scal policy should
be countercyclical. Better institutions cause more countercyclical scal policy. Here, Chile is
the champion. With the structural budget reforms of 2000 and 2006, a committee of experts,
not inuenced by political forces, was assigned to forecast copper price and control government
spending. This worked very well especially during the 2008-2009 recession.
The link between oil price and scal policy in the oil exporting countries is well documented.
However, is scal policy the only channel to transfer volatility from oil price to economy? Husain
et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between scal policy and economic cycles in ten major
oil exporting countries with the total of 50 per cent of world oil export. Using panel VARs of a
three-variable system oil price, government spending to non-oil GDP, and output they show
that the volatility in oil price is transmitted through scal policy to the economy and that it
hurts the welfare of the people.
For the impact of a volatile economy on welfare, Fatás and Mihov (2003) and Afonso and
Furceri (2010) investigate the welfare e¤ect of the volatility in government expenditure on
growth. Fatás and Mihov (2003) estimate that every percentage point increase in the volatility
of scal policy decreases economic growth by more than 0.8 percentage points. This is a huge
negative e¤ect on growth because of the procyclicality of scal policy. Afonso and Furceri (2010)
examine the e¤ect of scal volatility on growth for a set of OECD and EU countries from 1970
to 2004. The total expenditure negatively inuences the real growth of the GDP per capita
for the OECD and the EU countries. In particular, a percentage point increase in the share of
total expenditure decreases output by 0.12 and 0.13 percentage points for the OECD and for
the EU countries, respectively. In other studies based on the theories of irreversible investment,
Ramey and Ramey (1995), for 92 countries including the OECD countries, and Aghion and
Banerjee (2005), using an empirical cross-country method, explain the adverse e¤ect of the
32Based on the countercyclicality or procyclicality of scal policy in 1960-1999 and 2000-2009, Frankel et
al. (2011d) classify countries into four categories: Established graduates: these are countries that have always
been countercyclical. Still in school: these are countries that have continued to behave procyclically. Back to
school: these are countries that were countercyclical during the 1960-1999 period and turned procyclical during
2000-2009 period. Recent graduates: these are countries that used to be procyclical and became countercyclical
during 2000-2009.
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volatility of government spending on growth via its negative impact on capital formation and
investment. Indeed, in a volatile economic environment, the economic agent (which could be
the government, the private sector or a household) cannot decide optimally regarding saving or
investment; this negatively a¤ects economic growth.
For the procyclicality of monetary policy in the commodity exporting countries, we
describe the issue in a xed exchange rate regime. In the Middle East oil exporting countries
with a xed exchange rate regime, an increase in oil price causes expansion of money and credit
and this is followed by high ination. This is exactly what happened in the Middle East in
the oil boom of 2000-2008. When oil price decreases, money and credit contract, and recession
follows, such as occurred in Russia and Mexico in the 1990s. The proper policy against this
procyclicality of monetary policy of an economy under a xed exchange rate is to appreciate
currency when there is a boom in commodity price and depreciate it when there is a bust.
As commodity exporters, the oil exporting countries in the Middle East are not immune
from all the adverse e¤ects of commodity exporting described above. Although they have
high per capita income, their overall economic performance is poor. They have experienced
relatively low economic growth rate and a very volatile macroeconomic environment. On the
other hand, there is some improvement in education, health, and overall in the standard of
living, but these countries still su¤er from structural problems in their economies. For now,
a self-insurance policy in the form of oil funds may be helpful; however, for the long term,
focusing on the political economy, they should promote institutions and a Chilean style of scal
policy (conservative assumption of oil price) and expand their non-oil exports. That is the long
term remedy, but for the short and medium term, this chapter proposes and empirically tests
a monetary policy (close to Ination Targeting but with a di¤erent price index) to decrease
volatility in the macroeconomics of these countries. In the next section, we review some nominal
anchors which have been already tried or proposed.
3 Di¤erent Nominal Anchors for a Monetary Regime
A proper nominal anchor, as the essential part of a monetary policy for commodity exporting
countries, may moderate the booms and busts caused by a swinging commodity price. The
main function of a declared specic nominal target is transparency, with communication of
a target which public can monitor. Therefore, a nominal anchor establishes credibility for a
monetary policy and limits peoples expectations of ination. Frankel (2011b) argues, in a
non-stochastic model, that as long as the anchor is a nominal variable, the system functions
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properly and there is no di¤erence in performance of di¤erent nominal anchors. In contrast, in
a stochastic model, di¤erent nominal anchors have distinct e¤ects. There are di¤erent nominal
variables such as: money supply, exchange rate, the CPI and other alternatives. This chapter
proposes and tests an alternative nominal anchor which may work for commodity exporting
countries. The di¤erent variables serving as nominal anchors are explored next.
3.1 Gold
Under a gold standard, the central bank pegs the price of gold in terms of domestic currency.
It announces that it will exchange the currency for a certain weight in gold; therefore, central
bank must have enough gold reserves. Upon the demand of the people, the central bank must
always be ready to exchange gold for the currency of the country. From 1880 to 1914, the
price of gold was considered to be the only possible anchor, although it had its drawbacks.
An economy with gold as an anchor is hostage to the world gold market. Instead of gold,
Keynes (1938) and Graham (1941) proposed a basket of metals and minerals to average out
any price uctuation in a single commodity. As we will see in this study, if the basket contains
the exported commodities of a country, this may work. In contrast, it may fail if the basket
contains imported commodities.
3.2 Nominal Income Targeting
First proposed by Meade (1978), Nominal Income Targeting targets the future level of economic
activity in nominal terms. It was popular with macroeconomists in the 1980s. Because of
problems of measurement error and delay in data gathering usually encountered in developing
countries, it is di¢ cult to apply to them. Despite these di¢ culties, McKibbin and Singh (2003)
argue that Nominal Income Targeting is a proper anchor for developing countries, since these
countries are more vulnerable to supply shocks than developed countries. Using the theoretical
framework of Rogo¤ (1985), Frankel and Chinn (1995) show the superiority of Nominal Income
Targeting in facing import price shocks over the Ination Targeting regime. The Nominal GDP
Targeting does not have the problems of Ination Targeting facing supply shocks as it manages
to stabilize demand and dampens any adverse supply shock by dividing it between ination
and GDP. The number and inuence of economists who support Nominal Income Targeting
is growing. On 21st September 2010, the Federal Open Market Committee of the US Federal
reserve also discussed the possibility of a nominal income target.33
33From the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee on 21st September 2010.
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3.3 Monetarism
Under a monetarist regime, the central bank xes the growth rate of M1,34 but uctuations in
the public demand for money a¤ect velocity, which inuences the economy. In 1980, the US
Federal Reserve adopted the money growth rule; however, in 1982, the rise in demand for money
caused the cancellation of this policy due to threat of recession. Estrella and Mishkin (1997)
point out that Germany successfully implemented a monetary target; however, the credibility
of the central bank in Germany is not comparable with its counterparts in the developing world
and many countries in both the developing and developed world did not welcome Monetarism.
At the end of the 1980s, monetary policies based on money supply targets were almost
completely out of the fashion. The main criticism was the credibility issue. Atkeson and Kehoe
(2001) argue that money targeting is not visible and controllable by the public to monitor
the central banks behaviour in the way Exchange Rate Targeting does. After the failure of
monetarism, the peg exchange rate regime, as champion of the monetary regime, was able to
defeat hyperination in some developing countries such as Israel, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and
Brazil; this accelerated the adoption of the xed exchange rate regime.
3.4 Fixed (Peg) Exchange Rate Regime
In a xed exchange rate regime,35 the government announces the value of its currency in terms
of the anchor currency, and the central bank is committed to buy and sell its currency at the
xed rate. The Persian Gulf oil exporting countries follow a peg exchange rate regime; they do
not have the proper institutions and central bank credibility to go for a oating exchange rate
regime, which is the regime that the developed commodity exporters such as Australia, Canada
and New Zealand follow.
The academic literature of the advantages and disadvantages of various exchange rate
regimes (xed versus oating, as well as various intermediate regimes) is very large. In practice,
many factors inuence exchange rate regime choice, and the theoretical models cannot accu-
rately simulate the complexity of optimal exibility of di¤erent exchange rate regimes. Under
the xed exchange rate regime, the home currency is linked to an anchor currency, and the
uctuation of the anchor currency can produce volatility in the countrys international price
34In the US, M1 is dened as the total amount of cash plus the amount of demand deposits, travellers checks
and other checkable deposits.
35We use the term exchange rate to refer to nominal exchange rate not the real exchange rate. Few studies
propose real exchange rate instead of nominal exchange rate.
36
competitiveness in other export markets. In most currency crises, such as those of Mexico
(1994), Thailand and Korea (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999) and Turkey (2001), the rigid-
ity of exchange rate has been, if not the main factor, at least one of the important factors.
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) in "The Mirage of xed exchange rate" attack the xed exchange
rate. They encourage policy authorities to avoid relying for their credibility on an asset price
(exchange rate) which is dynamic by the peoples expectations.
In the next section, we will detail the advantages and disadvantages of oating and xed
exchange rate regimes. The possible exchange rate regimes are on a exibility continuum of
exchange rate regimes which Frankel (1999) describes in nine categories from the most rigid
(the currency union) to the least (the clean oat):
1. The Currency Union: two or more countries share the same currency. If a country aban-
dons its own currency and circulates the anchor currency, it is called the Dollarization.
It is not only applied to usage of the US dollar, but generally to the use of any foreign
currency as the national currency. For example Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama are in
a currency union with the US dollar. It is the rmest xed exchange rate regime.
2. The Currency Board: in contrast to a currency union, the country has its own currency
at a xed rate of exchange. It maintains unlimited convertibility between its currency
and the anchor currency. In a currency board, the central bank must have enough foreign
currency reserves to response to the peoples will to exchange their local currency and
to be able to back each unit of the domestic currency. Similar to a currency union, in
a currency board, the country does not have its own monetary policy, and authorities
are not free to expand domestic credit on their own. A currency board has its own
problems; choice of the currency to peg and the rate of pegging to the anchor are not
dened clearly. The other problem is the stability of the domestic nancial system while
there is no domestic lender of last resort.
3. The Rigid Peg: currency is pegged to a single foreign currency. For example; in the
Middle East, most of the oil exporting countries are pegged to the US dollar. Similar to
a currency board, the main component of a peg exchange rate regime is the existence of
a signicant amount of foreign reserves.
4. The Adjustable Peg: most countries that declare themselves as peg actually are not
following a rigid peg exchange rate regime. It is the exchange rate of the Bretton Wood
regime.
5. The Crawling Peg: in countries with high ination, the peg is reviewed and corrected
based on the di¤erences of the ination in the country and its main partners.
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6. The Basket Peg: the exchange rate is xed in terms of a weighted basket of several foreign
countries. For example, from 2007, Kuwait has pegged its currency to a basket of Euro
and dollar. Usually, in a basket peg, the o¢ cials do not release the weights.
7. The Band: authorities intervene when the exchange rate hits margins on either side of a
central parity. For example, from 1979 until 1999, the exchange rate mechanism of the
EMS was a band regime. In limit, narrow band functions similarly to a peg and a wide
band similarly to a oat.
8. The Dirty Float (Managed Float): a dirty oat respond to a 1 per cent change in demand
of the currency by modifying the supply by k per cent and allowing the rest of the change
to be released to the exchange rate. In limit, if k goes to zero, the exchange rate regime
approaches an exchange rate peg and if k approaches to 1, it goes to a pure oat exchange
rate regime.
9. The Clean Float: central banks do not intervene in the market, and the exchange rate
is determined by supply and demand in the market. The ideal clean oating exchange
rate regime does not exist; however, Australia and Japan follow a regime which is very
similar.
In this continuum of exchange rate regimes, most of the Middle East oil exporting countries
follow the peg exchange rate regime. In these countries, the business cycles are correlated
with oil price in the US dollar.36 On the other hand, the swing in the dollar is based on the
fundamental of the US economy not the Middle East Economy; therefore, locking currency to
the US dollar may not be a proper exchange rate regime. In a xed exchange rate regime, the
uctuations in anchor will create uctuations in the countrys monetary conditions which may
not match the characteristics of that country. To avoid this kind of uctuation, some countries
do not peg their currency to an anchor currency, but to a basket of currencies.
The basket peg exchange rate regime minimizes the adverse e¤ect of uctuations among
the major currencies. The weight for each currency could be assigned based on the percentage
currency composition of the total trade. Although the basket peg does not have the simplicity
and transparency of a single currency peg, it could reduce the volatility of the nominal and
real e¤ective exchange rate. Furthermore, as Iqbal (2010) argues, applying a band around a
basket peg makes for more exibility and moderation in the exchange rate regime; therefore,
the monetary policy has more space to support the scal policy.
Under the Bretton Woods agreement, from 1946 until 1971, the xed exchange rate
regime (peg to the US dollar) worked quite well. Similarly, in Europe from 1979 to 1992, the
36See Husain et al. (2008).
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European Monetary System (EMS) functioned properly. If such examples of a xed exchange
rate regime worked in the past, whether it works today or not depends on the current inuential
variables in new international economy. In recent decades, we have observed the appearance
of capital ow as a new signicant and inuential factor in the world economy. In the past,
countries controlled capital ow, and sometimes they enjoyed its benets. In the Asian crisis,
the capital control helped China defend its peg exchange rate regime. By removing capital
control, countries become much more vulnerable to speculative attacks. At rst glance, capital
control seems to be the solution but most probably the benets of the international capital
markets and foreign competition in the nancial sector dominate the costs.37
3.4.1 Advantages of Fixed Exchange Rate
As pointed out by Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) and Dornbusch (2001), the main advantage
of a xed exchange rate regime is the discipline argument of limiting ination. Policy makers
recognize price stability or limiting ination as the main goal of monetary policy. To control
ination, countries peg their currency to an anchor currency; typically the US dollar. A peg
exchange rate limits the ination rates for tradable goods, thus keeping ination under control.
Another argument for limiting ination by a peg exchange rate is the enhancement of credibility
through controlling the expectation of the people (the Psychological E¤ect). Edwards and
Meagendzo (2003) argue that the harder the peg, the more credibility is enhanced. A xed
exchange rate regime, if believed by the people, convinces them that they need not fear either
high ination or depreciation.
The discipline argument of a xed exchange rate regime should be evaluated against the
adverse costs of adapting a monetary policy which is not compatible with the local economy.
Frankel (2006) states that the optimal monetary policy for an oil exporting country facing a
swing in oil price is loosening monetary policy and a real depreciation when oil price declines,
and tightening monetary policy and a real appreciation when oil price rises. As Setser (2007b)
describes, proper reactions to a supply shock in the importing and exporting oil countries are
di¤erent. We should recognize the di¤erences between supply and demand shocks. A supply
shock is accommodated by loosening monetary policy (currency depreciation) in oil importers
and tightening monetary policy (currency appreciation) in oil exporters. In contrast, for a
positive demand shock, both oil importers and exporters should go for tighter monetary policy.
Sometimes the e¤ects of a supply and a demand shock on oil price are not clearly separable.
Therefore, adopting a currency anchor which, in its response to shocks, is not compatible with
the local currency may dominate the discipline argument of a peg exchange rate regime.
37See Williamson (2000) and Edwards (2002).
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Another problem with the discipline argument is that ination has a signicant degree of
inertia. Sometimes, without any fundamental reason, after implementing a xed exchange
rate regime, high ination persists and prices keep rising. Edwards (1998) investigates the
persistence of ination in Chile and Mexico after applying the peg exchange rate regime. In
both cases, ination had not declined much; therefore, the lack of credibility of a peg exchange
rate regime or other reasons, such as expectation of the people, may dominate the discipline
argument. Although the discipline argument of limiting ination works for both xed exchange
rate regime and a currency board, we should recognize the di¤erences between them
The currency board as a rm form of a peg exchange rate has more capability in ghting
ination. Argentina 1990-1994, Estonia in 1992, Lithuania in 1994 and Bulgaria in 1997 are
examples of successful implementation of the currency board to ght ination.38 In addition to
all its benets, the currency board has its own problems. In a currency board, the central bank
cannot expand domestic credit; it should completely give up its monetary independence. Under
a currency board regime; there is no lender of last resort for the banking system. Chang and
Velasco (1998) state that a currency board could limit the probability of balance of payments
crises only at the cost of making bank crises more likely; therefore, we could face stable, low
ination while the chance of banking crises increases. In contrast, in a peg exchange rate regime,
the monetary authorities can adjust the interest rate and a¤ect domestic credit by some open-
market operations. For both a peg exchange rate or a currency board, once ination is under
control, the exit strategy is an important issue. On some occasions, the disadvantages of a peg
exchange rate or a currency board soon outperform the advantages; in those cases, we need an
exit strategy as well.
The other two advantages of xed exchange rate are limiting competitive devaluations and
promoting trade. Limiting devaluation was one of the main incentives of establishing the Bret-
ton Woods System to create a cooperative outcome for the competitive devaluation (Currency
war). Examples include Great Britain on Black Wednesday and Asian tiger economies during
the Asian Crises of 1997. Another advantage of a xed exchange rate regime is facilitating
international trade and international investment by reducing transactions costs and exchange
rate risk. In an inuential research, Rose (2000) shows that xed exchange rate and, especially,
monetary unions increase trade and investment substantially. By applying the gravity model,
Rose argues that members of currency union trade with each other three times as much as with
similar trading partners. The threefold e¤ect is very great and caused much disagreement and
doubt. Initial studies attempting to test the validity of this relationship between exchange rate
volatility and trade could not recognize this link, however more recent research has conrmed
it.39
38In Argentina, ination decreased from 1,000 per cent in 1990 to 5 per cent in 1994.
39For example, see MacDonald (2007).
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Limiting the time inconsistency problem and promoting capital inow are the other
benets of a xed exchange rate regime. Limiting the time inconsistency problem is the case
when governments preference changes over time, in such a way that a preference, at one point
in time, contradicts another preference at another point in time. A peg exchange rate regime
can stop a government concentrating on short run objectives by sacricing long run outcome;
therefore, it helps governments resist any political pressure towards time inconsistent policies.
Another possible advantage of a peg exchange rate is increasing capital inow and consequently
promoting growth. This can however cause a lending boom, hurting the banking system and
causing nancial crises (Mishkin, 1998).40
3.4.2 Disadvantages of Fixed Exchange Rate
One prominent criticism of adopting a peg exchange rate regime is the loss of control over
monetary policy. The simultaneous combination of a xed exchange rate regime and open
capital markets with an independent monetary policy constitutes the Impossible Trinity. If the
exchange rate is pegged and capital is mobile, then the domestic nominal interest rate must
equal the foreign nominal interest rate. Lack of e¤ective local monetary policy is harmful,
especially when a country is hit by domestic shocks which are not correlated with business
cycles in the anchor country. A domestic monetary policy is a plus, but the existence of an
independent monetary policy does not guarantee its proper performance. Developing countries
usually do not have the developed political and monetary institutions to get the most out of
an independent monetary policy; therefore, these countries may be better o¤ adopting the
monetary policy of a proper anchor country through the xed exchange rate regime even with
all its negative consequences.
Transmission of shocks from the anchor country to the pegging country is another problem
of a peg exchange rate regime. For example, in 1994, the Federal Reserve in the USA increased
interest rates. This policy was made based on the USA economys requirements, but it had
very severe consequences for Mexico which had pegged its currency to the US dollar. This rise
in interest rates of the USA and consequently interest rates of Mexico hurt the balance sheets of
households, banks and non-nancial business, and it is one of the reasons for the 1994 nancial
crisis in Mexico.
Another aw of a peg exchange rate regime is its vulnerability to speculative attacks. De-
preciation under a oating exchange rate regime is likely to be much less and slower than
40Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show how a lending boom is a predictor of banking crises.
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devaluation under a peg exchange rate regime. In a xed exchange rate regime, it is possible
for the government to defend the currency by raising interest rate, but this causes damage to
the balance sheets of banks and non-nancial institutions. The losses in a failed defence of
the currency are more costly in developing countries, and the open capital market intensies
the cost. Three historical examples of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, the successful
attacks under the European Monetary System in 1992 and 1993 and the emerging market crises
of 1994-2000 prove that the fragility of a peg exchange rate is more severe under an open capital
market (Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1995).
Another challenge in a xed exchange rate regime, after choosing the right anchor,
is pegging to the right rate. The risk of being locked into a misaligned exchange rate is a
disadvantage of a xed exchange rate regime. The equilibrium exchange rate an exchange
rate based on the fundamentals  is the e¢ cient rate. Any divergence from this rate and
insisting on the wrong exchange rate is damaging. This is not the case in a oating exchange
rate regime where the exchange rate is not locked. However, even in a oating exchange rate
regime, there is a possibility of being far from the equilibrium exchange rate for some time.
In a xed exchange rate regime, especially if the trade of a country is concentrated
with those major currencies, the cross-rate uctuation (the uctuations of the anchor currency
against other major currencies) is another severe aw. For example, the Persian Gulf oil
exporting countries follow a peg exchange rate to the US dollar and have most of their trade
with Europe and Japan. In 1997, the appreciation of the US dollar against the Japanese Yen
appreciated the real e¤ective exchange rate of several East Asian countries which were pegged
to the US dollar and this accelerated nancial crises. In contrast, for a country with most
trade concentrated on its anchor, the uctuation of the anchor currency against other major
currencies is not severely damaging.
In addition to all the disadvantages of the peg exchange rate regime (such as loss of an
independent monetary policy, transmission of shocks from the anchor country to the pegging
country and the speculative attacks) Mishkin (1998) describes a criticism which solely applies
to the developing countries: the higher probability of nancial fragility and the likelihood of
a nancial crisis in a peg exchange rate regime. The developing countries do not have much
credibility in ination ghting, and usually their debts are short term and in foreign currencies.
Therefore, sudden currency devaluation puts pressure on banks, and rms cannot operate prop-
erly because they cannot easily access capital market. In contrast, in most developed countries,
the devaluation of a peg has little adverse e¤ect on the balance sheets of rms, banks and
households because their debts are mostly in their currencies, and the probability of nancial
crises is less. As Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) point out, a peg exchange rate regime may
cause excessive capital inows followed by a lending boom, which is a predictor of banking
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crises.
3.4.3 Floating Exchange Rate Regime
The primary reason why the exchange rate regime may matter is price stickiness. Friedman in
his classic 1953 essay "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates" introduced the oating exchange
rate regime as a tool, in a world with sticky prices, to isolate an economy from real shocks
(the Friedman Hypothesis). He argued that the oating exchange rate regime would not be
more volatile than pegs. This in fact is not universally agreed upon. Klein and Shambaugh
(2010) show that a typical oating exchange rate has more volatility than a peg; however,
Friedman (1953) argues that smoothly oating exchange rates create less volatility than the
large devaluation which usually happens in peg regimes. Under a exible exchange rate regime,
relative prices can adjust immediately through changes in the nominal exchange rate; however,
under a xed regime the changes are slow, and it takes time until excess demand in the goods
and labour market pushes nominal goods prices down. Therefore, exible exchange rate regimes
are likely to have smoother responses and quicker price adjustments to real shocks than xed
exchange rate regimes. Milton Friedman uses an example to describe the concept clearly: every
summer, it is easier to move to daylight savings time than to coordinate large numbers of people
and move all activities by an hour. Several authors empirically test and conrm the Friedman
Hypothesis.
To test the Friedman Hypothesis, Broda (2004) uses a post-Bretton Woods sample
(1973-96) of 75 developing countries to check whether the responses of prices to terms of trade
shocks, real GDP and real exchange rates di¤er systematically across exchange rate regimes.
Broda (2004) nds that responses are symmetric to shocks of di¤erent signs in the pegs and
asymmetric in the oats. The paper conrms that responses are signicantly di¤erent across
regimes and supports Friedmans Hypothesis. In this kind of study, using di¤erent methods,
categorization of an exchange rate regime between oating or peg exchange rate regimes is
vague. In one study, a currency is categorized as a peg, but in another, it is characterized as a
oat; therefore, it is possible to see some contradictions.
To implement a oating exchange rate regime, we need an independent central bank and
developed nancial markets. In this context, independence is usually dened as the central
banks operational and management independence from the government. Advocates of central
bank independence argue that a central bank which follows political pressure may face economic
cycles. In this case, to attract peoples vote, politicians may expand the economy without con-
sidering the long term health of the economy. For the nancial market issue, as markets develop,
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an exchange rate regime with more exibility becomes more feasible and attractive.41 Husain
et al. (2005) show that the performance of a exible exchange rate regime dominates a xed
regime only for more nancially developed countries, while Aghion et al. (2009) recommend an
exchange rate peg regime for countries with low levels of nancial development. The oating
exchange rate regime as a major regime in the developed world has its advantages.
Allowing a country to pursue an independent monetary policy is the main blessing of
a oating exchange rate regime. To some extent, a exible exchange rate regime can isolate the
domestic economy from external shocks. When the economy faces shifts in terms of trade or
exogenous shocks, in a xed exchange rate regime, monetary policy is constrained and cannot
actively react. In this case, the transmission of the shock to the real exchange rate takes a long
time while the real GPD and employment decline. According to Edwards and Yeyati (2005),
terms of trade shocks hurt economic growth more in a peg exchange rate regime, as compared
to a oating one. By allowing the currency to oat, the country can use monetary expansion
and currency depreciation to increase demand and boost output. In a peg exchange rate regime,
however, the central bank loses that exibility and must allow recession to run its course. In a
peg exchange rate regime with free capital mobility, this process could be intensied.
Earning seigniorage and existence of a lender of last resort are the other two advantages
of a oating currency. Seigniorage is partially lost if the rate of money creation is linked to
that of the external currency to which it is pegged. In a currency board or dollarization there
is no opportunity for seigniorage. In the Middle East oil exporting countries with high levels
of reserves, seigniorage is not an issue. As for the lender of last resort advantage, the central
bank is able to act that role for the banking system, and the main prerequisite for the existence
of an e¤ective lender of last resort is the credibility of the central bank.
More protection against speculative attacks and minimizing the role of tari¤s and quotas
are other advantages of a oating exchange rate regime. Reviewing the history of speculative
attacks, it is apparent that most of them occur in xed exchange rate regimes. To manage
a speculative attack, countries with a xed exchange rate regime need high level of reserves.
However, the possession of reserves cannot guarantee the stability of a xed exchange rate
regime. During a speculative attack, if the government insists on supporting the xed exchange
rate, they face serious nancial crises and quickly lose their reserves.42 On the other hand,
even in a oating exchange rate regime, the central bank must have some reserves to pay for
o¢ cial commercial transactions. The nal argument in the favour of exible exchange rate,
41Financial market development is dened by the ratio of private credit to GDP and the recommendation for
a proper exibility of exchange rate regime is a threshold of around 40 per cent.
42While Argentinas xed exchange rate provided short term benets, it caused the economys collapse in
2002. Although a peg to the US dollar could manage the high ination in short term, it was not a long term
solution.
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as MacDonald (2010) points out, is that if a oating exchange rate regime can equilibrate the
balance of payments, then the role of tari¤s and quotes is minimized.
3.4.4 The Hollowing of the Middle (The Corner) Hypothesis
During and after the emerging market crises of the late 1990s, there was an acknowledgement
of the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes which is called "The Corner" or "Hollowing of the
Middle" Hypothesis. Swoboda (1986) suggested the rst version of this hypothesis describing
an intermediate regime as an inconsistent and not credible exchange rate regime. Eichengreen
(1994) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤(1995) were rst to introduce the bipolar view (the free oat and
the peg exchange rate) as sustainable regimes. There are mixed empirical results supporting or
rejecting this hypothesis. Rogo¤et al. (2004) show the durability of intermediate exchange rate
regimes and reject the corner hypotheses. In contrast, Fischer (2001) shows the reduction of
countries with an intermediate exchange rate regime from 62 per cent in 1991 to 34 per cent in
1999. Fischer and Sahay (2000) conrm the shift from the intermediate exchange rate regime to
the corners (the hard peg and the oating) for 1991-1999. In another study, Williamson (2000)
accuses the IMF of misusing its authority to push exchange rate regimes to the corners. Since
the developed countries either peg (Euro in Europe) or oat, IMF (1999) suggests emerging
markets and developing countries must do the same and go for the hard peg or the oating, not
the intermediate exchange rate regime. In IMF (2003), there is a signicant change replacing
the de jure measure of regimes with the IMFs de facto43 classication. Focusing on ination
and growth, the IMF recommendation is a peg exchange rate regime for developing countries
and a oating one for emerging market countries.
At rst glance, it appears that there is a contradiction between the Impossible Trinity
and intermediate exchange rate regime. According to the Impossible Trinity, a country cannot
simultaneously implement the following three: the xed exchange rate regime, nancial market
integration and an independent monetary policy. In a world of almost free capital ow, we are
not obliged solely to take one of the two extreme regimes (The Corner Hypotheses), but there
is an option of sacricing a part of exchange rate exibility for partial monetary independence.
We can describe the intermediate exchange rate regime as a medium solution which works by
using only a part of all three factors (Frankel, 1999).
43The de facto exchange rate regime usually is di¤erent from de jure: countries real behaviour in managing
their exchange rate regime (de facto) is not consistent with what they claim (de jure).
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3.5 Ination Targeting
By the end of the 1990s, the peg exchange rate regime, monetarism and the gold standard
had already failed. There was a need for a fresh nominal anchor. Ination Targeting was
pioneered in New Zealand in 1990, and is now also in use by the central banks in Sweden,
the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. It became popular as well in Latin America
(Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Brazil) and in other developing countries (Turkey, Egypt,
South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa and Thailand, among others).
The main objective of a monetary policy with a market determined nominal exchange rate is
price stability or limiting ination. With Ination Targeting, we directly focus on the limiting
ination which is the ultimate goal. In contrast, with other nominal anchors, we use mone-
tary aggregate targets as an intermediate target to satisfy the nal objective which is limiting
ination. The Ination Targeting could be strict or moderated.
The strict version of the Ination Targeting is dened as a transparent policy which is
announced publicly and followed to control ination within a band of exact percentage. Mishkin
(1998) points out that Ination Targeting, which has a oor in addition to a ceiling, can reduce
output volatility. Therefore, negative shocks to aggregate demand are decreased by Ination
Targeting as are positive shocks.44 On the other hand, a strict focus on ination may lead
to large adverse e¤ects on output; therefore, some recommend exible or moderate Ination
Targeting. In the short term, such as under Taylor rule, this includes some weight on real
GDP growth in the target. For example Larrain and Velasco (2002) describe the experience
of countries such as Chile and Brazil with a moderate Ination Targeting policy which reacted
to the output gap and nominal exchange rate besides focusing on the ination rate. Switching
to a moderated version of Ination Targeting is not limited to developing countries. After the
international nancial crises that begin in 2007 with the US sub-prime mortgage crises, some
suggested adding equity and real estate prices to the Ination Targeting framework. However,
Ination Targeting, with all its successful performance, has its deciencies.
The absence of exogenous trade shocks and the existence of perfect capital market in the
theoretical models of Ination Targeting are two assumptions in Ination Targeting framework
which may not be satised in the context of developing countries.45 For the nature of shocks,
the developing commodity exporting countries are faced with exogenous not endogenous shocks.
44As Mishkin (1998) describes, this benet of Ination Targeting has been emphasized by the Canadian
monetary authorities.
45Frankel (2012a) conrms the vulnerability of theoretical models of Ination Targeting to terms of trade
shocks. First, they are not designed for open economies and second they are established based on the capital
perfect market hypothesis.
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The export markets for the manufactured goods and services produced by developed countries
are much more stable. The terms of trade shocks in the developed world are smaller and less
exogenous than in the developing countries. Therefore, Ination Targeting usually works better
in the developed world.46 It is already documented that the capital market in the developing
countries is not perfect, and these countries cannot smooth their consumption path through
the international capital markets.47 For the developed countries, the international capital ow
is countercyclical and smooths consumption, but in the developing countries the capital ow
is usually procyclical and often exacerbates external shocks.48 Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella
(2003) show that central banks in the developed world are more successful in implementing
their promised ination targets than their counterparts in the developing world.
In theory, a clean oating exchange rate regime is an important component of an
Ination Targeting framework. However, in practice, under an Ination Targeting policy, cen-
tral banks still do take care of exchange rates. This is the "Fear of Floating" of Calvo and
Reinhart (2002). For example, as Edwards (2006) shows, with the rise of commodity prices
in 2003, central banks intervened and limited the currency appreciation. In the opposite case
in 2008, because of the fall of commodity prices, they intervened and controlled the currency
depreciation.
In addition to a proper exchange rate regime, implementation of an Ination Targeting
regime has such prerequisites as proper institutions, communication strategies, and an inde-
pendent central bank. Our context is the developing commodity exporting countries where
lack of credibility, strong legal system and proper intuitions are major characteristics. Building
trust between government and people, and satisfying these requirements are a kind of long term
process and are not achievable in short run. Therefore, most it is likely that, being unable to
satisfy these prerequisites, most developing commodity exporters would not be able to adopt
Ination Targeting.
Masson et al. (1997) present two requirements for successful Ination Targeting in
developing countries. First, the CPI should be the only anchor. Second, the existence of an
independent monetary policy which is not limited by the scal policy. Usually, in Ination
Targeting, the CPI is the price index which is monitored; it can be the core (excluded food
and fuel price) or the headline CPI. An independent monetary policy in the expansionary
and contractionary form could be used to achieve the target. A successful Ination Targeting
monetary policy has some advantages.
46See Taylor (2002).
47For more details see Kaminsky et al. (2005) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2009).
48Kaminsky et al. (2005); Reinhart and Reinhart (2009).
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As outlined in Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Mishkin (1998), the main advantage
of Ination Targeting is its transparency. It can be easily monitored by the public; therefore,
it makes the central bank more responsible for controlling ination and overcomes the time
inconsistency problem. It communicates with the public and the markets about the plans and
objectives of monetary policy, and promotes accountability of the central bank for obtaining
its announced ination target. However, with all its benets, the Ination Targeting may not
always work.
Frankel (2012b) describes the main failure of Ination Targeting as the lack of response
to asset market bubbles. In 2008, central banks in some developed countries found out that
they had been focused too much on Ination Targeting while they did not take care of asset
bubbles and their adverse consequences. This is similar to the asset market crash in the US in
1929 and Japan in 1990. To cope with this problem, Greenspan recommends an expansionary
monetary policy to manage the crises, but solution has subsequently been proved not to work.49
In addition to the lack of response to the asset market bubbles, another problem of Ination
Targeting is the inappropriate response to supply shocks and terms of trade shocks.
Ination Targeting can be vulnerable to supply shocks. If the supply shocks are terms of
trade shocks, then the choice of the CPI as the price index on which Ination Targeting focuses
is particularly inappropriate.50 If the price of imports (food and oil) rises in the international
market, the Ination Targeting is actually procyclical (destabilizing). Food and fuel are a
considerable part of the CPI, the appropriate response based on Ination Targeting Monetary
policy is currency appreciation to control ination around its target. This is a wrong response,
precisely the opposite of what we want in accommodating an adverse shift in the terms of
trade. For example, the central banks of countries such as South Korea (an importer of food
and energy) have experienced this problem because of following an Ination Targeting policy
in the face of increases in the world prices of oil and agricultural commodities. If the price of
the export commodity in world market rises, a proper response for such improvement in the
terms of trade is the currency appreciation which Ination Targeting does not provide.
Another problem in implementation of Ination Targeting in the developing world is
the trust and credibility issue. In developing countries with high ination, the public is not
easily convinced of the ability of the government to apply the target, and it takes time and
e¤ort to establish trust. Therefore, Ination Targeting may be implemented in two steps. In
the prerequisite period, by joining a currency board, both the people expectations of ination
49It is interesting to know that Greenspan obtained his Ph.D. degree in economics from New York University
in 1977. His dissertation includes a discussion of soaring housing prices and their e¤ect on consumer spending;
it even predicts a bursting housing bubble.
50For example see: Frankel and Chinn (1995) and Frankel et al. (2007).
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and ination itself get under control; and then in the next step, the central bank can focus
on hard targets for ination. During this process, the monetary authorities must communicate
with the public and explain their intentions.51
In a comprehensive analysis of the alternative monetary policies for the developing
countries, we should take into account the breakdown of monetarism in the international -
nancial crises of 1982, the failure of exchange rate targeting of 1994-2001, and the Ination
Targeting problem with supply shocks and the asset market bubble during the 2008-09 crises.
This chapter introduces and tests alternative price indices which may work better for the com-
modity exporting countries. Therefore, our proposed anchor could t into the Ination Target-
ing framework, but with completely di¤erent price indices. A contribution of this chapter is to
consider the other price indices instead of the CPI as nominal anchor within what could still
be called Ination Targeting.
4 Classication of Exchange Rate Regimes
To evaluate the performance of xed and oating exchange rate regimes, rst we should cat-
egorize countries between these two regimes. In practice, it is not an accurate task since the
de facto exchange rate regime usually is di¤erent from the regime de jure: the real behaviour
of countries in managing their exchange rate regime is not always consistent with what they
claim. The other issue is that of dual exchange rates, an o¢ cial rate and a black (parallel)
market one. The behaviour of the black market rate may be considered if most transactions
are done in that rate.
Up to the 1990s, using the de jure exchange rate regime announced by countries in
the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions was the only
comprehensive categorization of exchange rate-regimes. In 1999, the IMF started to consider
the de facto classication based on actual exchange rate and reserves uctuations. Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) coin a phrase "Fear of Floating" to refer to the situation of some countries
which are de jure oating, but in practice which fear to oat.52 Alesina and Wagner (2006)
investigate which features of countries make them experience this Fear of Floating and show that
these are characteristically countries with good institutions. O¢ cially these countries follow a
oating exchange rate regime; however, they peg in order to limit exchange rate uctuations
and not to be labelled unstable, especially in the devaluation phase.
51For example, Chile in 1990 followed this policy. Another example is Israel. See Bernanke et al. (1999).
52Some countries, such as Japan and Australia, follow an Ination Targeting framework but follow a clean
oat exchange rate regime, which is de facto oating.
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In another study of exchange rate regimes categorization, "A Taxonomy of De facto
classication", Klein and Shambaugh (2010) review the three inuential de facto exchange rate
classication schemes, which are: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003); Reinhart and Rogo¤
(2004); and Shambaugh (2004).53 In each of these three studies, the classication schemes and
assignment rules are di¤erent. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) divide the continuum of
exchange rate regimes into three categories: the peg; intermediate; and oat regimes. This
categorization of countries considers the rate of change of the exchange rate and the volatility
of the reserves. On the other hand, using the most longitudinally complete data set of 150
countries over more than 40 years, Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) base their categorization on the
behaviour of the parallel market-determined and the o¢ cial exchange rate. In this study, if the
o¢ cial exchange rate is constant but the parallel exchange rate is changing, the country is not
categorized as having a xed exchange rate.54 Furthermore, Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) show
that for the post-World War II period, the o¢ cially announced exchange rate is not accurate
since most countries at some point either applied capital control or had a dual exchange rate.55
They carefully distinguish the free oating exchange rate regime from another exchange rate
regime which they call "Free Fall". This is an exchange rate regime with very high ination
or a failed peg. As Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) show, 41 per cent of transition economies
follow the "Free Fall" exchange rate regime. In any categorization of exchange rate regimes,
the free fall must be considered separately from the oating exchange rate regime. The third
study, Shambaugh (2004), unlike the other two exchange rate regime classications, is bivariate
(peg or non-peg category). In this categorization the focus is on the o¢ cial rate; therefore,
it is not proper for countries with a parallel exchange rate. Some correlation for these three
categorizations of exchange rate regimes is expected.
Klein and Shambaugh (2010) investigate the correlation of these three di¤erent ex-
change rate regimes classications by the percentage agreement between them. As expected,
the correlations are di¤erent, but there are overlaps among these categories; however, it is not
clear whether this is because of the characteristics and complexion of the classication or real
di¤erences in performance across regimes. Therefore, categorization of exchange rate regimes
is not an accurate and well dened task. Di¤erent assignment rules, the variety of samples
and diverse methodologies provide di¤erent categorizations of exchange rate regimes, and their
contradictions and di¤erences mean it is not possible to label one wrong and another right.
Indeed, a unique categorization may not be possible at all.
53Other classications are Moreno (2001) and Dubas et al. (2005). Dubas et al. (2005) use information in
e¤ective exchange rate to classify exchange rate regimes. Using three variables as inputs: the volatility of a
country e¤ective exchange rate; a bilateral exchange rate; and international reserves, they base their classication
by output of a multinomial logit choice problem.
54Malaysia is an example for this case. It introduced capital control to defend its peg but the parallel market
exchange rate was moving. Based on Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004), we cannot consider this case a xed exchange
rate regime.
55For example Belgium had a multiple exchange rate until 1990.
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5 The E¤ect of Exchange Rate Regime on the Real Vari-
ables
As Iqbal (2010) argues, to evaluate an exchange rate regime we need to prioritize the internal
and external objectives. The main internal objectives are stable growth and low ination.
The main external objectives are a sustainable current account, external competitiveness and
stability of the exchange rate. For di¤erent objective functions (for example, switching the
emphasis from growth and competitiveness to ination control) it is helpful to reconsider the
exchange rate regime and its corresponding macroeconomic policies.
The de facto classication of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004), Rogo¤ et al. (2004) can be
used to investigate the performance of di¤erent exchange rate regimes for developed, emerging
and developing countries. This shows that the oating exchange rate regime, in developed
countries, causes higher growth rate and less ination. For the developing countries, their
results conrm the peg exchange rate regime as the best regime. This investigation recommends
a crawling peg for the emerging countries which are almost integrated in the international capital
market but which do not have their own sound institutions as developed countries do. Rogo¤ et
al. (2004) also emphasize the unication of exchange rates for countries with multiple or dual
exchange rates. They show the adverse performance of di¤erent exchange rate regimes under
multiple exchange rates. Many studies have investigated the e¤ect of exchange rate regime on
trade volume, ination and growth.
For the impact of exchange rate regime on trade, as mentioned above, Rose (2000) "One
Money, One Market. . . ," inuenced the literature by its surprising results (Rose E¤ect). Rose
(2000) argues that countries in a currency union trade three times more with each other than
one would expect. He arrives at that surprising result using a Gravity-Equation approach to
data for bilateral trade among 186 countries for 1970-1990. Although, many studies  such
as Persson (2001), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Baldwin (2006) and Nitsch (2002) in
his paper "Honey, I Shrunk the Currency Union E¤ect on Trade" doubt the large amount
of trade boost, other studies such as Klein and Shambaugh (2010), Glick and Rose (2002),
Frankel and Rose (2002) and Rose and Wincoop (2001) partly conrm the Rose E¤ect.
For the e¤ect of exchange rate regime on ination, Ghosh et al. (1997), based on
the data of 140 countries from 1960 to 1990, conducted one of the rst studies. They nd
the average ination in a peg exchange rate regime is less than that of intermediate regimes,
and the ination in an intermediate regime is less than that of a oating one. This result is
conrmed by Moreno (2001) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) for annual data from
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1974 to 1999 of 154 countries, and Husain et al. (2005) from 1970 to 1999 of 158 countries. All
these studies are di¤erent in their exchange rate classication schemes and regressions, but all
conrm the association of the peg exchange rate regime with lower ination in comparison to a
oating exchange rate regime. Most probably, the discipline argument of a peg exchange rate
regime on monetary policy and the limiting of expectations of the people are among the main
reasons.
For the e¤ect of exchange rate regime on growth, Dubas et al. (2010) nd that de facto
xed exchange rate regimes have the highest growth rate. Although, the de facto exchange
rate regimes followed by countries are what matters, Dubas et al. (2010) show the de jure
exchange rate regime is important as well, especially when countries do not follow what they
claim to be following. This study ranks the growth performance of exchange rate regimes from
the highest to the lowest for the o¢ cial exchange rate regime (de jure) of counties and their real
actions (de facto) as follows: i) de jure oaters-de facto xers ii) de jure xers-de facto xers,
iii) de jure oaters-de facto oaters, and iv) de jure xers-de facto oaters. Several authors
focus solely on the e¤ect of the de facto classication on growth; however, as we emphasized
before, there is no unique de facto classication. In one study, a currency may be considered
as peg and in another study as oating. Two reasons may explain this: Applying di¤erent
methodologies may cause di¤erent classication outcomes, and the behaviour of countries as
regards their currency regime is dynamic; they may switch among all possible exchange rate
regimes. In fact, the literature is inconclusive as to the e¤ect of exchange rate classication
on growth. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) recommend limited exibility. Using annual data from
1974 to 2000 for 183 countries, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) conclude that the oating
regime is the best, and Ghosh et al. (2000) show that basket pegs and intermediate regimes
work better for growth.56
Many studies conrm the slight impact of the exchange rate regime on long run growth.
In growth models, economic growth depends on real variables such as saving rate, the rate of
population growth, the initial income and technology. Long run monetary neutrality implies
that no nominal variables have any real e¤ect on the economy in the long term. Baxter and
Stockman (1989) show that the real exchange rate volatility is di¤erent in peg and exible
exchange rate regimes, but their growth performance are not di¤erent. Klein and Shambaugh
(2010) study the e¤ect of exchange rate regimes on economic growth in a sample of 92 countries
over the period 1980 to 1999. Their results conrm that there is little impact of the exchange
rate regime on long run growth. Even so, the indirect channel for the e¤ect of exchange rate
56Other studies such as Husain et al. (2005) and Moreno (2001) conrm the ambiguity of this literature.
Moreno (2001) nds that generally a pegged exchange rate regime is associated with a high rate of economic
growth. Husain et al. (2005)) show a oating exchange rate regime is associated with a high economic growth
rate only for developed countries.
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regime on growth through trade may be valid. Rose (2000) shows that trade is increased by the
e¤ect of a peg exchange rate regime and, as Frankel and Romer (1999) argue, increased trade is
associated with faster economic growth. Therefore, there is an indirect impact, through trade,
from exchange rate regime to growth.
6 Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
Choosing a particular exchange rate regime should be considered in a framework of the do-
mestic and international characteristics of the country in question. There is no a ultimate and
exact criterion for the selection of the proper exchange rate regime. In general, it depends on
many parameters such as the economic objectives, level of economic and nancial development,
political system, and characteristics of the economy. Many authors applying theoretical and
empirical studies have tried to identify and explain the determinants of the exchange rate choice
as a vital decision in any economy. Di¤erent countries go for di¤erent exchange rate regimes. A
commodity exporting country may adopt a oating exchange rate regime to isolate its economy
from external shocks; another country may join a currency union to boost trade and import
discipline and credibility.
There is no a standard and accepted denition of optimality of an exchange rate regime.
Iqbal (2010) and Husain (2006) identify some criteria for the choice of exchange rate regime:
degree of involvement with capital markets, trade integration, balance sheet stability, credibility
of monetary policy, labour market and wage exibility, nature of shocks real or nominal and
their frequency, synchronicity and scal policy exibility. Using these characteristics, there is
no precise method to get to a denite recommendation for the right exchange rate regime.
Surprisingly, there are some studies which generalize recommendations for exchange
rate regime choice. Hanke and Schuler (1994) support the xed for all, Williamson (2000)
goes for intermediate regimes, and Larrain and Velasco (2002) recommend the clean oating
exchange rate regime. Even some international nancial institutions such as the IMF and
the World Bank are biased toward a particular exchange rate regime. The theoretical and
empirical literature on the determinants of the exchange rate regime choice is abundant and
extensive. We can categorize this literature into three main groups: the Optimum Currency
Area (OCA) theory; determinants based on the nature of shocks; and determinants based on
the characteristics of institutions and the political system.
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6.1 OAC Theory of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
From the theoretical point of view, the rst framework for exchange rate regime selection is the
OCA theory, originally formulated by Mundell (1961). The OCA is created to check whether
a currency should join a currency union or not; however, it has the capability to consider the
desirability of a xed exchange rate regime against a oating one. It describes the advantages
of xed exchange rates regimes in small and open countries, with a high level of trade with
those countries of the currency to which they peg.
MacDonald (2007) reviews the OCA literature and nds it to be mainly based on
three papers: Mundell (1961); McKinnon (1963); and Kenen (1963). Mundell (1961) argues
that if capital and labour are not mobile, then the country should go for a exible exchange rate
regime. McKinnon (1963) points out that the more open the economy is, the more proper is the
xed exchange rate regime. Kenen (1963) focuses on the level of diversication of an economy
as one of the OCA criteria. The more diversied an economy is, the more it is compatible
with a xed exchange rate regime. An OCA theory based on these three criteria could be
contradictory. For example, if a country has a closed but diversied economy, based on the
second criterion, it should adopt the oating exchange rate regime but according to the third
criterion it should go for the xed exchange rate regime.
Applying the OCA framework, Frankel (2012a) describes the characteristics which could
determine the choice of exchange rate regime. These criteria which support a xed exchange
rate, versus a more exible are: small size and openness, an anchor country with high trade
with the home country, symmetry of shocks between home and the anchor country, labour
mobility, countercyclical scal transfers, and proper level of nancial developments. All these
criteria are not permanently stable; some of them such as openness and income correlation may
be endogenous and change by time.
Evolution in the criteria of some countries may change the result of the OCA. Frankel
(1999) describes this: "The OCA criterion might be satised ex post, even if not ex ante" and
points to the membership of Sweden in the European Union. Even if Sweden did not satisfy
the OCA criteria when it joined the EU, it would have more trade with the EU afterwards
and higher income correlation and it would eventually satisfy the OCA criteria.57 In contrast,
there are other studies such as Krugman (1993) which argues that, by becoming a member
of a community such as the EU, countries have more trade and have to be more specialist in
their production. This reduces their income correlations, moving countries away from OCA
57Frankel et al. (1997) use a gravity model and show that membership of the EU increases trade with other
members of the EU by 60 per cent or more.
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satisfaction. A number of authors test the OCA theory empirically.
Among the rst empirical attempts to test the e¤ect of OCA theory on exchange rate
regime choice are Heller (1978) and Dreyer (1978). Dreyer (1978) conrms that the larger
countries follow a oating exchange rate, but this result for openness does not support the
OCA theory. Heller (1978), using ve characteristics of a country (such as its size, openness,
the degree of international nancial integration, ination, and the foreign trade pattern) shows
larger size (GNP), low degree of openness, higher ination, high degree of international nancial
integration and less geographic trade concentration all to be associated with a oating exchange
rate regime. Álvarez et al. (2011) survey the literature and conrm that the only variable which
empirically satises the OCA theory in exchange rate choice is the size of the country.58
6.2 Shock Theory of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
Departing from the OCA literature, Melvin (1985) argues that the greater the terms of trades
shocks (domestic money shocks), the more likely is a exible exchange rate (xed exchange
rate) to work. The Mundell (1961) and Fleming (1962) model conrms that countries with
volatile terms of trade should go for a oating exchange rate regime. Applying a bivariate
probit model of exchange rate regime choice based on the OCA theory, Savvides (1990) adds
some variables representing shocks and conrms that variables from the OCA theory and the
variables representing shocks are e¤ective in exchange rate regime choice. The main problem
with those two pure economic analyses (the OCA and shock theory) is that they do not consider
the preferences of the policymakers and the authorities who are the ultimate determinants. In
practice, in addition to the economic issues, the exchange rate choice has a political dimension.
In the same economic situation, but with two di¤erent political environments, the exchange
rate choice could be di¤erent.
6.3 Political Theory of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
In the 1990s, the institution and political theory of exchange rate regime choice entered into
the literature. Edwards (1996), as the pioneer of this eld, introduced a model based on a pure
economic quadratic loss function based on the trade o¤ between ination and unemployment.
58This is conrmed by MacDonald (2007).
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The model is extended by adding some political variables such as measures of countrieshistor-
ical degree of political instability. Applying a probit model, with a binary exchange rate regime
index as the dependent variable and using an unbalanced panel data set of 63 countries from
1980-1992, this study empirically shows that the more political instability a country faces, the
less is the probability of choosing a peg exchange rate; and the more political transfers between
parties, the more probability that a country adopts a exible exchange rate regime. This result
is conrmed by some other authors. Using di¤erent measures of political instability on a panel
of 125 countries between 1980 and 1994, Méon and Rizzo (2002) conrm the results of Edward
(1996). In another study, Leblang (1999) adopts a binary probit model in a sample of 76 de-
veloping countries over the period 1973-1994 to check the e¤ect of the democratic environment
on exchange rate regime choice. Leblang (1999) nds that democratic governments are more
likely adopt a oating exchange rate regime, whereas non-democracies prefer a xed exchange
rate regime.
Another issue is the link between institution and proper exchange rate regime. Alesina
and Wagner (2006) point out the possibility of endogeneity of the choice of exchange rate
regime with respect to institutions, rather than the other way around. As countries evolve from
the developing towards the developed stage, they are more successful in limiting ination, and
the ination benet of a peg exchange rate regime fades. During this process, institutions are
getting well established and as countries develop economically and institutionally, it is probable
that more exible exchange rate regimes are attractive. (Rogo¤ et al. 2004)
In contrast to the above three theories, the current literature does not support any
special guidelines in determination of the exchange rate choice. Alvarez et al. (2011), using
a panel mixed multinomial logit model rather than a cross section approach with data of 21
Latin American countries over the period 1980-2004, empirically check the three types of choice
determinants: (i) the OCA theory; (ii) the nancial view, which focuses on shocks; and (iii)
the political view, which emphasizes the role of institutions, political environment and policy
makersdecisions. The results conrm the ndings of Juhn and Mauro (2002) which emphasize
that there is no general agreement on the parameters inuencing exchange rate regime choice
by countries. Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010) using a broad set of the most widespread variables in
this literature and di¤erent methods of classifying exchange rate regimes, reconrm the results
of Alvarez et al. (2011) and Juhn and Mauro (2002). In another study, Alvarez et al. (2007)
compare the results of 41 studies of the above three approaches of exchange rate choice. The
size of a country is the only variable which is a clear determinant in the choice of a exible
exchange rate regime. Most probably, one of the reasons for the contradictory results in this
literature is the di¤erent classication of exchange rate regime.59
59The main three exchange rate regime classications used in this literature are: the IMF, Reinhart and
Rogo¤ (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).
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In a survey of exchange rate regime, Rose (2011) argues that similar countries choose
completely di¤erent exchange rate regimes without any di¤erent consequences for their economic
performance such as growth and ination. One example is the case of Singapore and Hong Kong;
and another that of Denmark and Sweden. Each pair, with almost the same level of income,
institutions, and openness, follow di¤erent exchange rate regimes. Rose argues that exchange
rate regime choice is a purely academic issue, and emphasizes that it is impossible to determine
a clear rule to explain how countries decide about their exchange rate choice; therefore, a certain
exchange rate regime, xed or oating, does not amount to a miracle. Therefore, according to
the characteristics of di¤erent countries, the optimal exchange rate regime, at di¤erent times,
is di¤erent (Frankel, 1999).60 Although, as one of the components of a macroeconomic policy,
exchange rate regime is important, before the selection of the exchange rate regime, we should
take care of the development of sound scal, nancial and monetary institutions.
7 A Proposed Anchor for Oil Exporting Countries
For the countries which have most of their revenue coming from oil export, some argue that
pegging to the US dollar is a proper exchange rate regime. Usually the production level is
not volatile, but the oil price in US dollars is. The peg exchange rate could be harmful, if the
volatility in government revenues is associated with volatility in the oil price.
As distinct from the developed exporting countries such as Australia, New Zealand and
Canada, the Middle East oil exporting countries are years behind in the prerequisites for the
oating exchange rate and the Ination Targeting monetary regime. On the other hand, their
performance under the xed exchange rate has brought them some painful experiences such
as the Dutch Disease.61 Previous work on the proposed exchange rate regime for commodity
exporting countries mostly has focused on its benets to stop debt crises. This is not the case
for the oil exporting countries in the Middle East which are creditors.
In 1999, Frankel62 pioneered a series of studies, some with collaborators: Frankel (2002);
Frankel and Saiki (2002) and Frankel (2003a). They introduce a proposal for the developing
commodity exporting countries: countries specialized in the export of a particular commodity
should peg their currency to the price of that export (PEP). The currency regime proposed
in these studies is not for everybody. PEP may work for small economies where a single
60The title of Frankel (1999) clearly describes the issue: No Single currency regime is right for all countries
or at all times.
61Arezki and Nabli (2012).
62Frankel references this proposal to Schliesser (2001).
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commodity makes up a large part of exports and their GDP. For such a country, a peg to
its export commodity may bring the credibility of a xed exchange rate regime as a nominal
anchor and at same time the exibility of a oating exchange rate regime. In PEP, a swing
in the commodity price in international market does not change the price of the commodity in
the local currency; therefore, the government revenue in the local currency is stable. PEP can
be seen as a special version of Ination Targeting as the CPI is the price of a barrel of oil in
the local currency. Following the rule that the price of a barrel of oil is constant in the local
currency, the central bank every day announces an exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar.
Frankel and Saiki (2002) study the low income debtor countries which are price takers
and export silver, copper, aluminium, wheat, co¤ee and oil.63 They assume that the local
elasticity of supply is equal to one and simulate the path for exports, the trade balance, debt
and reserves for the counterfactual peg exchange rate to the US dollar, Euro, Yen and the
commodity price. They conclude that the automatic mechanism of a PEP regime could partially
save those developing countries facing deterioration in the commodity price of their exports.
Frankel (2003a) concentrates on some oil exporting countries (debtors) such as Nigeria,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Cameron, Indonesia, Mexico and Russia.64 From 1970 to 2000, for each
of these countries, Frankel calculates the hypothetical price of commodity in local currency
under di¤erent pegs and paths for the current account and the debt/ export ratio. This study
concludes that not all countries in all periods benet from a peg to their export commodities.
In some countries, PEP was able to cope with the 1990s currency crises when the commodity
prices fell. The PEP mechanism automatically depreciates the currency; therefore, it stimulates
exports without changing the nominal anchor.
There are two issues with Frankel (2003a). First, in converting the nominal price of
the commodity in the local currency to the real in the counterfactual calculations, the analysis
is simplied by assuming that ination in each of the counterfactual pegs is exactly equal to
the actual ination in the country in question. Second, some of these countries are in the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and they are limited by their
quotas. Assuming the local elasticity of supply to be equal to one, and calculating that oil
export data in the counterfactual cases are not accurate; this analysis does not apply to the
oil exporters which are limited by their OPEC quotas. On the other hand, PEP is a kind of
radical proposal and there are some objections to it, but it deserves to be considered as one of
63For silver, Peru and Bolivia; for copper, Chile and Mongolia; for Aluminium, Jamaica and Surinam; for
wheat, Argentina; and for co¤ee a set of thirteen: the ve Central American countries, three in South America
(Brazil, Colombia, and Peru) and ve in Africa (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Cameroon and Madagascar). If a
group of exporters of a commodity all together apply the proposal to peg their currencies to the commodity,
the commodity price would be endogenous.
64Nowadays because of soaring oil prices, Russia and Venezuela are creditors.
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the alternative monetary regimes for the commodity exporting countries.
By linking the currency to a commodity price, we would destabilize the price of other exports
in dollars; this is the main objection to PEP. If oil price goes up by 40 per cent, PEP causes
the currency to be appreciated by 40 per cent, although the price of one barrel of oil in local
currency will be constant, the dollar price of other exports goes up by 40 per cent. This hurts
the diversication of exports and damages investments, business plans and markets for other
exports. However, the radical version of PEP can be moderated by including a basket of exports
or currencies instead of the price of one commodity. For Iraq, Frankel (2003b) proposes a peg
to a basket of currencies and oil price. There are other moderate versions of the PEP.
Frankel (2005) introduces a moderate version of PEP which is a peg to a comprehensive
index of export prices (PEPI).65 The denition of the PEPI regime is that it eliminates export
price variability. Most probably, a moderate version of PEP or PEPI could limit currency crises
which are followed by loss of credibility and shrinking output. Comparing the reactions of PEP
and Ination Targeting to terms of trade shocks could be a way of assessment of these regimes.
Frankel (2005) compares the response of PEPI or PEP with Ination Targeting. Under PEP or
PEPI, when the price of exports rises in international market, the currency appreciates. When
the export price falls, PEP or PEPI automatically causes depreciation in the currency. This
result is desirable and is conrmed by textbook theory.66 In contrast, Ination Targeting does
not provide this result.
If the price of imports increases, PEP outperforms Ination Targeting as well. This
is the major weakness of Ination Targeting. In response to adverse terms of trade shocks,
appreciation of the currency exacerbates swings in output and destabilizes the economy. For
example, in a country under Ination Targeting policy, positive oil price shocks (as in 1973,
1979 or 2000) require an oil-importing country to tighten monetary policy and to appreciate
the currency (to avoid the decline of national output) which is a wrong response. Frankel
(2005) conrms this by showing that exchange rates of all major ination targeting countries
(in dollars per national currency) are positively correlated with the dollar price of their import
baskets. In contrast, for a rise in import price, PEP and PEPI are neutral since they target
the export prices not the import prices.
PEPI can be moderated still further by targeting all domestically produced goods not just
the exporting goods. In PPT (Product Price Targeting) oil exporters target a price index with
65The target in the PEPI regime contains the goods which the country exports. As Frankel (2011b) points
out, this it is di¤erent from the proposals of Graham (1941) and Keynes (1938) which suggested a diversied
basket of commodities against the gold standard.
66Textbook theory says a countrys currency should be allowed to appreciate when world markets for its
export commodity are strong, and to depreciate when they are weak.
59
high weight assigned to oil; clearly this weight is much more than the weight of oil (fuel) in
the CPI, and excludes imports. As Frankel (2011b) argues, the main point in all the di¤erent
versions of this proposed monetary policy is the assignment of much weight on the exporting
commodities and less or no weight on the imported goods. Ination Targeting does exactly the
opposite. Another candidate could be the GDP deator, but it also has its problems: lags in
collection, measurement errors and only being available quarterly.
To evaluate PEP and PEPI, according to how they would a¤ect the variability of the
real prices of tradable goods, Frankel (2011b) compares seven alternative nominal targets, the
peg to the dollar, Euro, the SDR67, CPI; PEP; PEPI and PPT. The context is countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean which are price taker commodity exporting countries and
su¤er from procyclical international nance and volatile terms of trade. PEP beats other
regimes in any three criteria of the stability of level of nominal prices, level of real prices
and changes in nominal prices; therefore, for commodity exporting countries, PEP or PEPI
may work better than other monetary regimes. The ndings of simulations in Frankel (2002),
Frankel and Saiki (2002), Frankel (2003a,b) and Frankel (2005) are: under PEP, PEPI or the
more moderate version of the proposal, the developing commodity exporting countries would
be able to avoid some adverse e¤ects of the deterioration in their export revenue because they
would concentrate on the export price not the import one. Ination Targeting does it the
other way around. Therefore, for the Persian Gulf oil exporting countries with weak nancial
institutions and severe terms of trade shocks (swings in the oil market), Ination Targeting
may not be a proper monetary regime.
All Frankels papers reviewed above are about the comparison of PEP or PEPI with
other monetary policies on the country level. Setser (2007a) argues for a global advantage of
linking oil exporters currencies to the oil price. In addition to all the benets to oil exporting
countries, global adjustment will be less di¢ cult as long as the currencies of many large surplus
countries are not pegged tightly to the currency of a large decit country, the USA. In this
view, for the Middle East oil exporting countries, importing a monetary policy (pegging to the
US dollar) from the US, which is an oil importing country, is a policy mistake.
As we have observed, the peg exchange rate to the dollar in the Persian Gulf oil ex-
porting countries exacerbates procyclical swing in their macroeconomics. By rising oil price,
high government revenue leads to high ination and the Dutch Disease. Switching the anchor
from dollar to a basket contains the oil price and may help to smooth government revenue and
avoid the Dutch Disease and all its adverse consequences. Most probably, countries such as the
UAE which are successful in diversication of their economy and less dependent on oil revenue
67As from Dec. 2010, the value of one SDR is equal to the sum of 0.423 Euros, 12.1 Yen, 0.111 pounds, and
0.66 US Dollars. This basket is re-evaluated every ve years.
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might not be proper candidates for the radical version of PEP. PEP and its moderated versions
may be able to limit the macroeconomic volatility of these countries without much political
commitment with a cost that is comparable to the current xed exchange rate regime.
This chapter simulates the nominal and real oil prices of the ve Middle East oil export-
ing countries in local currencies under di¤erent counterfactual nominal exchange rate regimes.
We evaluate and compare the performance of the actual regime with the counterfactual pegs.
The chapter simulates government surpluses and government expenditure under a hypothetical
peg to the oil price and compares the results with other conventional pegs, such as a currency
basket68 as well as a peg to the dollar, the current exchange rate regime.
In all Frankels papers on PEP and PEPI, the aim is targeting the commodity price or
price index of the exports in the local currency. Targeting precisely a number, if not impossible,
imposes wild uctuation in exchange rate. One possible margin of moderation is the width of
the band; hence PEP or PEPI do not change exchange rate as long as the target in the local
currency is within the band. The width of the band can control the degree of moderation. Open
market operations to control the export price index inside the band could be done in terms of
foreign exchange or domestic securities. Another way of more moderation is to add a weighted
average of currencies of major trading partners69 to PEPI and to apply the band.
In all simulations, the real price (not the nominal one) of the commodity in the local
currency is considered. It is the real price of the commodity which makes the incentive for the
economic agents to switch between investment opportunities; therefore, we should deate the
nominal price of oil in the local currency by the general price level in the country in question.
Depending on the choice of the nominal exchange rate regime, price level and consequently
ination varies. In the case of pegging to the dollar, the ination in these ve oil exporting
Middle East countries is not equal to US ination. There is an inertia element which should be
considered. Hence, in an accurate simulation, ination is endogenous and should be estimated
in future research. This analysis should be done by use of the pass through literature. In
this chapter, we limit ourselves to consideration of the simple case; for all the counterfactual
simulations, we use the actual ination to get the real oil price in local currency.
68For the choice of the currencies in the basket, Meissner and Oomes (2009) suggest going for the currencies
that minimize the sum of the bilateral exchange-rate uctuations, weighted by the trade portion of each country
in total trade.
69For example Frankel (2003b) proposes one-third dollars, one-third Euros, and one-third oil.
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8 Data
We use four datasets; the consumer price indices and the bilateral exchange rates are from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, the oil productions and exports are
taken from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Manufactures Unit Value
(MUV) from the World Bank data and the oil price, government spending, government decit
or surplus for 1985-2011 all from DataStream.
9 The Model
In most of these ve countries, income and sale tax rate are zero,70 and the major part of
government revenue is from oil exports; therefore, with approximation, we assume that the
total revenue is equal to the revenue of oil export:
Re vt = Pt Qt (1)
Where
Re vt is Governments revenue at time t,
Qt is oil export at time t,
Pt is price of oil at time t.
As we have already reviewed in the literature, in these countries the link between the oil price
and the scal policy is well documented and the scal policy is the major channel to transfer
volatility from the oil price to the economy.71 Another line of enquiry in the literature documents
70In four of the ve countries, income and sale taxes are zero; in Saudi Arabia, income tax is 2.5 per cent.
71Husain et al. (2008).
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the negative welfare e¤ect of volatility in government expenditure on growth.72 Therefore, by
introducing an alternative exchange rate regime, we aim to decrease the volatility of the scal
policy and consequently enhance welfare and economic growth. The scal policy in these
countries is procyclical; therefore, the government expenditure increases when they face high
oil prices and decreases while oil prices go down. In the absence of the proper scal institutions
and under the inuence of multiple powerful groups and the voracity e¤ect, we assume the
governments of these countries use the oil price of the current and average preceding three
years to set the government spending in each scal year. We do not include the net foreign
assets in our model, because the data for this variable is not available, and it moves slowly and
often is I(2).
Expt = f(Re vt;Re vav) = + 1 Re vt + 2 Re vav + ut (2)
Oil revenue is calculated based on the oil price and the amount of oil export.
Expt =  + 1Pt + 2Pav + 3Qt + 4Qav + ut (3)
where73
Re vav is the average government revenue of preceding years,
Qav is the average oil export of preceding years,
Pav is the average price of oil of preceding years.
We do a set of counterfactual experiments, determining for each oil exporting country in
the Persian Gulf, how the volatility of government expenditure and would have changed, if they
had pegged their currencies to oil prices (the radical forms or the moderate one); to a basket
of oil, Dollar, Yen and Euro; or to a basket of those three currencies as compared to a peg to
72See Fatás and Mihov (2003), Afonso and Furceri (2010), Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aghion and Banerjee
(2005).
73Because of very high correlation of Qt and Qav, we remove Qav from our model.
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the US dollar exchange rate regime which they actually follow. We investigate the relationship
between the oil exports, the current price and the average of the preceding three years of oil
prices in the local currency with government expenditure. If these two prices could explain
government expenditure, we could reduce the volatility in government expenditure by reducing
the volatility of oil prices in the local currency.
To manage scal policy with less volatility, in the absence of functioning scal in-
stitutions (the Chilean style), a proper exchange rate regime could smooth oil prices in local
currency, and we achieve our goal which is the reduction of the volatility of government expen-
diture. For these countries, small, open economies, the oil price in the US dollar is exogenous.
First, we need to explore the possibility of a relationship between current and the average
preceding three years real oil prices in the local currency with government expenditure. Oil
revenue is calculated based on the oil price and the amount of oil exports.
Here are the regressions:
Expt =  + 1Pt + 2Pav + 3Qt + 1D1 + 2D2 + 3D3 + 4D4 + "t (4)
Where
Expt is the government expenditure as a share of output at time t,
Qt is the log of oil export at time t,
Pt is the log of real oil price in local currency at time t,
Pav is the log of the average real oil price of three preceding years in local currency, and D1
to D4 are the country xed e¤ect dummies.
Our hypothesis is that the current and preceding years oil prices can explain the government
expenditure as a share of GDP. After a few years of high oil prices, under public pressure
government increases its expenditure. On the other hand, a few years of low oil price makes
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government more cautious and it reduces its spending. Therefore, we expect to see a positive
relationship between government expenditure as a share of GDP and past oil prices (a positive
and signicant 2 in regression 4).
Although, in real world, oil prices and oil exports are not the only explanatory variables
for the government expenditure, the empirical results in regressions 4 conrm their signicant
e¤ect.
10 Data Analysis
To get a reliable country specic inference, we need a long range of data for government spending
of these countries. Unfortunately, these data are not available for long periods; therefore, we
pool countries into a panel. Another reason for the panel analysis is that, as Levin and Lin
(1992) show, the panel approach substantially increases the power of the unit root test relative
to the time series.
There are a variety of di¤erent tests with panel data which di¤er in terms of the assumptions
regarding the null hypothesis and the removal of autocorrelation. Levin, Lin and Chu (2002)
introduce the LLC test. In this test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF)74 is done for
each individual in the panel. A pooled t-test, asymptotically distributed under the normal
distribution, is then produced to test the null hypothesis. Another panel unit root test (IPS) is
introduced by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) which is an alternative to the LLC test. Instead of
assuming a common unit root process such as the LLC test; the IPS tests for individual unit
root processes and averages all the individual ADF test statistics. The null hypothesis in the
IPS test is that each series contains a unit root. There are two main di¤erences between these
two tests. First, the LLC assumes a common unit root for the series, but the IPS considers
individual unit root. The second is regarding the alternative hypothesis. In the LLC, the null
hypothesis is: each individual series is I(1), versus the alternative hypothesis that is: All the
series considered as a panel are stationary. In contrast to the LLC test, the IPS test has an
alternative hypothesis stating that at least one of the series is stationary.
Maddala and Wu (1999) introduce the Fisher test which combines the p-values from N
independent unit root tests ADF75 for each series. The Fisher test assumes that all series
74Dickey and Fuller (1979).
75Or the PP test based on Philips and Peron (1988).
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are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that at least one series in
the panel is stationary. Depending on di¤erent values of the N and T components, these test
statistics can lead to di¤erent results.
The four panel unit root tests for all variables are presented in Tables 2 to 6. The LLC test
assumes a common unit root for the series which is a strong statement; therefore, we base our
unit root analysis more on the other three tests. Table 2 and 3 report the results of our four
panel unit root tests for the log of current and the average of three preceding years of real oil
price in local currency. None of the tests reject the existence of a unit root in these variables.
These results are consistent with those of other studies which conrm the non-stationarity of
oil prices. Table 4 demonstrates the results of the panel unit root tests for the log of oil exports
in the Persian Gulf oil exporting countries. It yields very little evidence to reject the null
hypothesis of unit root. Table 5 and 6 illustrate the results of the panel unit root tests for
government spending as a share of GDP. All four tests, with signicance at 5 per cent level,
reject the null of unit root. This also accords with the boundedness of these two variables by
denition.
Table 2 - Panel Unit Root Tests for Pt
Method Prob Prob Prob
Null: Unit root (Assumes common unit root process (1) (2) (3)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.3174 0.0011 0.9760
Null: Unit root (Assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.8873 0.2835
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.9581 0.2977 0.9997
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.9856 0.3340 1.0000
Table 3 - Panel Unit Root Tests for Pav
Method Prob Prob Prob
Null: Unit root (Assumes common unit root process (1) (2) (3)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.0617 0.3402 0.9916
Null: Unit root (Assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.5196 0.7342
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.2991 0.5318 0.9975
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.8497 0.9008 1.0000
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Table 4 - Panel Unit Root Tests for Qt
Method Prob Prob Prob
Null: Unit root (Assumes common unit root process (1) (2) (3)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.0245 0.0400 0.1808
Null: Unit root (Assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.0657 0.5402
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.0608 0.3316 0.5656
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.0691 0.3742 0.5629
Table 5 - Panel Unit Root Tests for Expt
Method P value P value P value
Null: Unit root (Assumes common unit root process (1) (2) (3)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007
Null: Unit root (Assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.0218 0.0455
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.0095 0.0232 0.0133
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.0103 0.0221 0.0006
Notes: Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution.
All other tests assume asymptotic normality. For each test, the P values for the three following cases
are reported: (1) Individual intercept (2) Individual intercept and trend (3) None. The lag length is
chosen based on the Schwartz criterion.
11 Empirical Strategy
In both regressions 4 and 5, the variables on the right hand side of the equation are I(1) while
the dependent variable is I(0), thus resulting in an unbalanced regression.76 This can potentially
cause biased results and unreliable t-statistics and R2. When all variables in an OLS regression
are stationary, the conventional statistical measures such as t-statistics and R2 are the standard
approach. However, if all the variables are non-stationary, such conventional measures no longer
have the usual interpretation. A standard cointegration model, however, requires all variables
76Banerjee et al. (1993) refer to this type of model as unbalanced regression.
67
in the regression to be of the same order of integration. In contrast to these two standard
cases, here, we face a regression in which the dependent variable is integrated of order zero;
I(0), while the explanatory variables are integrated of order one, I(1). The regressors are not
stationary; therefore, the conventional statistical procedure is inapplicable. On the other hand,
the cointegration statistics are inapplicable, because the variables are not of the same order
of integration. However, Pagan and Wickens (1989) state that a minimum criterion for an
unbalanced regression is that the error term inherits the stationary property of the dependent
variable.
Table 6 presents the unit root tests for the error term of regression 4. We reject the unit root
hypothesis for both. Ba¤es (1997) expands on this and further suggests that if the dependent
variable is I(0) and at least two of the independent variables are I(1); the model can still
be considered well performing, if the predicted value of the dependent variable is also I(0)
and the variance of the observed and predicted dependent variable are equal. Regressions 4
satises these conditions; therefore, we pursue with level regression in 4. Finally, in the spurious
regression literature, as a rule of thumb, if low values of the DurbinWatson statistic (DW)
accompany with high adjusted R2, most likely we have a spurious regression. In regression 4,
the DW statistic is greater than the adjusted R2.
Table 6 - Panel Unit Root Tests for the Error Term of Regression 4
Method P value P value P value
Null: Unit root (Assumes common unit root process (1) (2) (3)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.003 0.000 0.000
Null: Unit root (Assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.041 0.071
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.020 0.029 0.000
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.076 0.026 0.0001
Notes: Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution.
All other tests assume asymptotic normality. For each test, the P values for the three following cases
are reported: (1) Individual intercept (2) Individual intercept and trend (3) None. The lag length is
chosen based on the Schwartz criterion.
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12 Empirical Results
We run regressions 4 for the ve Persian Gulf Oil exporting countries using their pooled data
of government spending as a percentage of GDP. Table 7 demonstrates that the current and
average of three preceding years of real oil price in local currency could explain government
spending as a share of GDP. In regression 4, for example, a 10 per cent increase in current
real oil price would lead to 1.4 percentage point decrease in government spending as a share
of GDP, and a 10 per cent increase in the average of last three years of real oil price in local
currency would lead to 0.7 percentage point increase in government spending as a share of GDP.
The result for Pav is consistent with our hypothesis that last years high oil price convenience
government to follow an increasing trend in its spending.
Table 7 - Results of Regression 4 - Gov Spending - The UAE is the Base Country
Expt Coef. Std. Err. t P value
Pt -14.87 2.02 -7.36 0.000
Pav 7.038 2.00 3.51 0.001
Qt -11.91 2.84 -4.19 0.000
D1 15.23 1.83 8.32 0.000
D2 -.068 2.82 -0.02 0.981
D3 6.85 3.61 1.90 0.063
D4 21.39 1.86 11.44 0.000
Cons 59.13 5.31 11.12 0.000
R2 0.85
Adj R2 0.83
Prob > F 0.00
A possible explanation for the negative e¤ect of current oil price on government spending
might be that the rise in oil prices increases GDP; therefore, government spending as a share
of GDP may decrease. Another explanation could be that our data for government spending
do not cover capital investment. By increasing oil prices, government may increase the capital
investment not the government spending of the same year, usually before the start of each
scal year; they must nalize their planned spending. For the e¤ect of oil export levels which
is limited by the OPEC quotas, as shown in Table 7, a 10 per cent increase in oil exports would
lead to 1.2 percentage point decrease in government spending as the share of GDP in the same
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year, which is very similar to the e¤ect of current oil prices. This is what we expect, since both
current oil prices and oil export levels directly inuence the current oil revenue.
12.1 The Counterfactual Exchange Rate Scenarios
Equation 5 presents the general form of exchange rate regimes; it covers a wide range of exchange
rate scenarios, from a radical peg to oil price (PEP) to a basket of Euro, yen and Dollar.
Ln(Et) = Ln(k=P
0
t ) + (1  ) [(1Ln($=e)t + 2Ln($=U)t + 3(Ln($=$)t] (5)
Where Et (Dollar=Local Currency) is nominal exchange rate at t,
i is the weights based on the relative trade share of the home country with each of its trade
partners where 1 +2 +3 = 1: In our counterfactual baskets, for simplicity all calculations are
done based on equal weights for these three currencies. Possibly applying weights corresponding
to the relative trade share of each country with the USA, Europe and Japan could attain better
results.
P
0
t is nominal oil price in US Dollar at time t,
If  = 1 , Exchange rate is pegged to oil price. (The PEP)
If  = 0 , Exchange rate is pegged to a basket of Euro, Yen and Dollar.
Using the Manufactures Unit Value (MUV), the nominal oil price in US dollar, the CPI
of each country and its counterfactual nominal exchange rate from equation 5, we calculate
the real oil price for each counterfactual exchange rate scenario. Based on the coe¢ cients from
regressions 4 and 5, we simulate government expenditure as a share of GDP. Although di¤erent
counterfactual pegs inuence the CPI di¤erently, to simplify the simulation, we use the actual
CPI of each country for all its counterfactual pegs.
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Table 8 to 12 present the volatility (Standard Deviation/Average) of government spending
for the ve Persian Gulf oil exporting countries under di¤erent exchange rate scenarios. The
volatility should be positive; however we calculate Standard Deviation/Average. Three coun-
terfactual exchange rate regimes which are compared to the actual regime are: a radical peg
to oil price ( = 1); a moderate version of the proposal ( = 0:5) with a basket of oil price,
Dollar, Euro and Yen; and nally a basket without oil ( = 0) containing Dollar, Euro and Yen
with equal weights. For government spending volatility, these results are consistent with the
growing debates in these countries regarding the need to depart from the current exchange rate
regime of the US dollar peg to other regimes. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar, switching from the
US dollar peg exchange rate regime to a basket of Dollar, Euro and Yen halves the volatility of
government spending. It is the same case for the UAE with 35 per cent decrease in the volatility
of government spending. Oman is the only country which faces an increase in its volatility of
government spending by shifting from the US dollar peg to a basket of Dollar, Euro and Yen.
Omans more concentrated trade with the USA could be a possible explanation for this. Adding
the oil price to the basket of Dollar, Euro and Yen, in all ve countries, decrease the volatility
of government spending. Except for Kuwait, a radical peg to oil price does not bring them any
benet in reducing the volatility of government spending. On the other hand, a radical peg to
the price of oil (PEP) would result in high volatility of the exchange rate as it swings in line with
the oil price in the international market. In all these countries, the expanding of non-oil export
is a part of their development plans; therefore, PEP could potentially destabilize the price of
other goods and services in the local currency and discourage investment and business in the
non-oil sectors. However, to remove the volatility of oil price and consequently the volatility of
exchange rates in the radical version (PEP) as MacDonald (2010) proposes, we could smooth
the oil price by a mechanical lter or by using the equilibrium price.
Table 8 The Volatility of Fiscal Policy (Qatar)
exchange rate Regime (St Dev /Average) of Expt
Actual 0.24
 = 0 0.14
 = 0:5 0.09
 = 1 0.07
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Table 9 The Volatility of Fiscal Policy (Oman)
exchange rate Regime (St Dev /Average) of Expt
Actual 0.11
 = 0 0.14
 = 0:5 0.08
 = 1 0.09
Table 10 The Volatility of Fiscal Policy of Fiscal Policy (Kuwait)
exchange rate Regime (St Dev /Average) of Expt
Actual 0.218
 = 0 0.217
 = 0:5 0.11
 = 1 0.05
Table 11 The Volatility of Fiscal Policy of Fiscal Policy (Saudi Arabia)
exchange rate Regime (St Dev /Average) of Expt
Actual 0.12
 = 0 0.05
 = 0:5 0.03
 = 1 0.04
Table 12 Volatility of Fiscal Policy of Fiscal Policy (The UAE)
exchange rate Regime (St Dev /Average) of Expt
Actual 0.20
 = 0 0.14
 = 0:5 0.07
 = 1 0.05
Three more points about the result of our panel analysis. First, by adding Iran to the
regressions, the results based on regressions 4 and 5 are ruined, perhaps because Iran is di¤erent
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from all other ve countries in many aspects: it is not an open economy, and does not have
a unique exchange rate. Second, we run regressions 4 and 5 for each individual country, only
for Saudi Arabia, we get signicant coe¢ cients and the calculated Expt and BSt are similar
to results of our panel analysis. Third, for Pav by switching from three to two preceding years
of average real oil price in the local currency, we do not get signicant coe¢ cient for Pav. It
seems that high oil price in last two years will not convince government to increase current
expenditure. Perhaps we need at least three years to see the governments reaction.
13 Conclusion
In last three decades, the US dollar peg has served these countries well by reducing trade and
nancial transaction costs, encouraging investment and providing a credible nominal anchor
for their currencies. This exchange rate regime has been consistent with the main criteria of
adopting a peg exchange rate regime such as wage and labour market exibility. However, it
has its limitations, particularity its recent inability to tackle ination. In the absence of an
independent monetary policy, the tools for controlling ination are limited. This is the case,
unless scal policy can be tightened signicantly which is subject to political impediments.
The high volatility in the price of oil coupled with the US monetary policy have had serious
implications for these countries in terms of domestic monetary policy and ination. While
these countries are pegged to the US dollar, most of their trade is with Europe and Japan. Any
uctuation of the US dollar against the Euro and Yen could be a destabilizing factor which
may hurt their economies. In addition, the weak synchronization of the US and these countries
business cycles increases the cost of maintaining a peg regime to the US dollar. Therefore, these
countries need to modify their macroeconomic policy and in particular should adopt a exible
exchange rate regime which could support scal and monetary policies in promoting non-oil
exports and management of ination.
The alternative exchange rate regimes range from peg to a basket of currencies, oating
exchange rate regime, peg to oil price and a peg to a basket of oil and currencies. In contrast
to the developed commodity exporting countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada
which follow a oating exchange rate regime, the Middle East oil exporting countries are years
behind in prerequisites related to Ination Targeting such as proper institutions, communication
strategies, and an independent central bank. The proposed exchange rate regime in this chapter
is a medium term solution for commodity exporting countries following the peg exchange rate
regime; this could smooth the transition of these economics in diversication of non-commodity
exports and development process.
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Focusing on the Fiscal Policy volatility, this chapter contributes to the literature of monetary
policies in the commodity exporting countries by considering other possible anchors within the
Ination Targeting framework. We simulate the nominal and real oil prices of the Middle East
oil exporting countries in local currencies under di¤erent counterfactual nominal exchange rate
regimes. We do a set of counterfactual experiments. For each oil exporting country in the
Persian Gulf, we determine how the volatility of government expenditure would have changed
if they had pegged their currency to oil price (the radical forms); a basket of oil, Dollar, Yen
and Euro; or a basket of these three currencies without oil as compared to a peg to the US
dollar exchange rate regime which they actually follow. In Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar,
switching from the US dollar peg exchange rate regime to a basket of Dollar, Euro and Yen
signicantly decreases the volatility of government spending.
Our results conrm the ongoing debates in the region on the necessity of departure from
the current US dollar peg to a more exible exchange rate regime. Based on the results of
our counterfactual experiments in this chapter, we recommend a gradual shift from the current
exchange rate regime to a basket of Dollar, Euro and Yen. In our model, we assign equal weights
to each of these three currencies, but in future research the weights of the various currencies
in the basket could reect the currency composition of trade. Furthermore, adding the price
of oil to the basket of these three currencies decreases even more the volatility of scal policy.
Meanwhile the volatility of the exchange rate should be monitored. In practice, applying a
band around the basket peg would allow the authorities to use monetary policy to support
scal policy in satisfying internal objectives.
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Part III
Equilibrium Exchange Rates in The
Persian Gulf Oil Exporting Countries
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1 Introduction
The real exchange rate is one of the main factors in the world economy. It has a major
inuence on the prices faced by consumers and producers throughout the world. It measures
the relative prices of domestically produced goods in comparison to international ones, and its
volatility and level can inuence the world economy. Furthermore, it is one of the important
determinants of the balance of payments (competitiveness) which allocates the resources of a
country between tradable and non-tradable goods and services. On an individual or company
level, the real exchange rate signals the choices between domestic or foreign goods and saving
or investing, and its variations may a¤ect many variables, such as: export, import, demand,
supply, commodity prices, government nances and employment. There are many questions
related to the real exchange rate as an important variable in world economy. This chapter
focuses specically on two of them: rst, is there a right or proper real exchange rate? Second,
how can we measure it?
The concept of equilibrium exchange rate has been the focus of governments, policy makers,
market participants, the IMF and academics since the 1990s.77 Therefore, often this topic has
been on the agenda of international policy summits such as the G20 meetings.78 In particular,
two key issues in the debate on global imbalances are estimation of equilibrium and of any
misalignment for both current account and exchange rates.
An exchange rate is called misaligned if its movements are not linked to the movements
of the fundamentals.79 It may impact the competitiveness of an economy, export and private
investment,80 terms of trade, foreign investment, growth rate, and cause global macroeconomic
imbalances. One of the important components of an economic policy which promotes economic
growth is an exchange rate based on equilibrium not a misaligned exchange rate. A misaligned
exchange rate adversely a¤ects the economy thorough overvaluation or undervaluation. The
former may cause currency crises and the latter, overheating.
Both overvalued and undervalued currencies adversely impact the economy, but the negative
e¤ect of overvaluation can be more serious. Several studies underline that real exchange rate
misalignment in the form of overvaluation moves resources away from productive activities,
77See Williamson (1994), MacDonald (1995, 2007), Stein (1995, 2002) and Driver and Westaway (2005).
78The Group of Twenty (also known as the G-20 or G20) is an international forum for the governments and
central bank governors from 20 major economies.
79Real exchange rate misalignment is the deviation of the actual real exchange rate from the equilibrium
exchange rate. Sallenave (2010) and Aguirre and Calderon (2005) show that average misalignments in emerging
economies are higher than in developed countries.
80See Caballero and Corbo (1989), Serven and Solimano (1991) and Rodrik (1994).
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hurts competitiveness and may slow down economic growth.81 Furthermore, through current
account decit and increasing external debt, an overvalued currency may cause currency crises
and facilitate speculative attacks.82 In contrast, a real exchange rate undervaluation stimulates
investment and exports and improves the current account. However, it also may cause trade
and currency war.
Currency war (competitive devaluation) is the phenomenon occurring where countries com-
pete against each other to achieve a relatively low exchange rate for their own currency and
consequently boost their exports. It causes international tensions, and has brought the equilib-
rium exchange rate and currency misalignments to the heart of the economic debates.
To comment on this controversial topic, we need methods for determining real exchange
rate misalignments and equilibrium exchange rates. Determination of equilibrium real exchange
rates involves substantial uncertainties such as the time frame (short, medium or long run),
choice and denition of the dependent variable (real exchange rate or real e¤ective exchange
rate), the model selection and the econometrics method. There is a vast literature covering fun-
damental variables inuencing the equilibrium real exchange rate and the mechanisms behind
implied misalignment of the actual rate from its equilibrium level.
In the last two decades, the literature on equilibrium exchange rates has mushroomed.
Three reasons may explain this wave of studies. First, with the introduction of the Euro, the
new EU member countries have to know the right exchange rate in order to join the Euro
club. Second, the volatile behaviour of certain currencies (such as the appreciation of Sterling
in the late 1990s, the fall of the Euro in 1999, the substantial decline of the US dollar from
2002 to 2008 and the behaviour of the Renminbi against the US dollar) have encouraged a
hot debate regarding the sources of exchange rate movements and the right exchange rates.
Third, exchange rates are one of the major factors inuencing global imbalance manifesting in
phenomena such as decits in the USA and surplus in China.
On the other hand, high uctuations in oil prices also cause signicant shifts in the wealth of
nations and can create large current account imbalances. With the rise in oil prices in the decade
of the 2000s, the major oil exporting countries have accumulated one of the largest current
account surpluses. This highlights the relationship between oil prices and global imbalances
and the role of exchange rates.
81For the negative relationship between real exchange rate misalignments and economic growth see Ganyaupfu
(2013), Bleany and Greenaway (2001), Razin and Collins (1997), and Edwards and Savastano (1999). Some
other empirical studies, such as Ghura and Greenes (1993) show the negative link between economic growth
and misalignment volatility. In another study, Engel (2011) even proposes that policymakers should target not
only ination and the output gap but also the exchange rate misalignment.
82See Kaminsky et al. (1997) and Razin and Collins (1997).
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In this chapter, we investigate the following questions: What factors are driving the real
exchange rates in the Persian oil exporting countries? Is there any misalignment between their
actual and equilibrium real exchange rates at present? To what extent has the evolution of
these countriescurrencies been consistent with equilibrium real exchange rates; and, over the
last decades, to what extent can economic fundamentals explain the path that exchange rates
have taken in these countries?
Oil price is becoming more volatile. From 2000 to 2008 oil price jumped (six fold) from
$23.5 per barrel in January of 2000 to peak at $146.7 in July 2008 then crashed to $42 at the
end of 2008. In 2009, prices began below $40 a barrel, averaging $61.73 per barrel for the year,
peaking at $78 in November 2010. In 2011, the price of crude oil started the year on a high
note hitting a 2 year high selling point at $95 a barrel. The price continued to trend upward
until 2012 (Figure 5).
In this chapter we consider a sample of ve oil exporting countries (Qatar, Oman, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE) in the Persian Gulf which depend heavily on exports of oil. In addi-
tion to other related fundamentals, we investigate in particular the role of oil price as the main
source of revenue and its severe exogenous shocks for all of these countries in determination of
the equilibrium exchange rate. Based on the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER)
approach of Clark and MacDonald (1998), this chapter assesses the equilibrium exchange rates
and misalignments between the actual and the equilibrium exchange rates from 1980 to 2011.
The rest of the chapter is set out as follows. The second section, "Real Exchange Rate: "De-
nition and Measurement" elaborates on the multilateral (e¤ective) or bilateral and nominal or
real exchange rates, and denes the equilibrium exchange rates. The third section, "Literature
Review" surveys di¤erent approaches for estimation of equilibrium exchange rate. In the fourth
section, we review the literature for the impact of commodity (oil) prices on the real exchange
rate and the equilibrium exchange rate in commodity exporting countries with a focus on oil
as a strategic commodity. Section ve describes the Data. The Empirical Strategy, based on
times series and panel methods, is presented in sections six and seven, respectively. In Section
eight, the Conclusion is presented.
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2 Real Exchange Rate: Denition and Measurement
We may consider di¤erent denitions for exchange rate.83 It could be multilateral (e¤ective),
or bilateral and nominal, or real with di¤erent price deators. For any given real exchange
rate, there are an innite number of combinations of nominal exchange rates and relative price
levels. In the study of equilibrium exchange rate, most models are based on the real e¤ective
rate determined by using di¤erent price indices. Although, in the short run, real and nominal
exchange rates tend to move very closely together, but most studies are focused on the real rate
not the nominal. As Stein and Allen (1997) conrm, economic agents use the real exchange
rate in their decisions. Therefore, almost in all analysis of equilibrium exchange rates, the focus
is on the real not on the nominal rate. Furthermore, the real exchange rate expresses the terms
of trade for domestic and foreign goods and services. It is dened as the nominal exchange rate
adjusted by the relative price between domestic and foreign goods and services. Higher price
ination at home relative to other countries, or an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate,
strengthens the real exchange rate. This makes the goods and services in the home country less
competitive and results in a foreign trade decit and higher unemployment. The depreciation
of real exchange rate causes the opposite. The real exchange rate can be dened in a variety of
ways depending on the question at hand. At the simplest level the real exchange rate is given
as follows:
Q =
E:P 
P
(6)
where : P , P ; E and Q are the domestic, foreign price levels, the nominal, and the real
exchange rates expressed as units of domestic currencies per unit of foreign currency, respec-
tively. Hence a rise in E and Q implies a depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate of
the local currency, respectively. In the logarithm forms:
q = e+ p   p (7)
We distinguish between the price of tradable and non-tradable goods in domestic and foreign
countries as follows:
83In this study, none of the countries has a black market (parallel) exchange rate.
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p = :pNT + (1  ):pT (9a)
p = :pNT + (1  ):pT (9b)
where: pNT and pNT are domestic and foreign non-tradable prices, respectively and pT
and pT are domestic and foreign tradable price, respectively.  and (1-) are the shares of
non-tradable and tradable sectors for the domestic economy, while  and (1-) are the corre-
sponding shares for the foreign economy. Substituting Equations (9a) and (9b) into Equation
(8):
q = (e+ pT   pT )  :(pNT   pT )  :(pNT   pT )	 (9)
Equation 10 shows that the real exchange rate is driven by two di¤erent components: the
real exchange rate of tradable goods and the ratio of the domestic to the foreign relative prices
of non-tradable and tradable goods. Therefore, if the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in the
tradable goods holds, then the real exchange rate of tradable goods (the rst term in equation
10) is zero. For an accurate analysis, in transition economies which faces dynamic structures,
we should consider the evolutions in  and  which are the weights assigned to various sectors
of the domestic and foreign economies.
Usually countries have multiple trading partners and the real e¤ective exchange rate is a
better representative of current account balance rather than focusing on its bilateral balances
with individual trading partners. A general expression for the real e¤ective exchange rate of
country i (Qi) is:
Qit =
nY
j=1
Pit

Eijt
P jt
wij
(10)
where Pi measures the domestic price level in country i; P j the foreign price level in country
j; Eij is the relevant nominal exchange rate (dened as foreign currency per unit of domestic
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currency between countries i and j); and wij is the weight of country j in e¤ective exchange rate
index of country i.84 Therefore, an increase in Eij implies that the currency has appreciated,
or alternatively that it has become less competitive.85The other issue is the denition of price
level.
The price level or price deator is not unique. Marsh and Tokarick (1994) and Chinn (2002)
conrm that the price deators which are used in the calculation of real exchange rate or real
e¤ective exchange rate are not necessarily correlated and may move di¤erently. Driver and
Westaway (2005) categorize these price deators to ve groups: consumer price index (CPI);
the prices of tradable goods; the relative price of export of an economy to its import; relative
unit labour costs and the ratio of tradable to non-tradable prices. They propose unit labour
cost and the unit value of export indices to measure the cost competitiveness of an economy and
the competitiveness of the tradable sector of an economy, respectively. Therefore, by applying
di¤erent price deators, we may focus on di¤erent measurements of real exchange rates. For
example, if a country produces di¤erent goods, a shock may change the terms of trade, but
not necessarily the CPI. Hence, in this case, the real exchange rate based on the CPI is not
very informative. Although the real exchange rates based on the CPI represent the changes
in non-tradable and tradable sectors, to focus solely on the tradable sector of the economy,
instead of on the CPI, we should apply unit value of the export indices or the producer price
index (PPI).
In our ve oil exporting counties during the period from 1980 to 2011, the nominal exchange
rate (for one US dollar) was at 3.64 in Qatar, 3.67 in the UAE. For Oman, it was 0.34 from 1981
to 1985 then xed at 0.38 up to 2011. The nominal exchange rate for Saudi Arabia increased
from 3.38 in 1981 to 3.75 in 1987 and then xed at 3.75 up to 2011. Over the 1980-2011 period,
for Kuwait, it was in a band of 0.27 and 0.30. Among all these countries, Kuwait is the only
country which followed peg to a basket of currencies in some periods. For 25 years from 1977
to 2002, Kuwait was pegged to a currency basket then in 2003 it switched to pegging to the US
dollar for 53 months. In May 2007, the Governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait announced an
ending of the peg to the dollar, using instead a basket of currencies with 75 per cent of weight
for the US dollar to set the price of the Kuwaiti dinar.
Figure 6 shows the real e¤ective exchange rate for the ve oil exporting countries over the
period 1980-2011. We can divide our ve countries to two subgroups and place Kuwait in the
middle. It is apparent that the Real E¤ective Exchange Rate (REER) of Oman follows the
84By construction, the sum of wij will be one. If the real exchange rate is a bilateral exchange rate then j = 1:
85Usually in the empirical studies, the real e¤ective exchange rate is dened as the nominal e¤ective exchange
rate in terms of foreign currency units per unit of the domestic currency. In contrast, in the theoretical models
the norm is to dene the real e¤ective exchange rate as the nominal e¤ective exchange rate in terms of domestic
currency units per unit of foreign exchange.
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Saudi Arabian REER, and the REER of Qatar and the UAE move together.
2.1 Equilibrium Exchange Rates
As Driver and Westaway (2005) argue, there is no unique denition for equilibrium exchange
rate, and it could be categorized based on the time frame (short, medium or long run). At
the equilibrium real exchange rate, there is no reason for the exchange rate to appreciate or
depreciate. Furthermore, it is not an observable variable; however, it may be dened as the
level of exchange rate which is consistent with the internal and external equilibrium (balance)
of an economy. An economy is in internal balance if the level of output is consistent with both
full employment and a sustainable rate of ination.86 The external balance is in equilibrium
if the current account balance is equal to its target level. The existence of a current account
decits increase the foreign debt and associated interest payments. The ratio of debt/ GDP
will increase if the growth rate of current account decit/ foreign debt exceeds the growth rate
of real GDP. To be in external balance, the ratio of foreign debt/ GDP should be at a tolerable
level.
In summary, based on di¤erent theoretical models, di¤erent time horizons and di¤erent
estimation methods, several studies categorize di¤erent approaches for estimation of equilibrium
exchange rate. On the other hand, there is a distinction between positive and normative
methods of determining equilibrium exchange rates. For the former, the equilibrium exchange
rate is related to a set of fundamentals while in the latter, we need to add a value dimension
to the process of determining equilibrium exchange rate.
3 Literature Review
The literature on the determinants of the equilibrium exchange rates is very broad. There
are several comprehensive surveys such as: Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998), MacDonald (2000),
Driver and Westaway (2005), Siregar and Rajan (2006), Costa (2005), MacDonald (2007),
Williamson (2009), Bussière et al. (2010) and Égert et al. (2006a) for transition economies.
The literature starts with the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), and then based on di¤erent
theoretical models, the studies such as Dornbusch (1988) focus on the link between real exchange
rates and macroeconomic variables. In the 1990s, Froot and Rogo¤ (1995) and Rogo¤ (1996)
86In some countries, several goods such as food or fuel are subsidised, these price controls could inuence
equilibrium exchange rate through the change in internal balance.
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describe the PPP puzzle. Moving from macro to micro models, Frankel and Rose (1995) go over
the micro-structure of the foreign exchange market. Among the methods for determination of
equilibrium exchange rate, we review the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER),
the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) and the Natural Real Exchange Rate
(NATREX) which are introduced by Williamson (1983, 1994), Clark and MacDonald (1998)
and Stein (1994), respectively.
Overall the literature consists of di¤erent methods, ranging from the purely statistical to
the purely theoretical, with some methods in between. In contrast to the FEER and NATREX
which are normative, the BEER approach, which we will focus on, is rather statistical and does
not have normative elements. Meanwhile, in the estimation methods of the BEER approach,
there has been a shift from cointegration analysis in pure time series for a specic country to
panel methods covering a group of countries. We pursue our literature review with Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP).
3.1 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
In the First World War, when countries faced di¤erent level of ination, the term "Purchasing
Power Parity" was coined by the Swedish economist Gustav Cassel in 1918. The PPP is the
usual starting point for investigation of the equilibrium exchange rate. It is built on the existence
of arbitrageurs and absence of di¤erences in factors such as transaction costs, transportation
costs and taxes. It consists of the choice of a base period in which the economy is assumed to be
in equilibrium. Therefore, the dynamic of prices level and nominal exchange rates are matched
to keep the real exchange rate constant. The PPP hypothesis is dened in the absolute and
relative versions.
The absolute PPP (APPP) does not provide an accurate measure of equilibrium exchange
rate, and it is derived by the ratio of price of basket of goods in home and foreign countries in
their local currencies.87 We may drive the condition of absolute PPP as:
Et =
Pt
P t
(11)
87In the literature, there is a wide range of baskets of goods and services. From a simple Big Mac Index, which
was introduced by The Economist, to the Penn World Tables constructed by the UN International Comparison
Program (ICP).
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Equation 12 may be expressed in logs as:
et = pt   pt (12)
Another way of presenting the APPP is in terms of the denition of the real exchange rate,
Qt :
Qt =
Et:P

t
Pt
= 1 (13)
so, if the APPP holds, the real exchange rate is equal to one.
The APPP is a long run relationship, and arbitrage is the mechanism which holds it. There
are at least three problems with arbitrage. First, in real world trade, there are transaction
costs. Second, goods are not identical across countries and third, the weights of goods in the
baskets are di¤erent in di¤erent countries.
As an alternative to the APPP, in the relative form of the PPP, the dynamic of nominal
exchange rate follows the ination di¤erential at home and abroad and keeps the real exchange
rate as a stable level (or stationary variable).
The relative PPP is obtained by applying the rst di¤erences operator () to equation 13:
et = pt  pt (14)
The relative PPP hypothesis closely links to the monetary models and ination. Deprecia-
tion of currency is a logical reaction for a country facing a high rate of ination.
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3.1.1 Empirical Studies of Purchasing Power Parity
Before the introduction of unit root test and cointegration methods, in the 1970s and 1980s,
the early empirical studies of PPP used traditional econometrics. These studies conrm the
violation of the PPP.88 In 1982, Jacob Frenkel surveyed the PPP literature and conrmed
the collapse of the PPP hypothesis. After the introduction of new econometrics methods in
the 1980s and 1990s, there has been much more interest in the empirical test of the PPP.
MacDonald (2007) categorizes the PPP empirical literature in the early period (1960s to 1980s)
and the recent empirical evidence of the PPP which is enhanced by unit root and cointegration
methods.
As MacDonald (2007) describes the early empirical literature for the relative and absolute
PPP were based on the following two equations:
et =  + 0pt + 1p

t + "t (15)
et =  + 0pt + 1p

t + ut (16)
To satisfy the absolute PPP hypothesis, in Equation 16, 0 and 1 should be 1 and -1,
respectively. For the relative PPP, in addition to the absolute PPP requirements,  must be
zero. Krugman (1978) applies equation 16 to the 1920s and the 1970s; he could not support the
PPP in both periods. In other studies, applying Equations 16 and 17, Frenkel (1980, 1981a)
tests both versions of the PPP hypotheses and gets contradictory results for the two di¤erent
periods. For the 1920s, the results are supportive of PPP while for the 1970s, they are not.89
Davutyan and Pippenger (1985) criticize Frenkel (1981a, b) for claiming the collapse of the
PPP in the 1970s. In their view, the strong coordinated monetary policy in the 1970s (in
comparison to the 1920s) is the main reason for rejection of the PPP. In two other studies for
the 1970s, Hakkio (1984), for monthly data, and MacDonald (1988), for annual data, document
some supportive results of PPP. Later in the 1990s, Lothian and Taylor (1997) nd that the
real exchange rate does converge towards PPP but only in the very long run (200 years). They
show that the mean reversion towards PPP is very slow and the half-life of shocks to the real
88See Isard (1977), Kravis and Lipsey (1978) and Giovannini (1988).
89Two more studies which reject PPP in the 1970s are: Roll (1980) and Cumby and Obstfeld (1984).
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exchange rate is between 3 and 6 years. In another study, Frankel and Rose (1996) nd a
half-life of 4 years.
Later, as the literature shifts from time series to panel analysis, the introduction of unit root
tests and cointegration methods encourage a new wave of empirical studies to test PPP. These
tests are done based on equation 16. If et; pt and pt are I (1); and the residual in equation
16 is stationary, then MacDonald (1993) denes this condition as the weak-form PPP. The
strong-form PPP exists, if in addition to the weak-form conditions, in equation 16, 0 = 1 and
1 =  1:
The review of the empirical PPP literature for the post-Bretton period conrms that PPP is
not a proper method of calculation of equilibrium exchange rate. Several studies such as Rogo¤
(1996), Sarno and Taylor (2002) and Cheung and Lai (2000) argue that real exchange rates have
a tendency to converge towards a stable rate in the long run. Using the method of Johansen
(1988, 1995), MacDonald (1993, 1995), MacDonald and Marsh (1994), and Cheung and Lai
(1993) support the weak-form of the PPP. Although, in these papers, we observe a kind of
support for PPP, the mean reversion in these studies is still very slow. For developed countries,
Rogo¤ (1996) estimates the half-life estimates to be around 3 to 5 years. Rogo¤ (1996) labels
this phenomenon as the "PPP Puzzle" which cannot be explained by sticky prices. It is a
puzzle, because if the price stickiness is the real reason behind the slow reversion speed of
real exchange rate, the delay should not be more than one year or at maximum two years. In
summary, the volatility and the slow mean reversion of real exchange rates together imply the
PPP Puzzle. There are several explanations for the empirical rejection of the PPP hypothesis.90
First, the PPP does not consider the capital ows and any real determinants of the real
exchange rate. For example, the classic Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect which is based on Balassa
(1964) and Samuelson (1964) is the major example which drives the nominal exchange rate
away from its PPP level. The Balassa-Samuelson Theorem presupposes that PPP is satised
for tradable goods, and productivity growth in the tradable goods sector of poorer countries
is higher than in more advanced countries. Such stronger productivity increases wages in the
tradable sector. If wages are equalized across sectors, this would cause a rise in the prices
of non-tradable goods, hence an appreciation of real exchange rate. Therefore, if a country
faces an increase in the productivity of the tradable sector (relative to its trading partners),
its real exchange rate would tend to appreciate. Consequently, its equilibrium exchange rate,
as an endogenous variable, is inuenced by changes in fundamentals. Indeed, for a group of
industrialized countries, MacDonald and Ricci (2001) demonstrate the importance of this e¤ect
in explaining the persistence of the real exchange rates.
90For developing countries, Cheung and Lai (2000) estimate the half-life for a given deviation to be around 1
to 2 years. However, Akram (2000, 2002) show that for Norway, as a developed country, it is 1 to 1.5 years.
86
Second, as Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005) argue, even though the Law of One Price (LOOP)
holds, in di¤erent countries, the existence of di¤erent baskets (which cover di¤erent composition
and weights) may cause the failure of PPP. Third, as Hegwood and Papell (1998) argue, struc-
tural breaks may cause the empirical failure of PPP. By considering this structural change,
we observe a faster mean reversion for real exchange rate. Fourth, as Taylor (2001) argues,
non-linearities in the adjustment mechanism may cause the empirical failure of PPP. Fifth,
the frequency of data is important; Taylor (2001) distinguishes the di¤erent results if we use
di¤erent frequency for data (annual rather than quarterly or monthly data). Observing the
PPP failures as a reality, there have been several attempts to improve the PPP puzzle.
For improvement of empirical results of PPP, Clostermann and Schnatz (2000) o¤ers three
solutions: rst, using longer data sets such as those of Frankel and Rose (1995). Second, we
may improve the results of PPP by introducing fractional cointegration. Third, literature can
shift away from time series and go for the panel methods which enhance the information in the
data.
Time series analysis however may be problematic, because the long data samples required for
statistical analysis may not be available, and the exchange rate regime change could inuence
the results. In the 1990s, with the introduction of the panel conintegration method and panel
unit root tests, several studies could produce better results for the PPP hypothesis. Using a
panel of 150 countries and 45 years data, Frankel and Rose (1996) investigate the PPP. Their
results are compatible with the results of the long time series. Therefore, applying a panel
approach in a group of countries could extract the information which is not attainable in times
series methods. In summary, traditional PPP, as a static equilibrium exchange rate which
ignores the real factors, is not successful in explaining equilibrium exchange rates. The failure
of PPP brings the attention of several authors91 to the link between the real exchange rate and
fundamentals, such as commodity prices, productivity and net foreign assets. Before moving
to the equilibrium exchange rate approaches which use fundamentals to explain real exchange
rate, we review an enhanced version of PPP.
3.1.2 The Monetary Extension of PPP
As MacDonald (2000) argues, the monetary model is an extended version of the PPP which
endogenises the price in two countries based on the supply and demand for money. Generally,
it is based on a two-country, two-money, two perfect substitutable bonds model in which all
goods are tradable, and the law of one price holds. The monetary model has another version
91See Meese and Rogo¤ (1983), Frankel and Rose (1995) and in MacDonald (1995).
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which is based on assumption of sticky price. In the sticky model, PPP does not hold for the
short run, but it does for the long run. Following Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005), the money
demand relationships are given by standard Cagan-style log-linear relationships:
mDt   pt = 0yt   1it (18a)
mDt   pt = 0yt   1it (18b)
where 0; 1; 

0; 

1 > 0;m
D denotes money demand, p denotes the price level, y is output,
i the interest rate. Lowercase letters indicate that a variable has been transformed into natural
logarithms (apart from the interest rate) and an asterisk denotes a foreign magnitude. We
assume the money market is in equilibrium. Therefore:
mDt = m
S
t = mt (19a)
mDt = m
S
t = m

t (19b)
then, using the conditions in Equations 18a, 18b, 19a and 19b, we obtain:
pt   pt = mt  mt   0yt + 0yt + 1it   1it (19)
Using Equation 13, which conrms the PPP theory, we obtain a base-line monetary Equation
as:
et = mt  mt   0yt + 0yt + 1it   1it (20)
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Dornbusch (1976) introduces the sticky-price version of the monetary model where PPP is
relaxed. However, the empirical evidence of the monetary models is not very convincing.
In a seminal paper, Meese and Rogo¤ (1983) show that monetary models might t well in-
sample, but their out-of-sample forecasting is very poor. They document that the forecasting
of monetary models for exchange rates even cannot beat a random walk, and the monetary
models which t the data for the 1970s are rejected when the data sample is extended to the
1980s.92 With all these pessimistic views, there are still some promising results.
For a group of developed countries, Husted and MacDonald (1998), Groen (2000) and Mark
and Sul (2001) apply panel methods to the monetary model of the exchange rate and present
convincing results for in and out-of-sample. Applying a multivariate cointegration technique,
MacDonald and Taylor (1994) are able to get positive results for the long run sterling-dollar
exchange rate. In another study, applying a nonlinear, exponential smooth transition autore-
gressive (ESTAR) model, Mark (1995) nds strong evidence of predictability at horizons of 2
to 3 years, but not at shorter horizons. Based on three structural exchange rate models, Chinn
and Meese (1995) fail in short term forecasting, but their long run results are slightly more
positive. In contrast to some positive evidences, other authors such as Cushman et al. (1996)
document the rejection of long run monetary model. In summary, the dominant view in the
literature still is that monetary models cannot forecast exchange rate in short run.93
The weak performance of the monetary models may be because of neglecting some important
real (non-monetary) shocks that inuence real exchange rate. For example, shocks (changes
in fundamentals) may be new scal policies, change in world price of commodities, changes
in productivity or discoveries of natural resources. After PPP and its monetary extension,
which are the starting point for examining the equilibrium exchange rate, the 1980s witness the
emergence of other approaches which emphasize the time varying nature of equilibrium exchange
rate, and its dynamic links to fundamentals. In the 1980s and 1990s, most equilibrium exchange
rate studies apply time series for individual countries. These studies usually su¤er from short
span of data; therefore, the results have not been reliable and robust.
In summary, as Costa (2005) argues, we can divide the equilibrium exchange rate approaches
into two groups: structural approaches and direct approaches. The structural approach is based
on the solution of a macroeconomic model when the model is in internal and external balance.
92Other papers such as Diebold et al. (1994) and Engel (1994) conrm the Meese and Rogo¤ conclusion.
93To explain and forecast the exchange rate in short run, in addition to the models based on macroeconomics,
there is other literature based on microstructure which uses the action and behaviour of traders in inuencing
exchange rates.
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In the direct approaches, we directly estimate equilibrium exchange rate based on an equation
which links the fundamentals to the equilibrium exchange rate or by decomposing the real
exchange rate with statistical or econometric techniques.
3.2 The InternalExternal Balance (IEB) Approach
In the IEB approach, the equilibrium exchange rate is dened as the rate which satised both
internal and external balance. Low ination and full employment satisfy the internal balance,
and a sustainable level of the current account manages the external balance. MacDonald (2000)
represents the general form of the IEB approach as:
S   I = CA(q0 ; Y ) =  KA (21)
Where S denotes national saving, I is investment spending, Y and q
0
are potential output
and real exchange rate consistent with internal balance, respectively.
Within the IEB approach, there are several di¤erent approaches for the equilibrium exchange
rate. Among them, we focus on the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange rate (or FEER) of
Williamson (1983) and the Natural Real Exchange Rate (NATREX) approach of Stein (1999).
3.2.1 The Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER)
The FEER approach (also known as the Macroeconomic Balance model), as a medium run
concept94 which was introduced by Williamson (1983,1994) and Isard and Faruqee (1998), is
a normative method and does not represent a theory of exchange rate determination.95 It is
the real exchange rate that simultaneously satises internal and external balances for a country
or for a number of countries. The external balance is described by a sustainable level of the
current account balance vis-à-vis other countries. The internal balance means that actual
production equals the potential production with a reasonably stable ination. As MacDonald
(2000) argues, the FEER approach can be implemented either within a full-scale macroeconomic
model or within a partial equilibrium framework.
94MacDonald (2007) considers the medium run as a period of 5 years in the future.
95Isard and Faruqee (1998) refer to the FEER as the macroeconomic balance approach.
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In a fully specied macroeconomic model approach, we assume the internal and external
balance and solve for the real exchange rate which is called the equilibrium rate; therefore,
the FEER is the level of the exchange rate that would remain stable if all markets were in
equilibrium. Unfortunately, the fully specied macroeconomic model is complicated but it
does have two advantages: rst, most of the models variables are endogenous; therefore, the
calculated exchange rate is consistent with a well dened economic equilibrium. Second, we
can track the dynamic of the model from short to long run steady-state.
In the partial equilibrium model, as Wren-Lewis (1992) suggests, the current account is
equalized to sustainable level of the capital account (stable net capital outows). In the medium
run, when the GDP is in its potential level, the real exchange rate which equates the current ac-
count to the structural saving-investment balance is called the equilibrium exchange rate based
on FEER.96 In this approach, money supply, domestic prices, domestic demand, employment
and other quantities are exogenous. Furthermore, the FEER based on the partial equilibrium
model ignores the possible feedback e¤ects from the real exchange rate level to the GDP. Even
by considering this feedback e¤ect, as Driver et al. (2001) emphasize, the estimate of the FEER
is not changed signicantly. More precisely, the partial-approach FEER is the level of exchange
rate that makes the current account balance equal to its target level, given that other markets
are in equilibrium. Here, we follow Akram et al. (2004) for driving the partial FEER.
Let us assume that the import (IM) is determined by the domestic income level (Y ) and the
real exchange rate (Q). If the nominal exchange rate is the price of foreign currency in domestic
currency units, then a rise in the income level has a positive e¤ect on imports (IM), whereas
a stronger real exchange rate has a negative e¤ect on imports. Then the import function is:
IM = IM(
+
Y ;
 
Q) (22)
Similarly, the export (X) is assumed to depend positively on foreign income levels (Y f ) and
the real exchange rate (Q):
X = X(
+
Y f ;
+
Q) (23)
Using Equations 23 and 24, the trade decit (TD) is a function of the real exchange rate,
domestic and foreign income
96See Isard and Faruqee (1998) and Isard et al. (2001).
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TD = TD(
+
Y ;
 
Y f ;
 
Q) (24)
The trade decit decreases with the income level abroad and the real exchange rate, but
increases with the income level at home. In most versions of the FEER approach, the level of
equilibrium current account, over the medium run, is exogenously determined. On the other
hand, current account can be described as follows:
Ca = NFAR  TD (25)
where the NFAR; as the returns on net foreign assets, is assumed to be zero or relatively
small when compared to TD and Ca is the currenct account. Solving for Q in equation 24:
Q = Q(
+
Y ;
 
Y f ;
 
TD) (26)
Estimating Equation 26, the FEER can be dened as the level of the real exchange rate
when the trade decit and domestic and foreign income levels are at their equilibrium levels:
QFEER = Q(Y ; Y
f
; TD) (27)
where an overbar indicates the variables are at their equilibrium levels.
The equilibrium level for the trade decit (TD) depends on the value of net foreign assets.
It can be set equal to the return of net foreign assets, if the net foreign asset is positive. In long
run, if there is no return from foreign assets, TD must be zero. In contrast, for the short and
medium run, trade decit can be set to a sustainable level of borrowing. Overall, the FEER
approach, as a normative method which is not built on a theory of exchange rate determination,
has some drawbacks.
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First, in the FEER approach, as MacDonald (2000) and Driver and Wren-Lewis (1999)
argue, the long run estimates are very sensitive to the method of estimation of the trade
elasticities (coe¢ cients in Equation 26). If the trade elasticities are not accurate then the FEER
will be biased.97Second, the FEER approach does not describe the path of exchange rate from
the current level to the long term equilibrium rate. Therefore, it ignores the short run dynamic,
and we do not know much about the dynamic path of adjustment toward the FEER. Hence, the
FEER does not take into account the interaction between deviations from equilibrium and the
equilibrium path itself. In this context, Bayoumi et al. (1994) and MacDonald (2000) mention
the possibility that di¤erent equilibrium values may have di¤erent dynamic adjustment paths
which conrm the existence of a "Hysteresis E¤ect" in the real exchange rate.
Third, to satisfy the internal balance as one of the conditions of the FEER approach, we
need to estimate the output gap. This is a controversial issue especially in developing countries
where the structure of economies is changing. In the literature, there are two methods to
manage the internal balance: applying a decomposition lter, such as that of Hodrick and
Prescott (1997) or Beveridge and Nelson (1981); or, as Égert et al. (2006a) suggest, we can
determine the magnitude of potential growth based on economic theory.
Fourth, the sensitivity of the FEER approach to the targeted sustainable capital account
is another problem. Driver and Wren-Lewis (1999) show that di¤erent assumptions for the
sustainable capital account lead to signicantly di¤erent exchange rates in the FEER approach.
For example, by changing the sustainable capital account relative to the GDP by 1 per cent,
the value of the FEER is changed by 5 per cent.98
Fifth, the FEER approach may not be a proper method of determination of equilibrium
exchange rate in two kinds of countries: countries with high economic growth and countries
which host large volumes of capital inow (large current account decits). In the case of large
capital inow, we need to predict how this capital inow will in future increase production and
boost the current account.
There are two methods of calculating the targeted sustainable capital account and conse-
quently satisfying the external balance of the FEER approach. The rst is the Williamson
procedure which is a normative method based on the judgment regarding the appropriate value
of the external debt to GDP ratio. For example, by assuming that the targeted current account
surplus is equal to 1 per cent of GDP, Bayoumi et al. (1994) estimate the FEER of major
currencies for 1970. The other way is to estimate the current account in terms of saving and
97Goldstein and Khan (1985) argue that most empirical studies estimate the trade elasticities to be very low.
98Borowski and Couharde (2003) show a high sensitivity of the FEER estimates to the choice of current
account norm.
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investment balances based on some explanatory variables, such as population growth, the scal
position or openness, then calculating the tted values for the current account.
In summary, decades after the introduction of the FEER approach, it is still not a perfect
method for examining equilibrium exchange rates. As we reviewed the drawbacks of the FEER
approach, there are serious sensitivity issues related to the assumptions of the building blocks of
the FEER. Several studies such as Buscaglia et al. (2011) empirically document the drawbacks
of the FEER, especially the sensitivity and uncertainties in the normative nature of the FEER.
They focus on the problem of the three building blocks of the FEER: the description of the
current account norm, exchange rate pass-through assumptions and the calculated elasticities.
Other studies in the equilibrium exchange rate literature criticize the application of panel
methods in the FEER approach for a group of heterogeneous countries, and the stability and
accuracy of the relationship between real exchange rates and output gaps. Overall, much further
work must be done on the FEER approach to make it a reliable benchmark in examining
equilibrium exchange rate.
3.2.2 Natural Real Exchange Rate (NATREX)
Based on dynamic stock ow model, Stein (1994) introduces the NATREX theory which is
an extension of the FEER, and similar to the BEER, the reduced form of the NATREX is
based on a cointegration method. Through a set of fundamental variables, it links the real
exchange rate to savings, investment and the current account. In contrast to the FEER which
is focused on medium term, the NATREX describes the dynamic of the medium to long run
when three conditions are satised: rst, unemployment is at its natural rate. Second, there
are no speculative and cyclical elements, and third, foreign debt and capital stock are assumed
to converge to their long run steady state.
Similar to the FEER, the economy is in equilibrium if the current account is equal to the
sustainable capital ows (net savings). Net saving is the function of saving and investment
which are inuenced by the rate of time preference and Tobins q ratio (link to productivity
in the domestic economy and abroad), respectively. Stein represents the time preference and
productivity measures by the ratio of the sum of private and public consumption to GNP and a
moving average of the growth of real GDP, respectively. As Sallenave (2010) argues, a rise in the
time preference rate (less savings) causes appreciation of the real exchange rate in the medium
run and its depreciation in the long run while an increase in productivity (more investment)
induces an appreciation in the medium term and has an ambiguous e¤ect in the long run.
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3.3 Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER)
Clark and MacDonald (1998) introduce the BEER method as a general approach to exchange
rate modelling which is not based on any specic exchange rate model. The behavioural mod-
els, in reduced form equation, usually identify the exogenous variables (fundamentals) which
inuence the internal and external balances. In contrast to the short term e¤ects of capital
ows, the fundamentals are expected to play a role over the medium term. Therefore, in con-
trast to the FEER, we do not need to be concerned about the current account and the external
position, as they are endogenous to the model.
Following Clark and MacDonald (1998), we dene Z1t as a set of fundamentals which are
expected to have persistent e¤ects on the long run real exchange rate, and Z2t as a set of
fundamentals which have persistent e¤ects in the medium run (over the business cycle). Usually
Z1t represents the terms of trade, net foreign assets and productivity while Z2t covers real
interest rate representing business cycle. Therefore, we represent the real exchange rate in the
following way:
qt = 1Z1t + 2Z2t + Tt + t (28)
where T is a set of transitory and t is a random error.
The current equilibrium exchange rate,q0t, is derived when we remove Tt and t from equation
29:
q0t = 1Z1t + 2Z2t (29)
The related current misalignment, cmt, is dened as:
cmt = qt   q0t = qt   1Z1t   2Z2t = Tt + t (30)
As the current values of the economic fundamentals can deviate from the sustainable lev-
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els, Clark and MacDonald (1998) also dene the total misalignment, tmt, as the di¤erence
between the actual and real rate given by the sustainable, or long run, values of the economic
fundamentals, denoted as :
tmt = qt   1
 
Z1t   2
 
Z2t (31)
Equation 32 can be rewritten as:
tmt = Tt + t +

1(Z1t  
 
Z1t) + 2(Z2t  
 
Z2t)

(32)
Equation 33 decomposes the total misalignment into the e¤ect of the transitory factors,
the random disturbances, and the extent to which the economic fundamentals are away from
their sustainable values. As we see in Equations 31 and 33, the BEER approach covers both
current and total misalignments. Other methods of the equilibrium real exchange rate such as
the FEER and the Capital Enhanced Equilibrium Exchange Rate (CHEER) present total and
current misalignment, respectively.
Following Clark and MacDonald (1998), the BEER approach is built on the uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP):
Et [et+k] =  (it   it ) + t (33)
where et is the foreign currency price of a unit of domestic currency, it, denotes a nominal
interest rate, t = t + k is the risk premium that has a time-varying composition, t,  is
the rst di¤erences operator, Et is the conditional expectations operator and t+ k denes the
maturity horizons of the bonds.
By subtracting the expected ination di¤erential, Et(pt+k  pt+k) , from both sides of
Equation 34, we get the real relationship:
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qt = Et [qt+k] + (rt   rt )  t (34)
where rt = it   Et [pt+k] is the ex ante real interest rate. Based on Equation 35, we can
explain the current equilibrium exchange rate by three factors: the expectation of real exchange
rate in period t+k, the real interest rate di¤erential with maturity t+k, and the risk premium.
Clark and MacDonald (1998) continue by assuming the time-varying component of the risk
premium term as a function of the relative supply of domestic to foreign government debt:
t = g(
gdebtt
gdebtt
) (35)
Assuming Et [qt+k] is determined solely by the long run economic fundamentals,Z1, they
denote the long run equilibrium exchange rate as:
f
qt = Et [qt+k] = Et [1Z1t] = 1Z1t (36)
In di¤erent studies a wide range of variables are assigned for fundaments (Z1t), these could
be the terms of trade (commodity price), the Productivity Di¤erentials (Balassa-Samuelson
E¤ect), Net Foreign Assets, Output Gaps, Openness, Government Spending (Fiscal Balance)
and Demography. Clark and MacDonald (1998) focus on three variables:
f
qt = f(tott; tntt; nfat) (37)
where tot is the terms of trade, tnt is the Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect, i.e. the relative price
of non-traded to traded goods, and nfa is the net foreign assets.
Equations 35, 37 and 38 imply the following general Equation:
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qBEERt = (rt   rt ; tott; tntt; nfat;
gdebtt
gdebtt
) (38)
Clark and MacDonald (1998) derive Equation 39 which is a reduced-form equation that
relates the current real exchange rate to the real interest rate di¤erential and to a set of
fundamental variables inuencing the long run equilibrium rate. As we have already mentioned,
the starting point for Equation 39 is the UIP; however, an important issue here is whether the
UIP is valid or not. In contrast to several studies such as Meese and Rogo¤ (1988) and Froot
(1990) which reject the relationship between real exchange rate and interest rate, there are
other studies such as MacDonald (1998) and MacDonald and Nagayasu (2000) which support
the UIP. In summary, the BEER approach is not built on normative elements; it relies on a single
equation approach and, applying either time series or panel methods, it can be implemented in
three steps.
First, based on cointegration methods, we investigate and estimate the exact form of the
relationship between the real e¤ective exchange rate and the fundamental variables. Second, we
need to determine the equilibrium level of any fundamentals which are signicant in explaining
the real e¤ective exchange rate. Third, substituting the equilibrium level of fundamentals from
the second step to the relationship in the rst step, we can calculate the equilibrium of the real
e¤ective exchange rate. The BEER approach has its pros and cons which will be reviewed in
the following.
First, applying cointegration methods, the BEER approach is a meaningful method for the
equilibrium concept. It is not complicated, and we do not need to investigate the detailed
mechanism of all factors involved in the economy, and the channels through which the real
exchange rate and the fundamentals are linked. Second, in the FEER approach, we estimate
misalignment indirectly by calculating the exchange rate for a normative level of current ac-
count while the BEER approach directly estimates equilibrium exchange rate and the possible
misalignment. Third, by including the interest rate, the BEER approach covers the short run
(cyclical) dynamic of capital account and consequently the current account and the behaviour
of the exchange rate. Fourth, in contrast to the FEER, in the BEER approach, we can analy-
sis the e¤ect of each fundamental variable on the movement of the equilibrium exchange rate.
However, with all its advantages, the BEER has several drawbacks.
First, by applying econometric methods to historical data, the BEER approach builds a re-
lationship between the fundamentals and the exchange rate. Especially in developing countries
where the structure of the countrys economy changes substantially, these data may not be
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reliable and represent the current status of the economy. Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2005, 2006)
argue that the usual BEER is built for mature economies where historical data may be used for
describing exchange rate levels. As an alternative to the traditional BEER, they introduce a
two-step procedure, the "Out-of-Sample" version of the BEER. In the rst step, after excluding
the transition economics, they apply the panel method to estimate the relationship between
fundamentals and the real exchange rate. In the second step, equilibrium exchange rates for
transition economics are extrapolated on the basis of the estimated structural relationships.
Second, as Cline and Williamson (2007) argue, the BEER approach is built based on the
assumption that the exchange rate is on average in equilibrium over the estimation period.
Therefore, it is not an absolute measure of the equilibrium exchange rate; it solely represents
an indicator of a countrys undervaluation or overvaluation relative to its own past averages.
Therefore, it does not (and cannot) take into account that a currency might be undervalued or
overvalued over the full sample. Third, lack of longer term data may hurt the BEER method,
especially in the studies based on time series analysis. Consequently, in the 1990s, we observe
a shift away from time series to the panel techniques in the BEER literature. Fourth, as Stein
(2002) argues, the choice of fundamental variables in the BEER approach is not based on any
theory or exact procedure.
The other important issue in the BEER literature is the choice between time series (single
country) or panel (group of countries) techniques. In contrast to the panel cointegration which
increases the e¢ ciency of the estimators, single country time series estimation may not cover
a long span of data and may consequently su¤er from low power. On the other hand, in the
panel methods, we impose the same long term parameters to di¤erent countries which may not
be appropriate.
There is an extensive literature of empirical applications of the BEER approach in de-
veloped, developing and emerging countries. A bulk part on the recent BEER approach is
about the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries which have joined the Euro. Égert
and Halpern (2006) in a meta-regression analysis show the overall result of this literature is
that the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciates with a rise in per capita GDP, the real
interest rate di¤erential, the terms of trade, productivity and government expenditure; whereas
it depreciates with a rise in openness, and the debt service ratio. Some other studies include:
Edwards (1994) for a panel of 12 developing and emerging economies; Dufrenot and Yehouh
(2005) for a sample of 64 developing countries; MacDonald and Dias (2007) for ten industri-
alised and emerging market economies that rank within the top 15 contributory economies to
global imbalances; MacDonald and Ricci (2004) for South Africa; Melecky and Komarek (2007)
and Babetskii and Égert (2005) for the Czech Republic; Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009) for the
G20 countries; MacDonald (2004) for Singapore; Elbadawi (1994) for Chile, Ghana and India;
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Spatafora and Stavrev (2003) for Russia; Kinkyo (2008) for South Korea; Doroodian et al.
(2002) for Turkey; Mongardini (1998) for Egypt and Mathisen (2003) for Malawi. In section 4,
we review some of the BEER studies for commodity (oil) exporting countries.
3.3.1 The Fundamental Variables of the BEER
The equilibrium real exchange rate is a dynamic path of real exchange rate over time which
is inuenced by the current and expected values of some fundamental variables which deter-
mine the internal and external equilibrium. In large economies such as the US, the exogenous
variables are changes in time preference and shocks to productivity while, in a small economy,
variables such as the terms of trade (commodity prices) and the world interest rate are con-
sidered as exogenous variables. A critical part in the BEER approach is the selection of the
fundamental variables.
As MacDonald and Ricci (2004) argue, the selection of most fundamental variables is based
on a simple neoclassical theoretical framework. In this model, across di¤erent countries, the
prices of tradable goods are equal; therefore, the change in the prices of non-tradable goods
causes the movements of the real exchange rate. In a realistic scenario, if the prices of tradable
goods across countries are not equal, in addition to the relative price of non-tradable goods, the
real exchange rate is also a function of the relative price of traded goods. Some of the candidate
fundamentals are:
 Net Foreign Assets
The e¤ect of net foreign assets99 to GDP on real exchange rate is controversial, and the
estimated impact of the net foreign assets position di¤ers across studies. Based on a
stock-ow consistent exchange rate model such as portfolio balance, we expect a positive
e¤ect of net foreign assets on the real exchange rate. Several studies such as Faruqee
(1995) for the USA and Japan; MacDonald and Ricci (2004) for South Africa; MacDonald
(2002) for New Zealand; Coudert and Couharde (2009) for a large sample of emerging and
developing countries; Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009) for the G20 and G7 countries; Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2008) for the USA and Euro Area and Gagnon (1996) the G20 countries
nd that in the long run, higher net foreign assets are associated with more appreciated
real exchange rates. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004) conrm that countries with
lower international net assets positions tend to have weaker currencies. With decrease
99As an alternative to net foreign assets, MacDonald and Dias (2007) introduce trade balance where a positive
long run relationship between net foreign assets and real e¤ective exchange rate implies a negative long run
relationship between trade balance and real e¤ective exchange rate.
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in net foreign assets (an increase in foreign debt) a country must increase its exports to
manage the higher debt servicing costs.100 We can explain the relationship between net
foreign assets and real exchange rate in two other ways: rst, through the wealth e¤ect,
a higher net asset increases the demand for domestic goods; consequently, the price of
non-tradable goods increases, then this appreciates the real exchange rate. Second, an
increase in net foreign assets can compensate a worse current account balance which is
linked to a more appreciated real exchange rate.
In contrast, some studies such as Alonso-Gamo et al. (2002) and Burgess et al. (2003)
nd a negative relationship between net foreign assets and real exchange rate for Lithua-
nia and the Baltics, respectively. In another study, using two di¤erent panels for the
Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and
the CEE countries, Égert et al. (2003) investigate the impact of the net foreign assets
variable on real exchange rate. The sign of the net foreign assets variable is positive for
the panel of the OECD countries while it is negative for the CEE countries. We may
consider the OECD panel results as the long run behaviour of the transition economies.
As Égert et al. (2006a) show, some of the CEE countries are already in their long run,
and they observe a positive impact from net foreign assets to real exchange rate.
The reason for the ambiguity of the e¤ect of net foreign assets on real exchange rate is
explained by the shortness of the sample period and separating the impacts in medium-
run or long run. As Detken et al (2002) argue, the real appreciation and decline in net
foreign assets (net capital inows) occur simultaneously when an increase in net foreign
reserves cause a depreciation of the domestic currency in the medium run but most likely
an appreciation in the long run. Based on the NATREX model with the net foreign
assets as an endogenous variable, Égert et al. (2006b) explain this process: a capital
inow decreases the net foreign asset and increases investment. This decline in net foreign
assets depreciates the real exchange rate in the medium run. However, when investment
boosts the trade balance thorough the current account, net foreign assets are increased
and consequently appreciate the real exchange rate in long run.
 Productivity Di¤erentials (Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect)
Since the 1980s, there has been a focus on productivity growth as a determinant of
the real exchange rate. Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) suggest that relatively
larger increases in productivity in the tradable goods sector compared to the non-tradable
goods sector are linked with a real appreciation of the domestic currency; or that the
real exchange rate should be positively related to productivity in tradable goods, but
negatively related to productivity in non-tradable goods. MacDonald (2000) describes
100Coudert et al. (2007) show that the US net foreign assets intermediate between oil price and the US dollar;
therefore, the e¤ect of oil price on the US dollar transmits through the US net foreign assets position which
reconrms the wealth e¤ect.
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several requirements for the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis. Terms of trade should be
xed; factors of production such as labour are mobile between tradable and non-tradable
sectors; production functions are constant return to scale and the assumption of perfect
capital movement is satised. A rise in the productivity of tradable goods increases
the wages in this sector. Because of wage equalisation across the economy, wages in
non-tradable goods are increased; hence, based on equation 10, we face an increase in
relative prices of non-tradable to tradable goods and consequently an appreciation of the
real exchange rate. However, the measurement of productivity has been a controversial
issue.101
Unfortunately, in most cases, there are no accurate data to measure the relative produc-
tivity per person employed; however, there are several proxies to measure productivity
di¤erentials. The rst one, which is employed by Macdonald (1998), Clark and MacDon-
ald (1998), Alshehabi and Ding (2008), Kakkar and Ogaki (1999) and Hossfeld (2010),
is dened as the ratio of the domestic CPI to the domestic wholesale or the PPI relative
to the corresponding weighted average of partner country ratios.102 However, Crespo-
Cuaresma et al. (2005) criticize representing the Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect with a relative
price term, because it picks up the demand side e¤ects in addition to the supply side
productivity inuences. In another study, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2009) argue that some
factors such as tax changes, the nominal exchange rate or relative demand e¤ects which
are not linked to the Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect may inuence the CPI/PPI ratio.103
The second proxy for measure productivity di¤erentials is real GDP per capita relative to
trading partners, which is used by MacDonald and Ricci (2004), and Chudik and Mon-
gardini (2007). Alexius and Nilson (2000) argue that this approximation is acceptable, if
the productivity growth in the non-tradable sector is similar across countries and most of
the total productivity growth is coming from the tradable sector. However, it has its lim-
itations. For example, Ricci et al. (2013) show that an equal increase in the productivity
of tradable and non-tradable sectors would increase GDP per worker; but in a small open
economy, it would not inuence the real exchange rate. They suggest that labour pro-
ductivity in tradable and non-tradable sectors is highly correlated with GDP per worker,
but the di¤erence between these variables is not. Therefore, GDP per worker may not be
a proper representative of Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect. As one of the fundamentals, Ricci
et al. (2013) use the di¤erence in output per worker between tradable and non-tradable
goods (relative to trading partners) which has a positive e¤ect on the real exchange rate.
 Output Gap
101For transition economies, see Égert (2002) and MacDonald and Wójcik (2004).
102Usually, the CPI basket covers a higher weight of non-tradable goods than the PPI; therefore, the ratio
CPI/ PPI may represent the prices of non-tradable to tradable goods. Even so, some authors such as Chinn
(2006) argue that the CPI may not be a good measure of non-tradable prices.
103Engel (1999) criticizes using the CPI/ PPI ratio as a proxy for the Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect also.
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The output gap in the domestic economy relative to the output gap in the trading partner
economies could be one of the fundamentals inuencing real exchange rate. MacDonald
(2002), applying the BEER approach for New Zealand, considers this variable among
the fundamentals in this study and presents two reasons for this. First, it can represent
growth potential and, second, it provides the counterfactual experiences as can the FEER
approach.
 Unemployment rate
Wadhwani (1999) in a BEER study for the UK Pound-Deutsche Mark exchange rate
considers the relative unemployment rate as one of the fundamentals which inuences real
exchange rate. The relative unemployment rate could be a representative of the output
gap. Wadhwani (1999) explains this relationship based on two arguments. First, the
relative unemployment rate may represent the supply side; therefore, international capital
and investment may ow into the countries with lower unemployment rates. Second, when
employment falls the external balance will worsen and consequently the exchange rate
should depreciate. Therefore, a relatively high unemployment rate in a country signals
the worsening of the current account and hence depreciation of its currency.
 Openness
This is a proxy for trade restrictions which is dened as the ratio of exports plus imports
to GDP. Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005) emphasize that this variable is more likely to be
relevant for developing or emerging countries than for industrial ones. The e¤ect of
openness on real exchange rate is ambiguous as it depends on the e¤ect of openness on
the current account. If the current account decreases, the real exchange rate depreciates,
and if the current account improves, it appreciates. Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) argue
that a more open trade regime is likely to decrease the price of tradable goods which
therefore lowers the overall price level and depreciate real exchange rate. Another issue
is the endogeneity of the openness to the real exchange rate which could be corrected by
proper econometric methods.
 Government Spending (Fiscal Balance)
The impact of government spending as a percentage of GDP relative to trading partners
on the exchange rate is controversial. The main point here is to distinguish the compo-
sition of government spending. Depending on how the government spending is divided
between traded or non-traded goods, it impacts the real exchange rate di¤erently. De
Gregorio et al (1994) and Galstyan and Lane (2009) conrm that if most government
spending goes to non-tradable goods, then it increase the relative price of non-tradable
goods and cause appreciation of the real exchange rate. However, if most government
spending goes to tradable goods, we do not face appreciation. Other studies such as
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Dibooglu (1996) and Iossifov and Loukoianova (2007), show that if government spending
goes toward non-tradable (or tradable) goods, it appreciates (or depreciates) the real ex-
change rate. In reality, it seems that government spending is more focused on non-tradable
goods; therefore, we may observe an increase in the price of non-tradable goods leading to
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Rogo¤ (1992) conrms this by modication of the
Balassa-Samuelson model. He adds the aggregate demand shocks (government spending)
to the model and shows that changes in the relative price of non-tradable goods can in-
uence the real exchange rate. Government may manage the increases in its expenditure
through raising taxes or increasing public debt.
Increase in tax decreases peoples income; therefore they are less able to buy non-tradable
goods. This causes a decline in the price of non-tradable goods and consequently depreci-
ates the real exchange rate. Therefore, there are two forces which are against each other.
As Égert et al. (2006a) mentions, the majority of empirical studies conrm that the rst
e¤ect dominates the second, and hence an increase in relative government spending is
more likely to appreciate the real exchange rate.
Another important issue is the time frame in the studying of the e¤ect of government
spending on the real exchange rate. Several studies distinguish the e¤ect of government
spending on real exchange rate in the short and in the long run. Monacelli and Perotti
(2010) and Kim and Roubini (2008) conrm that in long run government spending ap-
preciates the real exchange rate; however, it could possibly depreciate the real exchange
rate in the short run.
 Administrative Price Control Variable
In some developing countries such as the CEE countries and oil exporting countries in
the Persian Gulf, governments apply some price controls and may subsidise a part of the
consumption basket. This articial pricing inuences the real exchange rate thorough
price deators. To account for this, some authors such as Ricci et al. (2013) dene a
variable for administrative price controls which is the share of administered prices in the
CPI which proxies for the deviation of prices from their market value. By removing these
price controls, we observe a rise in administered prices toward market levels; hence, a rise
in CPI implies a real appreciation. For example, for Slovakia, Ricci et al (2013) show that
by liberalizing 20 per cent of the price basket between 1997 and 2004, the real exchange
rate appreciates by 12 per cent. Therefore, in transition economies, a lower share of
administered (higher share of market) prices in the consumer price index is associated
with a more appreciated real exchange rate.
 Risk Premium
For a given real interest rate di¤erential, more debt of a country in comparison to that
of other countries represents riskier assets and causes the depreciation of the currency.
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Several authors such as Koske (2008) and MacDonald and Dias (2007) do not include
the risk premium as one of the fundamentals in their equilibrium exchange rate models.
Furthermore, Chionis and MacDonald (2002) conrm that no variable is supported as
a representative of risk premium in the literature. Others dene risk premium as the
government debt to GDP ratio in the country divided by the weighted average of similar
variable in other countries. In another study, as a proxy for the Korean risk premium,
Kinkyo (2008) uses the scal balance divided by the GDP and is able to get a signicant
coe¢ cient with the expected sign which is a negative impact of the risk on the equilibrium
exchange rate.
 Demography
In contrast to the vast literature of the e¤ect of population age structure on the current
account, savings and capital ows, there are not many studies analysing the impact of
demography on real exchange rate. Gente (2001) introduces a two sector, two period
overlapping generation model where a fall in the birth rate causes a long run real ex-
change rate appreciation. On the empirical side, Andersson and Österholm (2005, 2006)
document that demography has signicant impact on the real exchange rate in Sweden
and the OECD countries, respectively. Recently, for a panel of 23 OECD countries over
1980-2009 period, Salim and Hassan (2013) examine the e¤ect of demography on the real
exchange rate. They show that the demographic share of both the working age and el-
derly dependent population appreciate the real exchange rate while the share of the young
dependents depreciate the real exchange rate.
 Real Interest Di¤erential
The literature considers the interest-rate di¤erential as a stationary series which does
not inuence the real exchange rates in long run; therefore, it is usually not included in
the long term relationship. In line with theory, this is conrmed by some studies such
as: Campbell and Clarida (1987), Meese and Rogo¤ (1988), Baxter (1994), Edison and
Melick (1999) and Clostermann and Schnatz (2000), and MacDonald (1998). By contrast,
Clostermann and Friedmann (1998), MacDonald and Nagayasu (2000) and MacDonald
and Ricci (2004)104 treat the real interest rate di¤erential as I(1) variable. Using a panel
data set for 14 industrialized countries, MacDonald and Nagayasu (2000) show that a
signicant cointegration relationship exists between real exchange rates and real interest
rate di¤erentials. Other studies, such as MacDonald and Clark (1998), Paiva (2006) and
Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2002), nd borderline results, but treat the series as I(1)variable.
 Investment
104MacDonald and Ricci (2004) argue for a positive impact of real interest rate di¤erential on the real exchange
rate. They describe the mechanism through three channels: aggregate demand, productivity, and persistent
monetary policy.
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Usually, more investment (through technology) as a percentage of GDP relative to trading
partners boosts productivity and consequently appreciates the real exchange rate. How-
ever, the source of investment is an issue. If it comes from abroad, it will have an adverse
e¤ect on the trade balance and current account leading to real exchange rate depreciation.
These two forces are against each other; therefore, its overall impact on real exchange rate
is ambiguous.
 Terms of Trade
Terms of trade is dened as the ratio between the unit value of export and the unit value
of import. It may cause appreciation or depreciation in the real exchange rate. For small
open economies, the terms of trade is considered an exogenous variable. However, for
some countries such as the USA it could be endogenous; although even for the USA, some
external shocks such as a jump in oil price may exogenously inuence the terms of trade.
The price elasticities of the contents of terms of trade determine the e¤ect of change
in price on quantity and consequently the dynamic of the revenue. For example, for
primary goods with low price elasticities, an increase in the terms of trade boosts the
export revenues, improving the trade balance and causing an appreciation of the real
exchange rate. By contrast, if the export volumes are highly inuenced by the price of
export, then an increase in terms of trade does not necessarily cause improvement in
trade balance. Therefore, by increase in export prices, the price elasticities of domestic
supply and foreign demand indicate increasing (or decreasing) trade, causing the real
exchange rate to appreciate (or depreciate). In a very unique and unrealistic case, if the
price of exported goods were the same as the price of consumer goods, and if the price
of imports were the same as the price of consumer goods in the countrys main trading
partners, then movements in terms of trade and the real exchange rate may be exactly
the same. Although, in commodity exporting countries, terms of trade is a function of
commodity prices, the link between commodity price and terms of trade is controversial.
Therefore, we should distinguish between behaviour in terms of trade and commodity
prices especially in commodity exporting countries.
Deaton and Laroque (1992) show that terms of trade is not a perfect representative of
the prices of major exports. In another study, for developing countries, Bidarkota and
Crucini (2000) and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2000) document that the real commodity
prices are much more volatile than terms of trade. In contrast by comparing domestic oil
prices with terms of trade for each of the US, Germany and Japan, Amano and Norden
(1998b) show that oil prices could explain most terms of trade uctuations, and that the
point correlation between terms of trade and one-period lagged price of oil is -0.78, -0.57
and -0.92 for Japan, the US and Germany, respectively. The next step is the investigation
of the di¤erences in the impact of commodity price or terms of trade on real exchange
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rate.
Several authors such as MacDonald (2002), Chen and Rogo¤ (2003) and Cashin et al.
(2004) show that commodity prices are strongly cointegrated with the real exchange
rate of commodity exporting countries while some studies document a signicant e¤ect
of the terms of trade on the real exchange rate. MacDonald and Ricci (2004) explain
this phenomenon based on two reasons. First, there is no unique and standard method
for constructing a country-specic export and import deator, however the commodity
prices are much more accurate than terms of trade. The other reason is related to data
availability. In comparison to the terms of trade, commodity prices are released more
frequently and can inuence markets more e¤ectively. The starting point in this empirical
literature is a theoretical link between terms of trade (commodity price) and real exchange
rate.
There are di¤erent theoretical models which describe the relationship between terms of
trade (commodity price) and real exchange rate. Neary (1988) presents a complicated
model which links the real exchange rate to all price elasticities of supply and demand
in the non-traded sectors, as well as to the income elasticity of demand. De Gregorio
and Wolf (1994) introduce a simplied version of this model with the assumption of zero
consumption of the exporting commodity in the domestic market. The model is based
on an economy with two di¤erent sectors: one produces the exportable goods and the
other non-traded goods, and the domestic agents consume non-tradable and imported
tradable goods. Therefore, the increase in commodity price does not raise demand, and
we can solely focus on the supply side. In this model, the price of tradable goods is
determined exogenously in international markets by world supply and demand, the supply
and demand in the home country dictates the price of non-tradable goods. In this model,
an improvement in the terms of trade appreciates the domestic currency. The mechanism
starts by the terms of trade shock (increase in the commodity price in the international
market) which increases wages in the commodity sector. The wages in the two sectors
are equal, thus the wage in the non-traded section goes up. This raises the relative
prices of non-tradable to tradable goods in the country, and we face a real exchange rate
appreciation. For a small open economy, Mendoza (1995) describes a theoretical model
with incomplete markets and three types of goods (tradable exporting, tradable importing,
and non-tradable) facing exogenous terms of trade and total factor productivity shocks.
Conrming the De Gregorio andWolf (1994) model, Mendoza (1995) predicts that positive
terms of trade shocks appreciate the real exchange rate. In another model, to describe
the e¤ect of terms of trade on real exchange rate especially in the oil exporting countries,
Tokarick (2008) modies the theoretical link by adding a non-resource tradable sector to
the model.
In the literature, there are two other channels which explain the e¤ects of terms of trade
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on real exchange rate: real wealth or income e¤ects. As Diaz-Alejandro (1982) argues, a
positive terms of trade shock increases domestic demand; hence it causes an increase in the
relative price of non-tradable goods which leads to a real exchange rate appreciation. For
the income e¤ect, based on an internal-external balance approach, an improvement in the
terms of trade increases real wages in the export sector of the economy, and consequently
causes a trade surplus. To manage the external balance, the real exchange rate should be
appreciated.
The simplied version of De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) is similar to the Balassa-Samuelson
E¤ect. The improvement in productivity of tradable goods and the assumption of the
law of one price for tradable goods together increase relative prices of non-tradable to
tradable goods and consequently appreciate the real exchange rate. As Cashin et al.
(2004) argue this appreciation in the real exchange rate would be through a nominal ex-
change rate appreciation, or increase of price level which is caused by the expansion of
domestic demand and increase of the price of non-tradable goods. The appreciation in
the real exchange rate encourages factors of production to transfer to non-tradable goods,
consequently it expands the non-tradable sectors and contracts (crowds out) manufac-
turing (de-industrialization) and non-export commodity traded goods. This is the Dutch
Disease.
However, we should not name just any de-industrialization combined with a high price of
commodity as the Dutch Disease. As Bayoumi and Mühleisen (2006) note for Canada, the
decline in the manufacturing sector comes from a standard long run deindustrialization
trend which corresponds with government policies, and is not inuenced by oil export
uctuations.
Facing a high commodity (oil) price in a commodity (oil) exporting country, Égert et al.
(2006b) describe the Dutch Disease in the following propositions: (1) The real exchange
rate appreciates; (2) The manufacturing growth and exports of the non-commodity (oil)
goods decline; (3) Expanding and ination in the non-tradable sector of the economy;
and (4) Improvement in the trade balance (balanced or surplus).
To make sure a country is su¤ering from the Dutch Disease, in addition to the posi-
tive e¤ect of commodity prices on the real exchange rate, other conditions such as de-
industrialization and crowding out of the non-export tradable sector should be satised.
In the most famous paper of the Dutch Diseases literature, Sachs and Warner (1995)
document this phenomenon for emerging Asian economies and in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, there are an increasing number of studies against the Dutch Disease phenom-
enon.
There are countries with abundant natural resources which do not su¤er from this disease
and use their natural resources e¢ ciently through their development process. Spilimbergo
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(1999) argue against the Dutch Disease in Chile and South Africa. In another study,
Gylfason (2001) argues that the main barrier for growth in some developing countries
with abundant natural resources is not the Dutch Disease, but rather corruption, political
turmoil and the lack of proper institutions. Finally, by controlling for these anti-growth
factors, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) show two ndings: rst, natural resources do not
necessarily slow economic growth. Second, several countries rich in natural resources can
successfully avoid the Dutch Disease.
For our ve oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf, in addition to the proper institu-
tions and establishing of Sovereign Wealth Funds, the Dutch Disease could be dampened
through two channels. First, as Neary (1988) underlines, diversication of exports from
crude oil to petrochemical goods and expansion of non-oil export could be helpful to de-
couple the economy from uctuations of oil price. Second, as Razgallah (2008) suggests,
the remittances sent abroad by the foreign labourers in these countries could be a part of
the dampening process of the Dutch Disease.
3.3.2 Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate (PEER)
After estimation of the BEER equation, we can apply a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter with
a proper smoothing factor to extract the temporary uctuations in the fundamentals out of
long run equilibrium values of these variables. For quarterly data, Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
suggest a smoothing factor of 1,600. A larger (or smaller) factor would generate a smoother
(or less smooth) equilibrium real exchange rate path. MacDonald and Ricci (2004) argue that
this lter does not provide reliable results for both the ends of the series. Another method
of ltering is the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition which was applied by Elbadawi
(1994) and Ba¤es et al. (1999). We get the real equilibrium exchange rate by substituting these
long run equilibrium values of fundamentals in the BEER equation. In contrast to this simple
lter, there is another way to extract the PEER.
Applying the Johansen methodology, Clark and MacDonald (2004) directly drive the PEER
from the BEER estimates. They decompose the fundamentals of the BEER into their perma-
nent and transitory components.105 In this alternative way of the PEER approach, they use
the statistical technique of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). The decomposition of Gonzalo and
Granger (1995) separates the cointegration relationship into a non-stationary permanent com-
ponent and a stationary transitory component. In this context, the permanent component of
the real exchange rate represents its equilibrium path and the transitory component reects
105For more on the PEER, see Hansen and Roeger (2000) and Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2002).
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the deviations from equilibrium. However, as Hansen and Roeger (2000) suggest, the Gonzalo
and Granger method may not be accurate, and it could wrongly present the goodness of t.
Clark and MacDonald (2004) mention two main advantages of providing the PEER beside
the BEER. First, the BEER consists of a permanent and a transitory part. By comparing the
BEER and the PEER, especially when they are very di¤erent, we can distinguish the e¤ect
of transitory component on the currency misalignment. This could help for policy purposes.
Second, analysing the BEER beside the PEER is helpful in identifying the source of non-
stationarity among our fundamental variables. In the PEER, we work with fundamentals which
inuence the equilibrium exchange rate; however, there are other purely statistical methods
which extract the equilibrium exchange rate directly from the real exchange rate.
Huizinga (1987) and Cumby and Huizinga (1991) extract the PEER directly from the real
exchange rate by applying univariate and mulitivariate Beveridge-Nelson decompositions. In
another purely statistical method, Frait et al. (2004) apply the Hodrick-Prescott and Band-
Pass Filters directly to the real exchange rate to obtain the PEER. In all these time series
decomposition methods, any persistent (or transitory) shock is treated as a sustainable (or
unsustainable) phenomenon. This is not always true. For example, if a country su¤ers from
imbalance for a long time, some persistent shocks may not be sustainable. Because of the
absence of any theory of exchange rate behaviour, MacDonald (2000) calls this method the
Atheoretical Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate (APEER).
3.4 Capital Enhanced Equilibrium Exchange Rate (CHEER)
This equilibrium exchange rate approach is made of the PPP and the UIP theories. It was been
introduced by Jusellius (1995), Johansen and Juselius (1992) and MacDonald and Marsh (1997,
1999). MacDonald (2000) labels such estimates as CHEERs (Capital Enhanced Equilibrium
Exchange Rates). As a measure of the equilibrium exchange rate, CHEER is a medium run
model, and it does not impose stock-ow consistency. In the absence of enough reliable data for
developing economies, the CHEER method can provide reasonable measures of equilibrium ex-
change rate. However, the CHEER approach may cause higher estimated speeds of convergence
than a PPP model.
The CHEERs approach may be presented by the following vector:106
106Juselius and MacDonald (2004) extend CHEER by including both short and long run interest rates.
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The CHEER out-of-sample exchange rate forecasts are convincing. For example, applying
a cointegration relationship between nominal interest rate di¤erentials, relative prices and the
nominal exchange rate, MacDonald and Marsh (1997) successfully beat a random walk in
forecasting bilateral exchange rates even at horizons as short as two months.
The major advantage of all these equilibrium exchange rate models over the simple PPP is
that they do not consider the equilibrium real exchange rate as a static equilibrium and instead
they link its movements to the uctuations of fundamentals. For policymakers, this is a tool to
control the e¤ect of each fundamental variable on the real exchange rate.
3.5 IMF Evaluations of Equilibrium Exchange Rate
One of the IMF mandates is the evaluation of the exchange rates of its members. In the mid
1990s, it formed a framework for assessing exchange rates. Based on a panel analysis, the
IMF Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues (CGER) focused on a number of advanced
economies, but it has been expanded to both key advanced economies and major emerging
market economies. Lee et al. (2008) present the three methodologies of the CGER: The
Macroeconomic Balance Approach (MB); a reduced-form Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
Approach; and an External Sustainability Approach (ES). The MB and the ES approaches
belong to the FEER family, and they are di¤erent only by the method by which they dene
the current norm.
3.5.1 Macroeconomic Balance (MB) Approach
This is the FEER approach which Lee et al. (2008) describe in three steps. First, using a
data set of 54 advanced and emerging market economies over 1973-2004 and panel econometric
techniques, they estimate the relationship between current account balances and a set of funda-
mentals. Second, for each country using the coe¢ cients in step one, they calculate the current
account norms as a function of the levels of medium run fundamentals. Third, they estimate
the relationship between current account and real exchange rate, and drive the corresponding
real exchange rate which is linked to the targeted current account in step two. Lee et al. (2008)
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show that a 1 percentage point increase in the government budget balance (relative to trading
partners) leads to a 0.2 percentage point increase in the current account balance in percentage
of GDP. For net foreign assets relative to the GDP, a 10 per cent increase raises the current
account balance by about 0.2 per cent of GDP. In contrast to the ES approach which is stock
ow equilibrium, the MB approach is ow equilibrium.
3.5.2 Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate Approach (ERER)
This is the BEER method which directly (and without referring to internal and/ or external
equilibrium of the economy) estimates an equilibrium real exchange rate for each country as a
function of medium term fundamentals such as the net foreign asset position of the country, the
relative productivity di¤erential between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, and the terms
of trade. For 48 countries over 1980-2004, Lee et al. (2008) describe this approach in three
steps: rst, the panel regression techniques are used to estimate an equilibrium relationship
between real exchange rates and a set of fundamentals. Second, equilibrium real exchange rates
are calculated as a function of the medium term level of the fundamentals. Third, by comparing
the equilibrium exchange rate from step two with the actual real exchange rate, we can nd
out the misalignment. Lee et al. (2008) show that a 10 per cent increase in the domestic
productivity relative to trading partner countries appreciates the equilibrium exchange rate
by about 1 to 2 per cent. For commodity terms of trade, a 10 per cent increase implies an
equilibrium appreciation of 4 to 6 per cent, and a 1 percentage point increase in government
consumption to GDP ratio causes an appreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate of 2.5
to 3 per cent.
3.5.3 External Sustainability (ES)
Similar to the MB approach, the ES approach is a medium term equilibrium concept. By
contrast with the MB approach, the ES method does not employ any econometrics to target
the current account norm. In the ES method, rst we determine the ratios of trade or current
account balance to GDP that would stabilize the net foreign asset position at given "benchmark"
values. Ajevskis et al. (2012) describe the relationship between the current account norm (ca)
and the net foreign asset position (nfa) as:
ca =
g + 
(1 + g)(1 + )
nfa (40)
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where g is the growth rate of real GDP,  is the ination rate, whereas nfa and ca are the
net foreign assets and current account norm as shares of GDP, respectively. Here, we get the
current account norm which stabilizes the net foreign asset position at a given "benchmark"
value. Then, similarly to the MB approach, we track the change in real exchange to satisfy the
current account at the desired level. Lee et al. (2008) start the ES approach by targeting the
ratio of net foreign assets to GDP at its estimated level in 2006, and then they drive the current
account norm. Their results conrm that emerging market countries seem likely to improve
their net asset positions while the USA position worsens.
4 Exchange Rate in Commodity Exporting Countries
Many authors have studied the e¤ect of commodity prices on real exchange rates in commodity
exporting countries. This is the overlap between literature on the equilibrium exchange rate
and on the Dutch Disease. These studies cover a wide range of developed and developing
countries with di¤erent commodities and various econometrics approaches including the use of
time series for individual countries and of panel for group of countries. The literature covers
both developed and developing countries.
For developed economies, a study by the Bank of Canada in the 1990s presents interesting
results for Canada. In this study, for monthly data over the 1973-1993 period, Amano and Nor-
den (1995) nd that non-energy commodity prices have a positive impact on the real exchange
rate of Canada (the Canada-US bilateral exchange rate), and the long run elasticity between
the two variables is 0.8. For energy prices, Amano and Norden (1995) document negative and
signicant estimated long run elasticity.107 A 10 per cent increase in oil prices causes a 2.2
per cent depreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the US dollar. Built on Amano and
van Norden (1995), Issa et al. (2006) revisit the relationship between energy prices and the
Canadian dollar. They extend the data and apply structural break tests. The authors observe
a break point in the sign of this relationship which changes from negative to positive in the
early 1990s. This result is consistent with the new role of Canada as an oil exporter in the
1990s, and it is conrmed by Lizardo and Mollick (2010).
107In their view, Canadian domestic energy policies may explain this. During the 1970s, the Canadian govern-
ment subsidised energy prices, but in 1985 when the oil price declined; they deregulated the energy prices.
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In other time series study for quarterly data over 1984-2001 period, Chen and Rogo¤ (2003)
focus on three developed countries that rely heavily on commodity exports: Australia, Canada
and New Zealand. For Australia and New Zealand, they document a long run elasticity of
0.7 to 1 between commodity prices as explanatory variables and real exchange rates. Cashin
et al. (2004) consider a mix of 58 developed and developing countries (not including our ve
oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf). In a time series study for annual data over the
1980-2001 period, they determine how many commodity exporting countries have Commodity
Currencies, in that real commodity prices and their real exchange rates are cointegrated. For
a third of these countries, with the long run elasticity of between 0.1 to 0.2, they conrm that
real commodity prices have an e¤ect on real exchange rates. Among the developed countries
in their sample, they are able to establish the relationship between commodity prices and real
exchange rate in Australia and Iceland, but not in Canada, New Zealand, or Norway.
Back to the BEER approach, MacDonald and Ricci (2004), for quarterly data over the 1971-
2001 period, apply the BEER approach to South Africa as a commodity exporter and estimate
a long run equilibrium real exchange rate path. In this study, the main fundamental variables
are: commodity price, net foreign assets, productivity and real interest rate di¤erentials vis-
à-vis trading partner countries, measures of openness and the size of the scal balance. After
applying alternative specications, they observe the commodity price variable as being the most
stable and robust coe¢ cient. They nd the long run elasticity between the two variables to be
around 0.5 which means that a 10 per cent rise in the commodity terms of trade implies a 5
per cent appreciation of the real e¤ective exchange rate in the long run.
Oil as a commodity is not an exception from this relationship between commodity price
and real exchange rate. As a strategic commodity, not only it inuences the real exchange
rate of oil exporting countries, but it may also a¤ect the real exchange rate of other countries.
Applying a monetary model of exchange rates with oil price, Lizardo and Mollick (2010) can
explain movements in the value of the US dollar against major currencies. Amano and Norden
(1998a) investigate the relative importance of real vs. monetary shocks in explaining the US
real e¤ective exchange rate over the post-Bretton Woods period. They show that oil prices
may have been the main factor of persistent real exchange rate shocks. Similar results are
obtained by Amano and Norden (1998b). For Germany, Japan, and the US, they nd that the
real domestic price of oil is the most important factor determining real e¤ective exchange rates
in the long run. Moreover, Chaudhuri and Daniel (1998) investigate 16 OECD countries and
nd that the non-stationary behaviour of the US dollar real exchange rate is because of the
non-stationary behaviour of real oil prices. Furthermore, for a monthly panel of G7 countries
from 1972:1 to 2005:10, Chen and Chen (2007) study the long run relationship between real oil
prices and real exchange rates. They show that the real oil price and real exchange rates are
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cointegrated, and the former may have been the dominant source for movement of the later.
Several other authors study this relationship in oil exporting countries either in context of the
individual country or as a group of countries.
For Norway, as a developed oil exporting country, several studies such as Bjørnland and
Hungnes (2008) and Akram (2004) have reported statistically insignicant or numerically weak
relationships between the Norwegian Krone and the oil price. Akram (2004) presents the long
run relationship between Norwegian real exchange rate with di¤erences in productivity growth
and the interest rate di¤erential. In another time series study for Norway, Russia and Saudi
Arabia, Habib and Kalamova (2007) investigate the e¤ect of real oil price on real exchange rate.
They use the theoretical model developed by Cashin et al. (2004) which is built on De Gregorio
and Wolf (1994) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996). For Russia, they conrm the existence of
the relationship between real oil price and real exchange rate with a long run elasticity of 0.29.
However, they could not document a signicant impact of the real oil price on the real exchange
rates of Norway and Saudi Arabia. These results may be explained by the accumulation of
foreign assets and institutional di¤erences among these countries. With high volatility of oil
price, several oil exporting countries have introduced Sovereign Wealth Funds to isolate a large
portion of the oil and gas revenues from the economy.108 Rickne (2009) documents the role of a
countrys legal and political institutions in the inuence of oil price on real exchange rate in oil
exporting countries. Using a panel of 33 oil exportering countries over 1985-2005 period Rickne
empirically conrms that currencies in countries with high bureaucratic quality and strong legal
systems are less a¤ected by oil price changes.
In another study on Russia, using four measures of exchange rate (both real e¤ective ex-
change rate and bilateral real exchange rate against both the Euro and the US dollar), Suseeva
(2010) conrms the impact of oil price on the bilateral real exchange rate against Euro and
the US dollar. In contrast to Habib and Kalamova (2007), this relationship does not hold for
the real e¤ective exchange rate. The di¤erences in data for the real e¤ective exchange rate in
Suseeva (2010) and Habib and Kalamova (2007) may explain this. Habib and Kalamova (2007)
apply their own measure of real e¤ective exchange rate with a small sample size, but Suseeva
(2010) uses the International Financial Statistics of the IMF data bank.
In country specic contexts for developing oil exporting countries, Koranchelian (2005) for
Algeria, Zalduendo (2006) for Venezuela, Ozsoz and Akinkunmi (2012) for Nigeria, and Kutan
and Wyzan (2005) for Kazakhstan, document the signicant impact of oil price on the real
108For Sovereign Wealth Funds in oil exporting countries, Norway is the pioneer with the Government Pension
Fund with 737 billion dollars. For Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar, the related funds are SAMA
Foreign Holdings with 675 billion dollars, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority with 627 billion dollars, Kuwait
Investment Authority with 386 billion dollars and the Qatar Investment Authority with 115 billion dollars,
respectively.
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exchange rate. Koranchelian (2005) conrms that oil price and the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect
inuence the equilibrium real exchange rate of Algeria. Similarly, Zalduendo (2006), applying a
vector error correction model, shows that oil prices and productivity have an e¤ect on the real
equilibrium exchange rate in Venezuela, and that productivity di¤erential relative to the main
trading partners becomes worse. In this study, long run elasticity of real e¤ective o¢ cial and
parallel exchange rates with respect to the real oil price are around 1 and 0.44, respectively.
Shifting to the panel method, to explore the e¤ect of commodity price on real exchange
rate, Bodart et al. (2012) focus on a large sample of developing countries which are specialized
in the export of one leading commodity. Our ve oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf are
included in their sample. Using the non-stationary panel techniques robust to cross-sectional
dependence, they nd that the price of the dominant commodity has a signicant long run
impact on the real exchange rate when the exports of the leading commodity have a share of
at least 20 per cent in the countrys total exports.
Comparing commodity and oil exporting countries, Coudert et al. (2011) use the panel
cointegration approach over the 1980-2007 period, for two samples of countries: 52 commodity
exporters and 16 oil exporters. They compare the impact of commodity (oil) price on real
exchange rate in these two groups of countries. They conrm the co-movement of real exchange
rate with commodity price. For the group of oil exporting countries, they show the same
relationship but somewhat weaker. Coudert et al. (2011) explain these di¤erences in the result
between these two groups of countries due to (i) greater uctuations in the oil price than in
commodity price and (ii) pegged exchange rates that prevent the nominal adjustment from
happening.
Interestingly for the case of our ve oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf, as expected,
the pegged currencies are highly dependent on the behaviour of their anchor. Coudert et al.
(2011) show that currencies of these oil exporting countries which are pegged to the US dollar
were pushed down by the dollar fall and were undervalued at the end of the period whereas
the Euro pegged currencies were being pushed upwards by the euro appreciation. For the
equilibrium exchange rate, they show that the currencies of Qatar and United Arab Emirates
are slightly overvalued. This is conrmed by Kamar and Ben Naceur (2007) who show that,
among the GCC countries, these two countries are quite di¤erent from the others. Indeed, while
the real exchange rates of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia are positively correlated,
the Qatar riyal and the UAE dirham are weakly and negatively correlated with these four
currencies. To achieve monetary union in the GCC countries, Kamar and Ben Naceur (2007)
recommend coordination in their policies.
Applying the panel dynamic OLS (DOLS) procedure proposed by Kao and Chiang (2001)
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and Mark and Sul (2003), Dauvin (2014) investigates the link between energy prices and real
exchange rates in countries which export fossil fuel products (such as coal, natural gas and
crude oil). Dauvin considers two sets of countries: 10 energy exporting109 and 23 commodity
exporting countries over the period 1980-2011. For the 10 energy exporting countries, Dauvin
shows a positive long term relationship between energy terms of trade and the real e¤ective
exchange rate: a 10 per cent increase in energy price leads to a 2.5 per cent appreciation of their
currency. The elasticity is consistent with other studies such as Habib and Kalamova (2007)
and Coudert et al. (2011).
Back to oil exporting countries, Korhonen and Juurikkala (2009) apply the BEER approach
for twelve oil exporting countries: nine OPEC countries110 and three CIS (Commonwealth
Independent States) countries over 1975-2005 and 1993-2005, respectively. The econometrics
method for cointegration is the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999)
which presents di¤erent short run responses for each country in addition to the same long
run coe¢ cients for all countries. The e¤ect of oil price on the real exchange rate of these
courtiers has a long run elasticity around 0.4 to 0.5 which is in the line with other commodity
exporting countries. Higher oil price appreciates the real exchange rate and oil price is the only
fundamental with a consistent and statistically signicant e¤ect on the real exchange rate. In
contrast to other studies of real exchange rate in commodity exporting countries, Korhonen and
Juurikkala (2009) cannot conrm real per capita GDP as a signicant fundamental inuencing
the real exchange rate. They initially include the net foreign asset as a variable, but either the
empirical results do not support it as a statistically signicant variable or its sign contradicts
with theory. Therefore, they then omit the net foreign asset position in their estimations.
Interestingly, Zalduendo (2006) estimates similar elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect
to the oil price results for Venezuela and Oomes and Kalcheva (2007) and Spatafora and Stavrev
(2003) for Russia. In another panel study of seven OPEC countries including Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, for monthly data from 2000:01 to 2007:12, Nikbakht (2010) demonstrates the
important inuence of oil prices on the real exchange rate. Nikbakht conrms that real oil
price has been the main source of real exchange movement. In another study applying time
series methods, Jahan-Parvar and Mohammadi (2008) conrm the relationship in a sample of
fourteen oil exporting countries (including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) over the annual period
of 1970-2007. Based on Pesaran et al. (2001), they apply the Autoregressive Distributed Lag
(ARDL) bounds tests of cointegration and show the existence of a stable relationship between
real exchange rates and real oil prices in all countries.
109The 10 energy exporting countries are: Algeria, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, Norway, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa and Venezuela. This sample includes 5 OPEC countries, 3 coal exporters and 2 gas-oil
exporting countries.
110The sample consists of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and
Venezuela.
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Overall, the literature conrms that commodity (oil) prices inuence the real exchange rates
of commodity (oil) exporting countries. Our literature review also proposes that, for the Persian
Gulf oil exporting countries as a group, the e¤ects of oil price on the equilibrium exchange rate
and real exchange rate have been studied relatively little. We aim to contribute to this part of
the literature.
5 Data Description
This study covers ve oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf, namely Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Oman and the UAE. The Data are annual and cover the period from 1980 to 2011.
The CPI based real e¤ective exchange rate from Darvas (2012), in logs (lreer); are new to this
literature.111 An increase in the REER implies a real appreciation of the domestic currency.
The Oil price (loil) deated by the unit price of manufacturing exports (MUV) in logs are from
the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database and the net foreign assets (nfa) is
obtained from the updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) as a percentage of GDP.
We do not have access to labour productivity data for these ve countries; therefore, as
often in estimation of equilibrium exchange rates in the literature, we employ the log of real
PPP based GDP per capita in current USD with respect to trading partner countries (lrgdpc)
as a proxy for the Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect.112 The data is from the World Data Bank, we
construct the data for productivity deferential based on the average trade of these countries
with their trade partners from 2005 to 2010.
As we can see in Figure 7, there is a steady decline in the productivity di¤erentials of these
countries. Zalduendo (2006), Koranchelian (2005), and MacDonald and Ricci (2004) identify
similar declines in Venezuela, Algeria and South Africa, respectively. We model the REER
111Darvas uses data on exchange rates and consumer price indices and the weighting matrix derived by Bayoumi
et al. (2006) to calculate consumer price index-based REER. To our knowledge, this chapter is the rst with a
complete data set for the REER of these countries.
112To describe the productivity di¤erential, some studies use CPI/ PPI as a proxy for the Balassa-Samuelson
E¤ect. In these oil exporting countries, some elements of the CPI (such as utility prices) are still under
government control, and some other elements are subsidized. Therefore, CPI/ PPI relative to their trading
partners cannot a proper representative of the productivity di¤erential. Moreover, as Chinn (2000) argues, the
CPI/ PPI ratio may be inuenced by tax changes, relative demand e¤ects or the nominal exchange rate itself
which are not related to the Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect. Therefore, in this study, we prefer to use PPP based
GDP per capita relative to trading partners.
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based on three explanatory variables as follows:
lreer = [loil lrgdpc nfa]
where variables are as previously dened.
6 Empirical Strategy (Time Series)
Based on the maximum likelihood approach of Johansen (1988, 1991, and 1995), we apply single
country econometric time series techniques and check for the existence of cointegration among
the variables of each country. In addition to the Johansen method, for robustness check of the
long run relationship for each country, we apply the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)
approach of Pesaran et al. (2001). For comparison, given the usual problems of short term time
series analysis, we apply the panel data econometric techniques. The single country time series
unit roots and cointegration tests may su¤er from shorter spans of data with associated less
degrees of freedom and low power. Therefore, the panel analysis which is based on time series
and cross country information compensates for the shortness of time series data and allows
more variation in the data that results in increased e¢ ciency of the estimators. However,
some assumptions of panel analysis (such as the equality of the long run parameters across the
di¤erent members of the panel, or averaging them) may not be true.
6.1 Unit Root Tests
We test for the presence of unit root for all the series used in the analysis. The Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP)113 Unit Root tests are employed to test the
integration level.114 The results for each country are provided in Table 16. In both tests, the
null hypothesis is the non-stationarity of the time series.
113The PP approach, which computes a residual variance that is robust to auto-correlation, allows for the
presence of unknown forms of autocorrelation with a structural break in the time series and conditional het-
eroscedasticity in the error term.
114The ADF and PP tests are based on Dickey and Fuller (1981) and the Phillips and Perron (1988), respec-
tively.
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Table 16- Unit Root Tests
Qatar ADF P-Value Conclusion PP P-Value Conclusion
lreer -2.26 0.02 I(1) -1.63 0.09 I(1)
lrgdpc -4.01 0.00 I(0) -4.01 0.00 I(0)
nfa -2.81 0.20 I(1) -3.00 0.14 I(1)
Kuwait ADF P-Value Conclusion PP P-Value Conclusion
lreer -2.83 0.00 I(0) -2.05 0.04 I(0)
lrgdpc -3.43 0.06 I(1) -3.44 0.06 I(1)
nfa -2.13 0.03 I(0) -2.23 0.02 I(0)
Saudi Arabia ADF P-Value Conclusion PP P-Value Conclusion
lreer -1.11 0.91 I(1) -1.34 0.85 I(1)
lrgdpc -1.14 0.22 I(1) -2.44 0.016 I(1)
nfa -3.01 0.00 I(0) -3.08 0.00 I(0)
Oman ADF P-Value Conclusion PP P-Value Conclusion
lreer -1.45 0.54 I(1) -1.28 0.87 I(1)
lrgdpc -3.42 0.06 I(1) -3.45 0.06 I(1)
nfa -1.33 0.86 I(1) -1.40 0.84 I(1)
The UAE ADF P-Value Conclusion PP P-Value Conclusion
lreer -1.96 0.59 I(1) -2.16 0.49 I(1)
lrgdpc -3.31 0.08 I(1) -2.43 0.35 I(1)
nfa -2.29 0.02 I(0) -2.34 0.02 I(0)
Oil Price ADF P-Value Conclusion PP P-Value Conclusion
loil -1.51 0.80 I(1) -1.23 0.88 I(1)
Note: In Both ADF and PP tests the Null Hypothesis is the non-statinarity of the variable. For
each variable, rst we investigate whether it has intercept and trend or not, then based on the result,
we apply the proper specication of each test. For all P-values, we consider 5 per cent signicance
level. * denotes the variables are I (0) and I (1) with 5 per cent and 1 per cent signicance level,
respectively.
For Oman and Qatar, we document the non-stationarity of four variables (lreer; lrgdpc; nfa
and loil) and three variables (lreer; nfa and loil), respectively. For the UAE and Saudi Arabia,
we observe the non-stationarity of the three variables (lreer; lrgdpc and loil).115
115The appropriate lag-length for the dependent variable in each test is chosen using the Schwarz Information
Criterion.
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6.2 Cointegration Tests
The results in the previous section suggest that in four of the ve countries, some of the
fundamentals and the REER have unit root. To avoid spurious regressions, we check for
the possibility of cointegration and long run equilibrium relationship among the variables, in
particular the relationship between the REER and its fundamentals. The Johansen (1995)
procedure is employed to test for the existence and number of cointegrating equations. The
country by country cointegration tests are reported in Tables 17 to 20. The procedure indicates
that there is one cointegrating vector for Saudi Arabia. Table 21 shows the results of VECM
analysis. The speed adjustment parameter of the VECM for Saudi Arabia is positive and
insignicant which does not support the existence of conintegration among the variables.
Table 17Johansen Cointegration Test - Qatar (lreer; loil; nfa)
No. of CE(s) Trace test Prob. Max-Eigen test Prob.
None 0.45 0.09 0.45 0.15
At Most 1 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.45
At Most 2 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11
Table 18- Johansen Cointegration Test - Saudi Arabia (lreer; loil; lrgdpc)
No. of CE(s) Trace test Prob. Max-Eigen test Prob.
None 48.18 0.00 38.39 0.00
At Most 1 9.79 0.29 9.77 0.22
At Most 2 0.01 0.88 0.01 0.88
Table 19- Johansen Cointegration Test - Oman (lreer; loil; lrgdpc; nfa)
No. of CE(s) Trace test Prob. Max-Eigen test Prob.
None 40.44 0.20 18.42 0.46
At Most 1 22.02 0.29 16.10 0.21
At Most 2 5.91 0.70 5.70 0.65
At Most 3 0.20 0.64 0.20 0.64
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Table 20- Johansen Cointegration Test - The UAE (lreer; loil; lrgdpc)
No. of CE(s) Trace test Prob. Max-Eigen test Prob.
None 24.39 0.18 14.90 0.29
At Most 1 9.48 0.32 9.29 0.26
At Most 2 0.18 0.66 0.18 0.66
Note: The number of lags based on Schwarz information criterion for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman
and the UAE are 2, 1, 1 and 1, respectively.
Table 21- Results of VECM for Saudi Arabia
Country Saudi Arabia
Number of cointegrating vectors 1
lreer ( 1) 1.00
loil ( 1) 0.30 (2.53)
lrgdpc ( 1) 0.96 (5.12)
c 0.02
CointEq1 0.007 (0.35)
P   V alue for CointEq1 0.72
6.3 ARDL Method-Bound Test
Pesaran et al. (2001) introduce the ARDL bound test. Firstly, the ARDL cointegration test in
Pesaran et al. (2001) assumes that only one long run relationship exists between the dependent
variable and the exogenous variables, and this method can be applied with a mixture of I
(0) and I (1); but not I (2) time series. Secondly, in compare to the Johansen method, the
ARDL is a simple method which is built on a single equation set up. After the conrmation
of the existence of a cointegration relationship and selection of the proper number of lags, the
model can be estimated by the OLS. In contrast to the Johansen method which is build on a
VAR, the ARDL reduces the number of parameters to be estimated and improving e¢ ciency in
small samples. Thirdly, di¤erent variables can be assigned di¤erent lag-lengths as they enter the
model. The ARDL approach consists of the following steps: rst, we construct the Unrestricted
Error Correction form of the ARDL model:
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Where, yt is the dependent variable; xit is explanatory variable; et is a residual; c and t
are drift and trend, respectively;  and i are long run coe¢ cients; j and $ij are short run
coe¢ cients; p and q are lag orders. We observe long run relationship if  (the coe¢ cient on
yt 1) is negative and statistically signicant.
The ARDL method is sensitive to lag order; therefore, we should correctly dene the lag
order of the rst di¤erenced variables. The optimal lag order is characterized by minimizing the
Akaike and Schwarz criteria and at the same time removing serial autocorrelation of the residu-
als. After constructing the proper ECM, the second step is to test for existence of cointegration
between variables. We apply a wald test (F-Test) on the long run coe¢ cients of equation 42.
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration between long run variables ( = i = 0),
while the alternative hypothesis is that there is cointegration between variables ( 6= i 6= 0):
In the ARDL analysis, the F-statistics have non-standard distribution. We take the as-
ymptotic critical value bounds for the F-statistics from a specic table prepared by Pesaran
et. al (2001). The two sets of critical values provide critical value bounds for all classications
of the regressors into purely I (1), purely I (0) or mutually cointegrated. The lower bound
is based on the assumption that all of the variables are I (0), and the upper bound is based
on the assumption that all of the variables are I (1). If the computed F-statistics is higher
than the upper bound of the critical values, given signicance level, then the null hypothesis
of no cointegration is rejected and we conclude that we have cointegration. If the computed F
statistics is less than the lower bound of the critical values, given signicance level, then the
null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted. The cointegration test result is inconclusive if
the computed F-statistics falls between upper and lower bands.
For Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman, the ECM model does not have trend and
intercept. We take the critical values from Table CI (i) on page 300 of Pesaran et al. (2001).
The lower and upper bounds for the F-statistics at the 5 per cent signicance levels are [2.45,
3.63]. For the UAE, the ECM model has intercept and trend. We take the critical values
from Table CI (v) on page 301 of Pesaran et al. (2001). The lower and upper bounds for the
F-statistics at the 5 per cent signicance levels are [4.01, 5.07]. As the Table 22 only shows
data for Qatar, the F-Statistics exceeds the upper bound at the 5 per cent signicance level;
therefore, we can conclude that there is evidence of a long run relationship between the time-
series (at this level of signicance or greater). For Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the
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F-statistics is less than the lower bound. Therefore, there is no cointegration relationship for
these three countries. For Oman, the computed F-statistics falls between the upper and lower
bounds, consequently the cointegration test result is inconclusive. In summary, based on the
ARDL Bound test, Qatar is the only country among our ve countries which has cointegration.
We apply the CUSUM and the Breusch-Godfrey LM tests to check the stability and serial
correlation, respectively. Both tests conrm the stability and lack of serial correlation.
Table 22- F-Statistics for Testing the Existence of Long Run Relationship -Wald
Test
Country Qatar Kuwait Saudi Arabia Oman The UAE
Computed F-Statistic 5.42 2.13 1.40 2.80 3.78
Critical Value (Upper) 3.63 3.63 3.63 3.63 5.07*
Critical Value (Lower) 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.45 4.01*
Note: The upper and lower bound critical values are for the case of 5 per cent signicance with no
intercept and no trend. * denotes the critical values for the case of 5 per cent signicance with trend
and intercept.
As the nal check as it is recommended by Pesaran et al. (2001), we should also perform
a bound t-test of H0 :  = 0, against H1:  < 0. If the t-statistic for yt 1 in Equation 42
is greater than the critical value bounds of the t-statistic in Table CII (i) on pages 303 and
304 of Pesaran et al. (2001), then this would support the conclusion that there is a long run
relationship between the variables. If the t-statistic is less than the lower bound critical value,
we conclude that the data are all stationary. In the Qatar case, the t-statistic is -3.66 and the
upper and lower critical values are [-195, -3.33]. Based on the general to specic procedure, we
remove non-signicant coe¢ cients and again run the Equation 42. The following is the long
run relationship for Qatar:
lreer = 0:13 loil + 0:24 lrgdpc (42)
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Table 23- The nal ECM model for Qatar, Dependent Variable: Dlreer
Variables Coe¢ cient t-Stat P-Value
lreer ( 1) -0.34 -3.66 0.00
loil ( 1) 0.04 2.01 0.05
lrgdpc ( 1) 0.08 3.27 0.00
Dloil 0.11 3.99 0.00
Dlrgdpc 0.18 2.52 0.01
Dlreer ( 1) 0.49 4.35 0.00
Dnfa ( 1) -0.02 -2.99 0.00
7 Empirical Strategy (Panel)
Given the limited length of the sample (32 years) and low power of individual country by
country tests for unit root and cointegration, estimating separate equations for each country
(time series) does not provide us with precise results. Therefore, to increase the e¢ ciency of
the estimators, we employ panel analysis to overcome the problems of short time series and the
low power of time series unit root tests and cointegration analysis. However, panel analysis has
its drawbacks. It either assumes the same long term estimators for each country or represents
averages across the di¤erent countries of the panel, neither of which is necessarily appropriate
for every country.
For the estimation method, we do not use the OLS estimator because in nite sample panel
models it is not reliable and may produce strong bias. As Pedroni (2000) argues, only under
very restrictive conditions, i.e. homogeneity across members of the panel and the exogeneity
of the regressors, is the OLS estimator asymptotically consistent and have a standardized
distribution. In other studies for non-stationary data, Pesaran et al. (1996, 1999) show that
a simple xed e¤ect model or a pooled OLS will lead to spurious regressions, and Kim and
Korhonen (2005) emphasize the dynamic nature of exchange rate models and state that static
estimators are unlikely to capture the essential features of such processes. Furthermore, as
Loayza and Ranciere (2006) argue, the static panel estimators do not consider the short run
relationship beside the long run one. Therefore, we apply dynamic panel methods.
We proceed with three steps. In the rst step, we investigate the existence of unit root
in the data and nd them to be integrated of order one. In the second step, using several
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di¤erent panel cointegration tests, we show the cointegration among some fundamentals and
the REER. In the third step, using the pooled mean group estimator (PMG) of Pesaran et al.
(1999) for these ve oil exporting countries, we calculate the equilibrium exchange rates and
the misalignments.
7.1 Panel Unit Root Tests
We apply several panel data unit root tests in order to exploit the extra power in the cross
sectional dimension of the data. We employ the panel unit root tests proposed by Levin et
al. (2002), Im et al. (2003), Maddala and Wu (1999) and Hadri (2000). The Levin, Lin and
Chu (LLC) and the Hardi tests assume a common autoregressive parameter for all panels, so
these tests do not allow for the possibility that the REER of some countries contain unit roots
while others do not. The LLC test considers the unit root as the null hypothesis, while the
Hadri test (as the panel equivalent of time series Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS)
unit root test) uses a null of no unit root. The LLC test ts an augmented Dickey-Fuller
regression for each panel. We use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to set the number
of lags. Unlike the LLC test which under alternative assumes all series are stationary, the Im,
Pesaran and Shin test (IPS) and Maddala and Wu test (MW) are both consistent under the
alternative that only a fraction of the series are stationary. The MW test is a Fisher-type ADF
or a Phillips-Perron (PP) test which combines the p-values from N independent unit root tests.
Based on the p-values of individual unit root tests, the Fisher test assumes that all series are
non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative that at least one series in the
panel is stationary.
Table 24 reports the test results based on the inclusion of an intercept and trend. Overall,
our ndings show that the panel of REER are I (1) series. All ve tests provide evidence of
non-stationarity at 1 per cent level of signicance. For 5 per cent level of signicance, all tests
(with the exception of LLC) conrm the non-stationarity of the REER panel. Maddala and
Wu (1999) show the superiority of the Fisher-type tests to the LLC test. Therefore we consider
our REER panel as a non-stationary process, which is a common nding. Concerning the
explanatory variables (lrgdpc; nfa; loil), all tests strongly support the non-stationarity process.
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Table 24 - Panel Unit Root Tests, Sample of Five Oil Exporting Countries
(1980-2011)
LLC IPS ADF-Fisher PP-Fisher Hardis Z-stat
lreer -1.68(0.046) -0.96(0.16) 12.13(0.27) 8.1(0.61) 3.92(0.00)
lrgdpc -1.04(0.14) 0.34(0.63) 7.18(0.70) 4.92(0.89) 7.50(0.00)
nfa 0.28 (0.61) -0.20(0.42) 9.51(0.48) 10.44(0.40) 5.94(0.00)
loil 1.66(0.95) 2.12(0.98) 1.77(0.99) 1.68(0.99) 6.65(0.00)
Note: LLC and IPS tests are based on Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003), respectively.
P-values are reported in parentheses. We allow for individual deterministic trends and constants. All
tests but Hardi are based on the unit root null of Hypothesis. Series are demeaned. Levin, Lin, and
Chu test suggest this procedure to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence.
7.2 Panel Cointegration Tests
After establishing the order of integration of the data, we use panel cointegration approaches
to test for a long run equilibrium relationship among variables (Tables 25 to 27). Among the
1st generation tests which are residual based, we apply Pedroni (1999, 2004), Kao (1999) and
Johansen Fisher panel cointegration tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999).
Table 25 - Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test
Panel Cointegration tests
Specications v-Stat rho-Stat pp-Stat adf-Stat
[lreer; loil; lrgdpc; nfa] -0.08(0.53) 1.09(0.86) 0.39(0.65) -1.19(0.11)
[lreer; loil; lrgdpc] 3.03(0.00) -1.43(0.07) -1.73(0.04) -2.55(0.00)
[lreer; loil; nfa] -.65(0.74) 1.11(0.86) 0.31(0.62) 0.54(0.70)
Group mean Cointegration tests
Specications rho-Stat pp-Stat adf-Stat
[lreer; loil; lrgdpc; nfa] 1.89(0.97) 0.93(0.82) -1.06(0.14)
[lreer; loil; lrgdpc] -0.62(0.26) -1.88(0.02) -3.27(0.00)
[lreer; loil; nfa] 1.52(0.93) 0.43(0.66) 0.53(0.70)
Note: All tests are based on the null hypothesis of no cointegration. P-values are in parantheses.
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Table 26 - Westerlund ECM Panel and Kao Residual Cointegration Tests
Specications Gt Ga Pt Pa Kao Stat
[lreer; loil; lrgdpc; nfa] -1.07(0.91) -2.10(0.97) -2.32(0.68) -2.01(0.78) -0.34(0.36)
[lreer; loil; lrgdpc] -2.69(0.00) -10.37(0.03) -5.76(0.00) -10.07(0.00) -1.94(0.02)
[lreer; loil; nfa] -1.68(0.26) -4.33(0.72) -3.23(0.19) -2.88(0.43) -0.39(0.34)
Note: The null hypothesis in the Westerlund and Kao tests is no cointegration. Optimal lag/lead
length determined by Akaike Information Criterion.
Table 27 - Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher Panel Cointegration Tests
Specications
[lreer; loil; lrgdpc; nfa] No. of CE(s) Trace test Prob. Max-Eigen test Prob.
None 43.66 0.000 32.04 0.000
At most 1 19.43 0.035 13.66 0.189
At most 2 13.76 0.184 10.30 0.414
[lreer; loil; lrgdpc] No. of CE(s) Trace test Prob. Max-Eigen test Prob.
None 26.74 0.002 21.48 0.018
At most 1 14.41 0.155 16.77 0.079
At most 2 2.86 0.984 2.862 0.984
[lreer; loil; nfa] No. of CE(s) Trace test Prob. Max-Eigen test Prob.
None 13.73 0.185 7.05 0.720
At most 1 13.00 0.223 10.71 0.380
At most 2 11.85 0.295 11.85 0.295
As a residual based test, the Pedroni panel cointegration test is the panel equivalent of the
Engle-Granger test in time series analysis. The Pedroni test contains seven tests, of which three
are group-mean tests (between-dimension) and the remaining four are pooled tests (within-
dimension). The between-dimension statistics are less restrictive than the within-dimension;
therefore, the cointegrating vectors may be the di¤erent among the members of the panel. The
Kao (1999) test is very similar to the Pedroni (1998) tests, but imposes cross-section specic
intercepts and homogeneous coe¢ cients on the rst-stage regressors. Its null hypothesis is the
non-stationarity of residuals (i.e., there is no cointegration) and its alternative hypothesis is
stationarity of residuals (i.e., there is a cointegrating relationship among the variables). The
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third test is the Johansen type panel cointegration test which was developed by Maddala and
Wu (1999). This test combines tests of individual cross-sections to produce a test statistic for
the full panel. Its results are based on p-values for Johansens cointegration trace test and
maximum eigenvalue test.
These residual based tests may fail to reject the no-cointegration test null, even in cases
where conintegration is strongly suggested by theory. Banerjee et al. (1998) and Kremers
et al. (1992) refer to this as a common factor restriction which is the strong assumption of
equality of long run parameters for the variables in their level with the short run parameters
for the variables in their di¤erences. They show that the common factor restriction can cause a
signicant loss of power for residual based cointegration tests. As a response to this, Westerlund
(2007) introduces four panel conintegration tests that are based on structural not residual. The
Westerlund test checks the null hypothesis of no cointegration by testing whether the error
correction term in a conditional panel error correction model is equal to zero. We apply all
these panel cointegration tests but for di¤erent specications.
We test the three specications: the rst specication consists of the REER and all three
explanatory variables. The second and third are made up of the REER, productivity di¤erential
and oil price; and the REER, oil price and net foreign asset, respectively. For the rst spec-
ication, except for the Johansen Fisher panel test, all the other cointegration tests conrm
the non-conintegration. For the second specication, Kao, Westerlund and Johansen-Fisher
tests all strongly suggest cointegration. For the Pedroni test, out of 7 tests, 6 and 5 support
cointegration for 10 per cent and 5 per cent level of signicance, respectively. In summary, we
do not get cointegration relationship for the two specications with the nfa. This is in line
with other studies such as Dauvin (2014), Coudert et al. (2011) and Korhonen and Juurikkala
(2007) which do not consider nfa in their REER model. For the third specication, all tests
strongly support non-cointegration. On the whole, these results tend to show that there exists
a cointegrating relationship between lreer; loil and lrgdpc.116
7.3 Long Run Relationship
With the preliminary ndings of the unit root and cointegration tests, we now turn to the
estimation of long run relationship between the REER and its fundamental variables. Pesaran
et al. (1999) present the error correction Pooled Mean-Group (PMG) estimator which is a
combination of two procedures that are commonly used in panels. The rst one is the traditional
116Even if we assume the cointegration relationship for the rst and third specications which contain nfa,
we get statistically insignicant coe¢ cient for nfa and even a sign which is not supported by theory.
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pooled estimators (such as the xed or random e¤ects estimators) which set di¤erent intercepts,
but the same coe¢ cients for each group. The second one is the Mean Group (MG) estimator
of Pesaran and Smith (1995) which estimates for each group separately then averages the
group specic coe¢ cients. Pesaran et al. (1999) emphasize that the MG estimator does not
take into account the fact that certain parameters may be the same across groups. However,
for consistency, the MG estimator should be applied for a case with a large number of cross
sections and a large time-series dimension. Hence, it is sensitive to outliners, especially with a
low number of cross sections.
The PMG estimator suggested by Pesaran et al. (1999) combines pooling and averaging, and
it provides a method to test for homogeneity in the sample. This estimator imposes the same
long run coe¢ cients but di¤erent intercepts, short run coe¢ cients and error variances across
groups. Providing the short run dynamic beside the long run coe¢ cients is the advantage of
the PMG estimator in comparison to the Fully-Modied OLS (FMOLS)117 and the Dynamic
OLS (DOLS).118
In order to check whether the results are robust, we additionally present results obtained
from the Dynamic xed e¤ect (DFE), DOLS and FMOLS regressions. The DFE, with di¤erent
country-specic intercepts, imposes restrictions on the slope coe¢ cient (short and long run)
and the speed of adjustment coe¢ cient to be equal across all countries. Using leads and lags,
the DOLS blocks the feedback e¤ect from the dependent variables to the regressors. Therefore
(in contrast to the OLS) even if the regressors are endogenous, the DOLS is consistent. In a
similar way, the FMOLS estimator takes care of the endogenous regressors but (contrary to the
DOLS estimator) the FMOLS corrects the bias in a non-parametric way.
The PMG estimator is built on an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model of order
(p; q) where p and q are the autoregressive orders of the dependent and independent variables,
respectively. Its ECM can be expressed as:
yit = i(yi;t 1    0iXi;t 1) +
p 1X
j=1
ijyi;t j +
q 1X
j=0
ijXi;t j + i + "it (43)
where yit is the dependent variable (REER), Xit is the vector of fundamentals for country
i, i is the vector of long run coe¢ cients, i is the error correction parameter, ij and ij are
the coe¢ cients of the short run dynamics, i is the xed e¤ects and it is a white noise process.
117Pedroni (2004) or Phillips and Moon (1999).
118The DOLS was been introduced by Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) and extended to panel
analysis by Kao and Chiang (1997).
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The PMG estimator imposes the same long run coe¢ cients for all countries; that is i = 
in Equation 42. If i is signicantly negative, then we have a long run relationship between yit
and Xit. To avoid ine¢ cient estimators such as OLS, Pesaran et al. (1999) use a maximum
likelihood estimator. Instead of the PMG, we can apply the MG estimator which is a consistent
estimator even under the heterogeneity of the slopes. If the parameters are homogenous (the
poolability assumption is valid), the PMG estimator is more e¢ cient119. If the poolability
assumption is invalid, then the PMG estimator is not consistent.
7.4 Estimation Results
Table 28 reports the estimation results. The error correction speed of adjustment parameter and
the long run coe¢ cients are of primary interest. Table 28 reports three alternative estimates:
of the PMG; the MG (the least restrictive, but potentially not e¢ cient); and the DFE which
allows intercepts to vary across countries. We expect the long run e¤ects of real oil price and
productivity di¤erential on REER to be homogenous across countries, although the short run
adjustments are more likely to di¤er across countries. All three estimators strongly support the
positive e¤ect of real oil price on the REER (i.e. higher real oil price leads to appreciation of the
REER) which is consistent with theoretical predictions and the previous studies for commodity
(oil) exporting countries. Based on the PMG estimator, the elasticity of the e¤ect of real oil
price on the REER is 0.19 which means that an increase of 10 per cent in real oil price causes
1.9 per cent appreciation of the REER. This result is in line with other studies such as Cashin et
al. (2004) for commodity exporting countries, Coudert et al. (2011) for a group of oil exporting
countries, Koranchelian (2005) for Algeria, and Dauvin (2014) for ten oil exporting countries
which get the elasticity of 0.1 to 0.2, 0.22, 0.20 and 0.25, respectively.
For the Balassa-Samuelson E¤ect, as Table 28 reports, the productivity deferential does
not have a signicant e¤ect on the REER in 1 per cent and 5 per cent level of signicance.
However, at 10 per cent level of signicance, the productivity deferential elasticity is 0.10 which
is consistent with the results of MacDonald and Ricci (2004) for South Africa and Lee et al.
(2008) for 48 countries over 1980-2004. Korhonen and Juurikkala (2007) encounter similar
results and get a signicant coe¢ cient for the e¤ect of real oil price of the REER, but not for
productivity di¤erentials.
119The satisfaction of poolability assumption, which conrms homogeneity of slopes, does not mean that the
coe¢ cients are exactly the same across the countries. It means the pooled estimator is a good approximation
of the mean of parameters across countries.
131
Table 28 - Results of Panel Estimations (PMG,MG and DFE)
Dep Variable: lreer MG PMG DFE
Explanatory Variables LR Coef P-Value LR Coef P-Value LR Coef P-Value
loil 0.15 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.00
lrgdpc 0.22 0.12 0.096 0.09 0.26 0.03
Error Correction Term -0.28 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.11 0.00
Joint Hausman Test 0.90 0.92
We use the Hausman test to check the long run homogeneity hypothesis of the PMG. As
Pesaran et al. (1999) argue, under the null hypothesis, PMG estimators are consistent and
more e¢ cient than MG estimators which impose no constraint on the regression. If the null
is rejected, we cannot assume the same long run coe¢ cients for all panels and the restriction
imposed by PMG estimators is not valid. In that case, the MG estimator is preferred.
The Hausman tests do not reject the null hypothesis for homogeneity restriction at 1 per
cent signicance level, suggesting that the PMG is the preferred estimator to the MG and
the DFE is preferred to the MG. The PMG estimator constrains the long run elasticities to
be equal across all panels. The Hausman test conrms the restrictions; therefore, the pooling
across countries yields e¢ cient and consistent estimates.
We nd a negative and statistically signicant error correction term (ECT) indicating the
existence of a stable cointegration relationship.120 The ECT of the VECM based preferred
regression suggests that in each year 17 percentage points of any misalignment between the
actual and equilibrium REER is corrected. For a group of oil exporting countries, Dauvin
(2014) suggests an ECT of 16 per cent which is very close to ours.
7.5 Robustness Check
For the purpose of robustness check, we utilize the DOLS and FMOLS estimators. Table 29
reports the results for the DOLS and FMOLS estimators. Both estimators provide very similar
coe¢ cients for real oil price and productivity di¤erentials. They are signicant and have positive
120The time (T ) required to dissipate x percent (in this case, 50 percent) of a shock is determined according
to (1   )T = (1   x), where  is the coe¢ cient of the error-correction term and T is the required number of
periods (years).
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e¤ect on the REER. In comparison to our PMG results, we observe a decrease in oil elasticity
and an increase in productivity di¤erential.121 However, as Figure 8 shows, up to 2000, the
equilibrium exchange rates of these ve countries based on the FMOLS and DOLS or PMG
estimation are almost identical. From 2000, we observe a stronger equilibrium exchange rate
for the PMG estimation in comparison to the equilibrium exchange rate based on FMOLS or
DOLS, which is explained by the stronger coe¢ cient of oil price in the PMG method.
Table 29 - Results of Panel Estimations (DOLS and FMOLS)
Dep Variable: lreer DOLS FMOLS
Explanatory Variables LR Coef P-Value LR Coef P-Value
loil 0.115 0.00 0.110 0.01
lrgdpc 0.189 0.00 0.188 0.00
Note: The DOLS estimation employs one lead and one lag.
The BEERs of Qatar, Kuwait and (to some extent) the UAE follow the REERs. From 2000,
with the increase in oil price, the BEERs appreciate; however, with the fall of the US dollar, the
REER of Oman and Saudi Arabia decline. Therefore, the currencies of Saudi Arabia and Oman
get undervalued. Qatar and Kuwait currencies are close to their BEERs, and the UAE currency
is slightly overvalued. Our results are in line with the results of Coudert et al. (2011) which
apply PMG estimation for a panel of 16 oil exporting countries. Their heterogeneous sample
consists of countries such as Norway, Mexico, Venezuela and other oil exporting countries in
North Africa and the Middle East. They conrm the undervaluation of the currencies of Oman
and Saudi Arabia after 2000. Our REER data are constructed based on the trade weights of
each of these ve countries with their trade partners; therefore, our data are more realistic and
accurate, but the REERs in the study of Coudert et al. (2011) are calculated against the world
basket of currencies, whether they are issued by trade partners or not.
8 Conclusion
Drawing on the existing literature and a new annual data set of the real e¤ective exchange rates
and productivity di¤erentials which cover the period from 1980 to 2011, this study follows the
121The productivity di¤erential elasticity based on DOLS and FMOLS estimation is in line with what Aguirre
and Calderon (2005) get using DOLS.
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Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach by Clark and MacDonald (1998)
to derive the equilibrium real e¤ective exchange rates and currency misalignments for ve oil
exporting countries in the Persian Gulf, namely Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the
UAE. We estimate the REER series based on both single country (Johansen and ARDL) and
panel-data cointegration techniques. In the time series analysis, the ARDL procedure shows
cointegration for Qatar with the same explanatory variables, which is very close to our ndings
in the panel analysis. Given the limited length of the sample (32 years) and low power of
individual country by country unit root and cointegration tests, estimating separate equations
for each country (time series) does not provide us with precise results. Therefore, to increase
the e¢ ciency of the estimators, we employ panel analysis. We apply the pooled mean-group
(PMG) of Pesaran et al. (1999) and four more panel estimators for the robustness check.
The main explanatory variables are found to be oil price and productivity di¤erentials vis-
à-vis trading-partner countries. Taking into account the whole set of regression results based
on di¤erent panel estimators and annual data, this study shows a signicant e¤ect of real oil
price and productivity di¤erentials on the REER. The estimated long run relation between the
REER and fundamentals is economically and statistically signicant. In particular, a 10 per
cent increase in real oil price causes 1.9 per cent appreciation of the REER, which is consistent
with theoretical predictions and the previous studies for commodity (oil) exporting countries
such as Cashin et al. (2004) for commodity exporting countries, Coudert et al. (2011) for a
group of oil exporting countries, Koranchelian (2005) for Algeria, and Dauvin (2014) for ten
oil exporting countries. On the other hand, the productivity deferential elasticity is 0.10 which
is consistent with the results in the related literature such as those of MacDonald and Ricci
(2004) for South Africa and Lee et al. (2008) for 48 countries over 1980-2004.
Our results conrm that these countries are not prepared for a currency union. Focusing on
2011, the last year of our analysis, the currencies of Oman and Saudi Arabia are undervalued
and should be appreciated while the currency of the UAE is overvalued. The currencies of
the other two countries, Kuwait and Qatar, are almost in equilibrium. In order to establish
a currency union, many political and economic prerequisites must be satised. Based on the
lessons from the establishment of the Euro in Europe, political convergence and harmonized
institutions are the essential ingredients of a currency union. In the case of the Euro, there
was a deep desire for political unication which was followed by establishment of the European
Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. The historical
process of the European currency union conrms that the European central bank is built on
the existence of proper institutions and convergence in political and economic reform, which is a
very slow process. The political relationship among these oil exporting countries in the Persian
Gulf (some of which are tribal kingdoms) is fragile and even sometimes hostile. The move of
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Oman towards Iran and the hostility between Qatar and Saudi Arabia are the latest divergence
among these countries. Therefore, the plan for a currency union in 2010 was premature and has
already failed. They have a long way ahead to satisfy the political homogeneity of a common
currency.
For the equilibrium exchange rate, which is the focus of this chapter and one of the economic
prerequisites for currency union, our results show that before any step toward the establishment
of a monetary union in these countries, the divergence in the fair value of their currencies should
be removed. As was the focus of the second chapter,122 these countries should move away from
their current currency peg to the US dollar towards a basket of appropriate currencies and
probably oil price to decouple their currencies from the US dollar as a major oil importer.
122A Monetary Policy for the Persian Gulf Oil Exporting Countries.
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Part IV
Sources of Real Exchange Rate
Fluctuations in a Developed
Commodity Exporting Country
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1 Introduction
There is a vast literature on factors which determine the dynamic of the exchange rate and its
uctuations. In the 1970s, the focus is on ination di¤erences and monetary factors. Based on
this view, when a country faces high ination in comparison to its trading partners, its cur-
rency would depreciate relative to its partnerscurrencies. In the 1980s, this theory is rejected
when we simultaneously observe converging ination across countries and high uctuations in
exchange rates. This contradiction directs the literature towards the non-monetary factors such
as shocks to world prices of exports, scal policy and productivity. This establishes the im-
portant role of fundamentals in explaining the exchange rate and its uctuations. During the
1990s, expansion of capital ow and invention of di¤erent nancial instruments add new factors
to determination of the exchange rate. This brings the expectation literature to the models
of exchange rate determination. This chapter focuses on the real exchange rate dynamic of
Canada as a commodity exporting country and the long run relationship of the US-Canada
real exchange rate with fundamentals. For purposes of comparison, we extend the analysis to
Australia as another developed commodity exporting country.
This chapter contributes to two types of literature: that of long run equilibrium relationship
between real exchange rates and fundamental variables; and that of variance decomposition.
MacDonald (1999) emphasizes two major points about real exchange rate dynamics: rst,
identication of a long run relationship between real exchange rate and fundamentals such
as supply factors (e.g., the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis), demand-side variables (e.g., gov-
ernment spending) and terms of trade. Second, assigning the proper weight to these factors
in explaining the variance of the real exchange rate. Information about the source of these
uctuations helps in evaluation of the empirical relevance of di¤erent classes of models of real
exchange rate determination. This chapter should help monetary authorities determine whether
uctuations of the Canadian dollar are driven by fundamentals, as opposed to short run market
forces, and thus help them in their policies.
For several reasons, the dynamic of the US-Canada real exchange rate as an energy and
non-energy commodity exporting country is interesting. First, for a long time both Canada
and the US have been under exible exchange rate regimes. Second, because of their high
volume of trade, terms of trade should be very inuential on their real exchange rate. Third,
most of Canadas trade is with the US; this may justify the approximation of the real e¤ective
exchange rate of Canada to its real exchange rate against the US dollar. Fourth, we can consider
Canada as a small open economy where terms of trade is exogenously determined by outside
forces. Fifth, the high ow of trade and capital between these two countries may synchronize
their business cycles; therefore, we may expect lower volatility in their real exchange rate in
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comparison to Canadas other trade partners. Overall, we expect a major role for terms of
trade in explaining the real exchange rate and its uctuations and, on the other hand, a minor
e¤ect from monetary forces.
Whenever Canadian dollar goes towards parity with the US dollar, there is great concern
that the high Canadian dollar may undermine economic growth prospects and harm the com-
petitiveness of Canadian exports. The monetary authorities are under pressure to react against
the currency appreciation. At the same time, the Bank of Canada must pursue its ination
targeting policy. This causes a conict between these two goals: in its interest rate manage-
ment, should the Bank of Canada concentrate on the exchange rate, or maintain focus on the
ination target?
In this chapter, using a new data set of Canada commodity price indices,123 we review and
update the Canada Bank Equation (which is a cointegration relationship between energy and
non-energy commodity prices with real exchange rate) in three aspects: rst, by extending the
data and dividing the full sample into two subsamples based on the break point in the sign
of the energy price coe¢ cient. Second, in addition to commodity prices, we add some other
fundamentals to the original Canada Bank Equation. Third, we use the new data of Canada
commodity indices which are updated annually. Therefore, we take care of historical change in
the composition of Canadian commodity production. Our cointegration relationship between
real exchange rate and fundamentals successfully tracks the real exchange rate for 35 years,
almost four decades.
This new version of the Canada Bank Equation checks whether the Canadian dollar is out
of track with fundamentals or not. This helps policy makers to set the optimal interest rate for
the ultimate goal of monetary policy which is ination targeting. If the currency is clearly out
of line with the fundamentals, the Bank of Canada may more easily reach the ination target
if the currency is brought to equilibrium. On the other hand, if the currency is in equilibrium
(with fundamentals), then the Bank of Canada should simply ignore the real exchange rate and
focus on its main goal: ination targeting. After updating the Canada Bank Equation, we use
a Structural Vector Error Correction Model (henceforth: SVECM) to drive impulse responses
to di¤erent fundamental shocks and decompose the variance of the US-Canada real exchange
rate. After each empirical analysis, we apply di¤erent robustness checks.
Furthermore, ignoring the long run relationship of real exchange rate and fundamentals in
level, we proceed with the rst di¤erence analysis, and identify the source of uctuations in the
real exchange rate of Canada and the US. We review and modify the analysis of Clarida and
123To our knowledge, this is the rst study using the new Canada commodity price indices in this literature.
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Gali (1994) for Canada. For di¤erent data samples, we rerun their model and check the results.
Built on Clarida and Gali (1994), for Canada as a commodity exporting country, in two steps
we add energy and non-energy prices to their Structural Vector Autoregressive (henceforth:
SVAR) analysis. In all stages, we apply extensive robustness checks and compare the results
(in the form of impulse responses and variance decomposition) with the original work of Clarida
and Gali.
To preview the results, we conrm the ndings of Amano and van Norden (1995) for the
period before 1993, and then we show the switch in the role of energy price in the Canada
Bank Equation. We expand the Canada Bank Equation and introduce a long run equilibrium
relationship between the real exchange rate of Canada and the US and the set of economic
fundamentals including real non-energy commodity price index, relative productivity and gov-
ernment spending. For variance decomposition of real exchange rate in both cases, with or
without cointegration, the identication scheme is based on long run restrictions.
For the variance decomposition in the case without cointegration, we conrm the ndings
of Clarida and Gali (1994) and show the dominant e¤ect of the demand shock and a minor
e¤ect of the supply shock in explaining the variation of the real exchange rate. Incorporating
non-energy commodity prices into the model of Clarida and Gali does little to challenge their
conclusion that the demand shocks account for the major part of variation in the real exchange
rate. Furthermore, by adding the energy price to the analysis, we still observe the domination
of the demand shock in the variance decomposition of the real exchange rate. However, in the
second subsample (post 1993), we observe a greater role for energy price. Studies in the SVAR
literature following Clarida and Gali (1994) have showed that productivity (supply) shocks have
negligible e¤ects on real exchange rate uctuations.
This study shows that explicitly taking into account the cointegrating relationship between
the real exchange rate and fundamental variables, relative productivity shocks explain the major
part of real exchange rate variance. Adding commodity price to the cointegration analysis of a
commodity exporting country such as Canada, the variance decomposition of the real exchange
rate reveals that supply shocks and the non-energy commodity price are the most important
source of real exchange rate uctuations. Therefore, results of the SVAR analysis, which fails
to take into account the long run relationship, do not highlight the importance of productivity
shocks in variance decomposition of the real exchange rate. For comparison, we apply the
SVAR and SVECM analysis for Australia, as a commodity exporting country with a exible
exchange rate and a small open economy.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the theoretical
model of the link between the real exchange rate and fundamentals. In section 3, we review the
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Canada Bank Equation which is focused merely on terms of trade and separates the e¤ect of
energy and non-energy commodities. Second 4 elaborates on the Structural VAR and VECM
literature, here we review factors which explain the uctuations of the real exchange rate with
or without a cointegration relationship. In section 5, the data used in the analyses is presented.
Section 6 sets out the empirical analysis of this chapter: after unit root and cointegration tests,
we introduce a new version of the Canada Bank Equation and update and extend the SVAR
and SVECM analysis for Canada. In this section, empirical results are followed by a robustness
test. In section 7, we rerun the SVAR and SVECM analysis for Australia as a commodity
exporting country. Finally, section 8 contains our conclusion.
2 Theoretical Model
In this section, we review the theoretical model for analysing real exchange rate dynamics for
a commodity exporting country. Based on Dornbusch (1976), the expected change of the real
exchange rate is proportional to deviations from its equilibrium level:
Etqt+1 = (qt   qt) (44)
where qt is the fundamental (or equilibrium) value of the real exchange rate, which may be
subject to permanent shifts. Applying the uncovered real interest rate parity condition:
Et [qt+k]  qt = rt   rt (45)
where rt and rt represent the home and the foreign real interest rates, respectively.
Rearranging Equations 45 and 46 into an expression for the real exchange rate:
qt = qt   (rt   rt ) (46)
Equation 47 describes the dynamics of the real exchange rate by the equilibrium level of the
real exchange rate and the real interest rate di¤erential.
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The failure of the PPP hypothesis rejects a constant equilibrium value, since the speed
of convergence towards the equilibrium is too slow to conrm a constant equilibrium exchange
rate. Therefore, the literature links the equilibrium exchange rate to the fundamentals which are
dynamic. Di¤erent models explain the related fundamentals, such as: productivity, government
spending and terms of trade.
In theory, there are two main di¤erent models which explain the e¤ect of productivity on
the real exchange rate. The rst is the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis which is based on Balassa
(1964) and Samuelson (1964). Based on this hypothesis, if the relative productivity of traded
goods to another sector in a country grows more that of their trading partners, the country
will observe currency real appreciation. The wages in the more productive part of the economy
increase, therefore prices will rise faster to reect the productivity increase. The Balassa-
Samuelson Hypothesis is based on four assumptions: rst, for traded goods in the short run,
the Purchasing-Power Parity (PPP) holds; second, in the two countries of the model, shares
of the non-traded sector are the same and constant; third, within a country, labour is mobile
between sectors; and fourth, labour is the only factor of production. The Balassa-Samuelson
Hypothesis is not the only theoretical model of the e¤ect of productivity on the real exchange
rate.
Benigno and Thoenissen (2003) introduce an alternative model which is a two country
sticky-price model of real exchange rate. In this theoretical model, the PPP does not hold
and rms are not price takers. In contrast to the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis, this model
considers price rigidities, intermediate goods, imperfect competition, and preference favouring
local goods. For Canada, Helliwell et al. (2005) present the result of the e¤ect of productivity on
the real exchange rate which is consistent with the Benigno and Thoenissen model. Therefore,
the faster productivity growth in the Canadian manufacturing sector than in the United States
tends to depreciate the currency and vice versa for aggregate productivity growth.
An important issue in empirical studies of real exchange rate determination is the choice
of variables which represent productivity. One suggestion is the relative output (real GDP
per capita) which can be interpreted as a broad measure of labour productivity for the overall
economy.124 Alexius and Nilson (2000) assign two conditions for reliability of the real GDP
per capita as a proxy for productivity: rst, the productivity growth in the non-tradable
sector should be similar across countries. Second, it should be a small proportion of the total
factor productivity growth. Other measures of productivity di¤erential that are employed are a
relative price di¤erential between traded and non-traded goods at home and abroad,125 a total
124Gauthier and Tessier (2002), Clarida and Gali (1994), Chadha and Prasad (1997), Alexius (2005) and
Zalduendo (2006) all use real GDP per capita as the proxy for productivity.
125Chinn (1999) and Kakkar and Ogaki (1999).
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labour productivity di¤erential,126 and a sectoral productivity di¤erential.127
In addition to productivity, the other factor inuencing the uctuation of the real exchange
rate is the demand shock. By adding the demand shock to the Balassa-Samuelson analysis,
Rogo¤ (1992) modies the model. Rogo¤ uses the ratio of government spending to GDP as
a proxy for aggregate demand. The ratio of government spending to GDP a¤ects the real
exchange rate through its impacts on the relative price of non-tradable goods. Based on this
model, a positive demand shock appreciates the currency, since most likely the government
spending is focused on non-tradable goods. This result is conrmed by the theoretical open
macroeconomic model of Clarida and Gali (1994).
On the other hand, there are some studies which suggest that currency depreciates with a
positive demand shock. Barro and Lee (1994) describe evidence that high government spend-
ing and higher tax are associated with lowered aggregate productivity growth which causes
currency depreciation through the Balassa-Samuelson channel. In another study, Habermeier
and Mesquita (1999) focus on cases where the increase in government spending is nanced by
distortionary taxes. This may discourage investment, and hence prevent productivity growth.
Another channel through which higher government spending may cause currency deprecia-
tion is the twin decits phenomenon. Bailliu et al. (2007) consider periods when an economy
faces current account and scal decits at the same time, and the current account decit is
driven by scal decit. Then, to improve a countrys competitiveness and boost its exports,
the currency is forced to depreciate; consequently, this improves the current account.
In addition to productivity and government spending di¤erentials, changes in the terms of
trade can also a¤ect the real exchange rate. This e¤ect is intensied in a commodity exporting
country such as Canada. Based on the theoretical terms of trade models, wealth e¤ect is the
channel through which the terms of trade may inuence the real exchange rate. An improvement
in the terms of trade of a country will increase its wealth; and consequently raise demand. This
extra demand will change relative prices in favour of foreign goods; therefore, it causes currency
appreciation. The link between commodity price and real exchange rates is documented in the
literature: studies such as Koya and Orden (1994) for Australia and New Zealand; Amano
and van Norden (1995) for Canada; Chen and Rogo¤ (2003) for Australia, Canada and New
Zealand; MacDonald and Ricci (2004) for South Africa; and Zalduendo (2006) for Venezuela.
Therefore, in this literature for a commodity exporting country, using the real commodity price
as a proxy for terms of trade is justied.
126MacDonald (2002) and Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2002).
127Chen and Rogo¤ (2003) and Chaban (2006).
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3 Canada Bank Equation
In theory, many factors may inuence the Canada-US real exchange rate: scal policy, interest
rate di¤erences, unemployment, relative ination, productivity, and terms of trade, among
others. These factors inuence a currencys e¤ective exchange rate rather than any particular
bilateral rate. However, in the case of Canada, because of high volume of trade and capital
movements between the US and Canada, we focus on the bilateral rate. Among all these factors,
terms of trade in a commodity exporting country such as Canada has special weight.
In the rst attempt to test the link between terms of trade and the Canada-US real exchange
rate, Lafrance and Longworth (1987) fail to establish an empirical link between Canadas real
exchange rate and the overall terms of trade. However, Amano and van Norden (1995) explain
the Canada-US real exchange rate using terms of trade deated by Consumer Price Indices
(CPI). Covering monthly data from 1973 to 1992, besides the satisfactory results for in-sample
data, their simple and stable error correction equation beat a random walk in out-of-sample
forecasting.128
Based on a cointegration approach, Amano and van Norden (1995) use a single-equation
error-correction model to present a long run relationship between the real exchange rate, real
energy commodity price index and real non-energy commodity price index. To represent the
short run dynamics, they include the Canada-US short term interest rate di¤erential.129 The
equation can be written as follows:130
rfx = [rfxt 1   0   ccomt 1   eenet 1] + intt 1 + "t (47)
where the dependent variable, rfx, is the nominal Can-US exchange rate deated by the
CPI and com; ene and int are non-energy commodity price index, energy price index and
Can-US interest rate di¤erential, respectively.
The empirical results conrm that the energy and non-energy commodity prices a¤ect the
128To check the di¤erences between bilateral and e¤ective real exchange rates, they add an additional explana-
tory variable (the US real e¤ective exchange rate against other countries). The results conrm that this variable
is insignicant. Therefore, using the bilateral rate is legitimate.
129For the short run dynamic, the Canada Bank Equation literature uses the Canada-US Short term interest
rate di¤erential, but Amano and van Norden (1995) use the di¤erential in the long-short term yield spread.
130Johansen (1992) mentions the special case in which, instead of working with the entire vector error-correction
model, we can use a single equation model. The conditions are: rstly, there is only one cointegrating vector;
secondly, all the other cointegrating variables are weakly exogenous with respect to the rst variable under
consideration.
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Canadian dollar in di¤erent ways. Therefore, the split of the commodity price to energy and
non-energy commodity prices is the key to the equations success. While higher prices for
non-energy commodities appreciate the Canadian dollar, higher energy prices depreciate it.
As Amano and van Norden (1995) argue, the reason for this behaviour is that the Canadian
manufacturing sector is more concentrated in energy intensive industries than that of its trading
partners. Therefore, the possible explanation for the negative relationship between energy price
and the Canadian dollar could be the outweighed adverse e¤ects of higher oil prices on the
competitiveness of Canadas relatively energy-intensive manufacturing exports in comparison
to the direct benets of oil exports.
Finally, based on the empirical results of Amano and van Norden (1995), a 10 per cent
improvement in non-energy commodity price leads to a 8.11 per cent appreciation of the Canada-
US real exchange rate while a 10 per cent improvement in energy price results in a 2.33 per
cent depreciation of the real exchange rate. The speed of adjustment  is - 0.038 implying that
37.1 per cent of adjustment is completed within one year (a half-life of 17.9 months).
Amano and van Norden (1995) contribute to the literature in three aspects. First, they
document a stable long run relationship between real exchange rate and terms of trade in
Canada. Second, they split commodity price to energy and non-energy prices and show that
these two prices inuence the exchange rate di¤erently. Third, in the framework of Meese and
Rogo¤ (1983) , Amano and van Norden (1995) successfully beat a random walk in forecasting
the US-Canada real exchange rate. However, in the long run, they only consider commodity
prices and ignore other fundamentals.
As in the rst extension of Amano and van Norden (1995), using quarterly data over the
period 1972 Q2 to 1994 Q3, Lafrance and van Norden (1995) conrm the performance of
Canada Bank Equation. As with Amano and van Norden (1995), the explanatory variables are
signicant and the inuence of energy and non-energy commodity prices are di¤erent.
To improve the Canada Bank Equation, di¤erent studies have extended data and /or added
some other fundamentals to the original equation. This literature may be categorized into two
main groups: the rst branch focusing on the historical change in the composition of Canadian
commodity export (production) and the second investigating some new explanatory variables
in the long run or short run part of the original model.
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3.1 Change in the Share of Commodities in Canadas Export (Pro-
duction)
Although Canada has been a commodity exporter, the composition of its commodity exports
has changed over time. As Laidler and Aba (2001) mention, in the three decades from the 1970s
to the 1990s, the composition of exports changed while the ratio of commodity exports to GDP
has been stable at around 11 per cent. In this period, the share of commodities in Canadas
exports decline from an average of 55 per cent in the 1970s to 47 per cent in the 1980s, to 37
per cent in the 1990s. Therefore, it is reasonable to observe a change in the e¤ect of commodity
and energy prices on the real exchange rate. This change in the dynamic of exports is ignored
by Amano and van Norden (1995). Recognizing this issue, Laidler and Aba (2001), Issa et al.
(2006, 2008), and Bergevin and Busby (2010) document the shift in the relationship between
energy price and the Canada-US real exchange rate.
Using three separate coe¢ cients on each variable for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, Laidler
and Aba (2001) re-estimate the Bank of Canada equation. The US dollar prices of energy and
non-energy commodities are the two variables in the cointegration part of the equation. In
contrast to Amano and van Norden (1995) which use CPI, Laidler and Aba (2001) apply the
US GDP deator to deate the nominal value of exchange rate, commodity and energy prices.
The use of this GDP deator, the price of a bundle of goods produced in the US, may give us
a more accurate measure of the real exchange rate in comparison to the CPI which represents
the price of a bundle of goods consumed there. Finally, according to the literature, the short
term interest di¤erential between the two countries represents the short run dynamic.
Laidler and Aba present decline in the e¤ect of energy price after the 1970s. This causes
the insignicance of energy price in explaining the real exchange rate after 1990. In contrast,
for non-energy commodity prices, in the three decades of this study, there is a decline in the
coe¢ cient but it is signicant. For the short run part of the equation, Laidler and Aba get
a signicant coe¢ cient for the Canadian-US ination di¤erential. Therefore, the only major
di¤erence in the results between Laidler and Aba (2001) and Amano and van Norden (1995) is
the decline and insignicance of e¤ect of energy price in the Canada Bank Equation.
The insignicance of energy price index in the equation for the 1990s may be explained
by the switching of the sign of the energy price coe¢ cient which is caused by changes in the
Canadian economy. In the 1990s, Canada converts from being an energy importer to an en-
ergy exporter. During this period, the e¤ect of energy price on real exchange rate is changed;
therefore, the insignicance of the energy price coe¢ cient in the Canada Bank Equation rep-
resents this transition. Helliwell (2000) focuses on the high oil price in the 1970s and 1980s
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and argues that this high oil price causes more demand for the US dollar as a safe asset and
consequently the appreciation of the US dollar against other currencies, including the Cana-
dian dollar. Helliwell (2000) criticizes the Canada Bank Equation and argues that it wrongly
interprets the depreciation of Canadian currency as the consequence of high oil price not US
dollar appreciation.
Using a longer and richer data set, Murray et al. (2000) extend data to 1998 Q4, and
run the Canada Bank Equation. Over the 1973 Q1-1998 Q4 period, the nominal bilateral
exchange rate depreciated by 44 Canadian cents. Of this, more than 56 per cent is because of
a decreasing trend in the relative price of non-energy commodities; the PPP, energy price and
other factors contribute 23, 2 and 25 per cent, respectively. On the other hand, interest rate
di¤erential appreciates the currency by 7 per cent. This is a partial conrmation of Laidler and
Aba (2001) which document the decline in the signicance of energy price in the Canada Bank
Equation during the 1990s. In another study, Issa et al. (2006, 2008) show 1993 Q3 as the
break point of the change in the sign of energy price coe¢ cient in the Canada Bank Equation.
Issa et al. (2006, 2008) revisit the Canada Bank Equation and show that the long run
relationship between real exchange rate, energy and non-energy commodity prices are not stable
for the full sample of 1973 Q1-2005 Q4. The energy price coe¢ cient shifts and they nd
cointegration in two subsamples, not the full sample. Using a dummy variable, they present
the change in the sign of energy price in the cointegration relationship:
rfx = [rfxt 1 0 ccomt 1 eenet 1 eI(t  )enet 1 uI(t  )]+intt 1+"t (48)
where I(t  ) is a dummy variable which takes the value unity when t   for  = 1993
Q3 and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable represents the change in the sign of the energy price
coe¢ cient. Applying structural break tests with an unknown break date, they nd a break point
in the sign of this relationship, which changes from negative to positive in 1993 Q3. This shift
in the e¤ect of energy price is rst suggested by Laidler and Aba (2001). Therefore, the result
of Issa et al. (2006, 2008) indicates that the cointegrating relationship in the standard Canada
Bank Equation is supported in the subsamples, not the full sample. In the rst subsample, an
increase of energy price depreciates the currency while in the second subsample it appreciates
it. This transfer in the relationship is coincident with the increase of Canadas energy export
which happens after establishment of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. Therefore, by
considering a dummy variable for the change of energy price coe¢ cient, they signicantly
improve the performance of the Canada Bank Equation in the full sample.
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Given the evidence provided by Laidler and Aba (2001) and Issa et al. (2006, 2008) which
acknowledges that the Canada Bank Equation coe¢ cients may be changed as the composition
of Canadas commodities production may have changed over time, Maier and DePratto (2008)
apply a weighting scheme for energy and non-energy commodities content in Canadas exports
and production. They use the model of Issa et al. (2006, 2008) as the base, and pre-multiply
the price indices for energy and non-energy commodities by appropriate scaling factors which
are derived from export or production weights.131
The scaling factor based on exports is the ratio of the value of energy exports (non-energy) to
total exports for the energy (non-energy) variable. For the scaling factor based on production,
they scale energy and non-energy commodities by a continuous series, indicating the degree
to which Canada is a net importer or exporter of energy and non-energy commodities. By
using these scaling factors, Maier and DePratto (2008) show the coe¢ cients are more stable
in comparison to the baseline model of Issa et al. (2006, 2008). Therefore, the exchange rate
dynamic is linked to the composition and dynamic of Canadas export or production patterns.
We use the new Canada commodity price indices which are updated annually based on the
dynamic of the production composition; therefore, our data automatically satisfy these scaling
factors.132
Following the decade by decade method of Laidler and Aba (2001), Bergevin and Busby
(2010) run the Canada Bank Equation for almost four decades from 1973 Q1 to 2007 Q2. For
each decade from the 1970s to the 2000s, they assign one coe¢ cient for the commodity price
and the other for energy price. Bergevin and Busby (2010) update the method of Laidler and
Aba (2001) in three aspects. First, as do Maier and DePratto (2008), they distinguish between
the commodity price indices of Canadian commodity exports and production. Second, they
extend the data; therefore, they present the 2000s as the fourth decade. Third, in addition to
interest rate di¤erential, they add the IMF Financial Stress Index to the short run dynamic of
the equation to describe the ight to safety phenomenon in nancial markets during periods of
nancial crisis when the Canadian dollar depreciates against the US dollar.
Furthermore, Bergevin and Busby (2010) successfully track the historical exchange rate
dynamic and beat the decade by decade model of Laidler and Aba (2001). Finally, Bergevin
and Busby (2010) conrm the results of Issa et al. (2006, 2008) which document the shift in
energy price from a negative inuence on the Canadian dollar in the 1970s and 1980s, to a
positive one in the 2000s. Therefore, the 1990s is the transition period for this sign change.
131To explain exchange rate, as Orr (1999) points out, it is more appropriate to use commodity price indices
which are based on exports not production.
132Maier and DePratto (2008) add the squared value of the energy price to the equation to test the non-linear
e¤ects of energy prices on exchange rate, but the results are not promising.
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Hence, after 2000, the Canadian dollar behaves similarly to an oil currency: it appreciates (or
depreciates) with increase (or decrease) in oil price.
3.2 Search for Alternative Explanatory Variables
To nd an improved version of the Canada Bank Equation, several new variables have been
tested as alternative explanatory variables. Tessier and Djoudad (1999) is the rst study to try
di¤erent fundamentals, such as: government debt, foreign indebtedness, unemployment rates,
productivity, and government spending. They do not get signicant coe¢ cients for these new
variables. In another study, Murray et al. (2000) add two variables to the cointergation part of
the original Canada Bank Equation: the di¤erence in Canadian and US labour force produc-
tivity, and the di¤erence in Canadian and US general government debt. In the cointegration
test, they do not nd a long run relationship between one or both of these variables and the
real exchange rate. Then they run three versions of the original Canada Bank Equation with
each of the two new variables and with both. These three modications do not improve the
performance of the original Canada Bank Equation.
In another study, over the 1975 Q1-1999 Q4 period, Helliwell et al. (2005) use the same two
variables of Amano and van Norden (1995): the energy prices and the non-energy commodity
prices deated by GDP deators rather than CPI. However, in the short run (beside the Canada-
US short term interest rate di¤erential) they add the change in relative public sector debt
positions as a proportion of GDP. The coe¢ cients of the non-energy commodity prices, interest
rate di¤erentials, and changes in relative public debt ratios have the correct sign and are all
signicant. Although the equation successfully explains 25 per cent of the variance of the real
exchange rate, it does not justify the appreciation of the Canadian dollar in 2003. In line
with Laidler and Aba (2001), and Bergevin and Busby (2010), Helliwell et al. (2005) show the
insignicance of the energy price coe¢ cient.
Helliwell et al. (2005) continue to look for the proper fundamentals; they run 13 di¤erent
versions of Canada Bank Equation with di¤erent explanatory variables. The long run part
of the equation with the best performance consists of real non-energy commodity prices and
labour productivity di¤erentials with the United States while the short run part consists of
Canada-US short term interest rate di¤erentials, the US dollar relative to other currencies
excluding Canada, and a measure of risk. This version of the Canada Bank Equation explains
the real exchange rate since 1975, both in-sample and out-of-sample, and successfully represents
the appreciation of the Canadian dollar in 2003. However, this equation fails in two periods:
rst, during the LTCM (Long Term Capital Management) failure in 1998 when the dollar is
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going through speculative pressure. Second, during the terrorist attacks on the US in Sep 2001.
Overall, it seems, under normal circumstances, the equation which is introduced by Helliwell
et al. (2005) links the fundamentals to the real exchange rate. Helliwell et al. (2005) name
this version of the Canada Bank Equation the Nominal Exchange rate model (NEMO). In the
Canada Bank Equation literature, this study is the rst which successfully shows the e¤ect of
productivity di¤erential on real exchange rate.133
In addition to the VECM procedure which starts by recognizing the non-stationarity of
variables and then testing for cointegration, Choudhri and Schembri (2014) investigate the
Canada Bank Equation by using the Bounds Testing procedure suggested by Pesaran et al.
(2001). There are two critical issues with the VECM method. First, as a part of the VECM
method, the unit root tests have low power in recognizing the non-stationarity process. Second,
excluding or including the trend in the unit root test may cause problems. In the Bounds
Testing method, without unit root tests and regardless of stationarity or non-stationarity of
the variables, we can test the long run relationship in levels. Choudhri and Schembri (2014)
apply the Bounds Testing method and get di¤erent results for post-1990 and pre-1990. The
e¤ect of each variable has become stronger and in the second subsample a positive trend is
present. As in Helliwell et al. (2005), the e¤ect of productivity on real exchange rate is
opposite to that predicted by the standard Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis.
In addition to the productivity di¤erential, another important fundamental is the global
trade imbalances which may cause the trend depreciation of the US dollar against most major
currencies including the Canadian dollar. Therefore, adding a variable representing the large
US external imbalances may enhance the performance of the Canada Bank Equation. Using
data for the period 1973 Q1 to 2005 Q4, Bailliu, Dib, and Schembri (2014) test for this e¤ect
by including the US scal and current account balances in the original Canada Bank Equation,
and outperform the original Canada Bank Equation.
4 Structural VARs and VECMs Literature
Determining the relative importance of permanent real factors and transitory nominal factors to
real exchange rate movements is an important strand of empirical research of the real exchange
rate. Clarida and Gali (1994) is the leading study in this literature. To model changes in the
real exchange rate and fundamental variables, they use SVAR134 and the long run structural
133We can consider the NEMO as a kind of the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach.
134See, e.g., Sims (1981, 1986), Shapiro and Watson (1988), and Blanchard and Quah (1989).
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identication method of Blanchard and Quah (1989).135 Then, they apply the variance decom-
position techniques to present the e¤ect of real and nominal shocks in explaining real exchange
rate uctuations.
For Germany, Canada and the UK currencies relative to the US dollar, Clarida and Gali
(1994) develop a SVAR model in which real shocks are separated into shocks to real supply,
demand and nominal. They contribute to the literature by recognizing the demand shocks as
the main factor of real exchange rate uctuations both in short and long run while the supply
shock has a minor role. In the short run, the nominal shocks are not important for the UK and
Canada but are for Japan and Germany, all relative to the US dollar.
After Clarida and Gali (1994), other studies, such as Chadha and Prasad (1997), MacDonald
and Swagel (2000), and Filosa (2004), extend sample data or, as Rogers (1999) and Webber
(1997), add some new explanatory variables. Although, Rogers (1999)136 and Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995) present larger relative e¤ect of monetary shocks, the negligible e¤ect of
supply (productivity) shock in explaining the uctuations of real exchange rate is accepted as
the stylised fact in the literature on sources of real exchange rate uctuations. Overall, the
common result of all these studies is the minor e¤ect of productivity shocks on real exchange
rates at all horizons, which is the conrmation of the conclusion of Clarida and Gali (1994) as
conventional wisdom.
Similar to Clarida and Gali (1994), a common characteristic of these SVAR studies is that
they do not consider the long run cointegration relationship between the levels of the variables.
Some of them, such as Clarida and Gali (1994), and Rogers (1999), reject the long run re-
lationship between real exchange rate and fundamentals while others, such as Weber (1997),
do not investigate it. On the other hand, based on the SVAR literature, productivity shock
does not explain much of the variance in the real exchange rate. However, this is against a
vast literature of long run relationship of fundamentals such as productivity and real exchange
rate. MacDonald (1999) emphasizes the connection of the literature on long run relationships
between real exchange rates and fundamentals (such as productivity) and on identifying the
relative importance of shocks in explaining real exchange rate volatility. Hence, there is a
gap between this variance decomposition literature and the literature of long run equilibrium
relationships between real exchange rates and fundamental variables.
135For the rst time, Blanchard and Quah (1989) suggest the use of long run restrictions to identify structural
shocks in a VAR model without cointegration.
136Rogers (1999) could not nd cointegration between the real exchange rate and fundamentals; therefore
Rogers applies a SVAR model for over 100 years of data for the real Sterling-US dollar exchange rate. Rogers
results show that from 19 to 60 percent of variation in real exchange rate is because of monetary shocks and 4
to 26 percent from scal and productivity shocks combined.
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Focusing on long run relationship, the literature of sources of real exchange rate variability
goes toward the cointegration analysis. Studies such as Fisher (1996); Gauthier and Tessier
(2002); Alexius (2005) and Chanthapun (2010) provide a link between the literature on the
cointegration relationship between real exchange rate and fundamentals with that on variance
decomposition. For the decomposition of structural shocks, these SVECM studies apply di¤er-
ent econometrics frameworks such as: King et al. (1991), Gonzalo and Ng (2001), and Pagan
and Pesaran (2008).137 Fisher (1996), Alexius (2005) and Gauthier and Tessier (2002) apply
the framework of King et al. (1991) while Groen and Lombardelli (2004), Kishor (2007), and
Veirman and Dunstan (2008) follow the decomposition approach of Gonzalo and Ng (2001).
Chanthapun (2010) applies the framework of Pagan and Pesaran (2008) to analyse structural
systems with permanent and transitory shock.
These SVECM analyses conrm that (if there is a long run relationship between the real
exchange rate and fundamentals) then the SVAR models, such as that of Clarida and Gali
(1994), which apply the rst di¤erences of data fail to present some characteristics of the model.
The SVAR and SVECM approaches are di¤erent in the sense that, in the latter, we consider
the cointegration relationship between variables while in the former we do not. However, they
are similar in applying long run restrictions in the process of identifying structural shocks.
Based on a SVECM, Gautheir and Tessier (2002) link di¤erent explanatory variables to the
Canadian real exchange rate. The fundamentals are the real aggregate commodity price index,
relative government spending and relative productivity, all quarterly data from 1961 to 2000.
Applying the econometrics frameworks of King et al. (1991) and using the long run restrictions
for the identication method, they decompose the real exchange rate according to long run
relationship. In contrast to Clarida and Galí (1994) who conclude that real demand shocks
account for most of the movements in the real exchange rate, Gautheir and Tessier (2002) nd
that uctuation in the Canadian real exchange rate is largely explained by commodity price
shocks over the short and medium run, while supply shocks have the largest impact over the
long run. In addition, in line with the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis, they nd that supply
shocks have a positive e¤ect on the real exchange rate.138
In another study, Alexius (2005) documents the cointegration of real exchange rates and
fundamentals. Following the method of King et al. (1991), the structural shocks are identied
by imposing restrictions on their long run e¤ects. The real exchange rates are the bilateral
real exchange rates between the US dollar and the currencies of the United Kingdom, Germany
and Japan; the fundamentals are relative real output, relative government spending and relative
price levels. The VECM is constructed by four variables and one cointegration vector with three
137Others similar studies are: Jacobson et al. (1997), and Breitung et al. (2004).
138Alquist and Chinn (2002) conrm the results of Gautheir and Tessier (2002) for the Euro-US dollar exchange.
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stochastic trends identied as a relative productivity shock, a government spending shock, and
a monetary shock. All these shocks are allowed to a¤ect the real exchange rate and the relative
price level in the long run. Alexius assumes that the monetary shocks do not inuence the
relative output or government spending in the long run. For identication, she provides one
more restriction. Following Rogers (1999), Alexius (2005) allows the government spending
shocks to a¤ect output, but the productivity does not a¤ect government spending in the long
run. In contrast to Clarida and Gali (1994), Alexius (2005) shows that relative productivity
shocks dominate the long run variance decompositions of real exchange rates when long run
equilibrium relationships are taken into account. For the robustness checks, she tests the results
with respect to changes in the identifying assumptions and the included variables. Furthermore,
she applies the SVAR analysis, as do Clarida and Gali (1994), and shows that productivity
shocks are not a major source of real exchange rate movements. It seems by excluding the
cointegration relationship between the real exchange rate and its fundamentals, the productivity
shocks are not any more the major source of movement of real exchange rates.
Chanthapun (2010) studies the sources of uctuations in the real exchange rate of three
commodity currencies (namely Australia, Canada and New Zealand) relative to the US dollar.
Chanthapun considers three permanent factors that may explain the long run variability and
dynamics of these commodity currencies: real commodity prices, productivity di¤erentials and
demand-side factors; and two transitory factors: real interest rate di¤erentials and risk premia.
Based on a VECM, Chanthapun merely focuses on long run relationship and uses the economet-
ric framework of Pagan and Pesaran (2008). First, for each of the three commodity currencies,
Chanthapun documents a long run equilibrium relationship between the real exchange rate and
a set of economic fundamentals including real commodity prices, relative output per capita
and relative government spending. Second, Chanthapun conrms that the main sources of
uctuation in the real exchange rates for Australia and New Zealand are the relative supply
shocks while it is the relative demand shocks that are the main sources for Canada, which is
against Gautheir and Tessiers results. For the commodity price shocks, Chanthapun (2010)
does not nd an important role in explaining the variation in the real exchange rate of these
three commodity currencies. These results should be considered with caution, because for all
three countries, instead of using their individual commodity indices, Chanthapun applies the
same global commodity price index. The e¤ect of the supply shocks is in agreement with
the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis, and the low e¤ect of transitory shocks implies that the
monetary authorities do not have much inuence on the real exchange rate.
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5 The Data
The Data are quarterly and obtained from Datastream which covers the period from 1972 Q1
to 2014 Q1. The real exchange rates based on CPI and GDP deators are qcpi and qgdp,
respectively. A decrease in the real exchange rate implies a real appreciation of the Canadian
currency relative to the US dollar. ene, com and tot (all in log) are energy commodity, non-
energy commodity and total commodity price indices, respectively, in US dollars from the new
Bank of Canada Commodity Price Index (BCPI). These new commodity price indices, called the
Fisher BCPI, are constructed by three modications: rst, by updating the production weights
on an annual basis, these indices present the dynamic of Canada commodities production.
Second, the calculation method is the chain Fisher index method. Third, they cover a broader
set of commodities. In contrast, the old BCPI was updated once a decade; therefore, they are
biased and do not properly represent the dynamic of the composition of commodities produced
in Canada. y1 and y2 represent the supply side of the economy which are the real GDP per
capita and the CPI/ PPI, respectively. Whereas the scal or demand side measure is proxied by
g, which is the ratio of government spending to GDP. The US-Canada CPI di¤erential, in log,
is p. All variables, except for the real commodity indices, are expressed in terms of di¤erentials
from the US.
6 Empirical Analysis
6.1 Unit Root Tests
We test for the presence of unit root for all the series used in the analysis. The Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin
(KPSS) Unit Root tests are employed to test the integration level.139 In the ADF and PP tests,
the null hypothesis is the non-stationarity of the time series. In contrast, the null hypothesis
of the KPSS test is the stationarity of the time series. As shown in Table 30, for the rst
subsample (1972-1993), all tests conrm the non-stationarity of qcpi; qgdp; ene; com and tot.
For the second subsample, (1994-2014), all tests approve the non-stationarity of all variables
except y2 which is showed to be I(0) by two of the three tests.
139The ADF, PP and KPSS tests are based on Dickey and Fuller (1979), the Phillips and Perron (1988) and
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), respectively.
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Table 30- Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron and KPSS Unit Root Tests
1972-1993 ADF P-v Con PP P-v Con K 1% 5% 10% Con
qcpi  0:26 0:58 I(1)  0:58 0:46 I(1) 0:49 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
qgdp  0:89 0:32 I(1)  1:09 0:24 I(1) 0:51 0:70 0:46 0:34 I(1)
ene  1:57 0:79 I(1)  1:60 0:78 I(1) 0:26 0:21 0:14 0:11 I(1)
com  4:84 0:00 I(0)  3:12 0:10 I(1) 0:17 0:21 0:14 0:11 I(1)
tot  2:98 0:14 I(1)  2:93 0:15 I(1) 0:21 0:21 0:14 0:11 I(1)
1994-2014 ADF P-v Con PP P-v Con K 1% 5% 10% Con
qcpi  0:92 0:31 I(1)  0:91 0:31 I(1) 0:79 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
qgdp  0:69 0:41 I(1)  0:73 0:39 I(1) 0:90 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
ene  3:65 0:03 I(0)  2:73 0:22 I(1) 0:15 0:21 0:14 0:11 I(1)
com 0:13 0:72 I(1) 0:07 0:70 I(1) 0:52 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
tot  3:47 0:048 I(0)  1:68 0:43 I(1) 1:03 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
y1  0:95 0:30 I(1)  0:89 0:32 I(1) 0:71 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
y2  3:62 0:03 I(0)  4:24 0:00 I(0) 0:25 0:21 0:14 0:11 I(1)
g  1:16 0:90 I(1)  1:14 0:91 I(1) 0:31 0:21 0:14 0:11 I(1)
Note: P-v, Con, K, % are P value, Conclusion, KPSS test stat and Critical % level, respectively.
Table 31 - Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron and KPSS Unit Root Tests (1980-2014)
1980-2014 ADF P-v Con PP P-v Con K 1% 5% 10% Con
qcpi  1:12 0:23 I(1)  1:14 0:22 I(1) 0:48 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
qgdp  0:81 0:36 I(1)  0:87 0:33 I(1) 0:66 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
ene  0:04 0:66 I(1) 0:03 0:69 I(1) 0:46 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
com  2:83 0:055 I(1)  2:93 0:053 I(1) 0:67 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
tot  2:03 0:27 I(1)  1:90 0:31 I(1) 0:49 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
y1  1:80 0:06 I(1)  1:79 0:06 I(1) 0:94 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
y2  1:58 0:10 I(1)  1:55 0:11 I(1) 0:97 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
g  0:73 0:39 I(1)  0:98 0:29 I(1) 0:66 0:73 0:46 0:34 I(1)
p  4:07 0:00 I(0)  3:86 0:01 I(0) 0:13 0:21 0:14 0:11 I(0)
Note: P-v, Con, K, % are P value, Conclusion, KPSS test stat and Critical % level, respectively.
Table 31 reports the results for the full sample, all variables except p are I(1).
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6.2 Update of Amano and van Norden (Canada Bank Equation)
Using the new Bank of Canada Commodity Indices, we revisit the Canada Bank Equation
and show that the long run relationship among real exchange rate, energy and non-energy
commodity prices are not stable for the full sample of 1972 Q1-2014 Q1. As the literature
shows, the energy price coe¢ cient switches in sign around 1993. Therefore, we break our full
sample into two subsamples: 1972-1993 and 1994-2014. As the di¤erent unit root tests suggest,
the real exchange rate, the real price of energy and the non-energy commodities are I(1). For
both subsamples, we test the conintegration of these two fundamentals with the real exchange
rate.
6.2.1 Cointegration Tests
Following the Johansen cointegration test, for the rst subsample (1972-1993), the maximum
eigenvalue and trace tests for the cointegration rank are performed, and are summarised in
Table 32. At 5 per cent critical value, both tests conrm one cointegration vector among the
real exchange rate (based on CPI), energy and non-energy commodity prices. The possibility of
cointegration of energy and non-energy commodity prices solely with each other (and not with
the real exchange rate) is checked and rejected; therefore, energy and non-energy commodity
prices are only related to real exchange rate.
For the robustness check, we rerun the Johansen cointegration test with the alternative real
exchange rate (based on the GDP deator instead of CPI). As Table 32 presents, the result
for the robustness test does not change and for the rst subsample we reconrm cointegration
among the real exchange rate, energy and non-energy commodity prices.
We apply the same procedure for the second subsample (1994-2014). Table 33 reports the
Johansen cointegration test, and its robustness check for the second subsample. Similarly to
the rst subsample, either for real exchange rates based on a CPI or GDP deator, we conrm
the existence of one cointegration vector among real exchange rate, energy and non-energy
commodity prices.
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Table 32- Johansen Cointegration Test (1972-1993)
qcpi; com; ene qgdp; com; ene
No. of CE(s) Trace Prob. Max-E Prob. Trace Prob. Max-E Prob.
None 36:17 0:00 22:73 0:02 39:51 0:00 24:00 0:01
At most 1 13:43 0:09 10:06 0:20 15:51 0:05 13:58 0:06
At most 2 3:36 0:06 3:36 0:06 1:93 0:16 1:93 0:16
Table 33 - Johansen Cointegration Test (1994-2014)
qcpi; com; ene qgdp; com; ene
No. of CE(s) Trace Prob. Max-E Prob. Trace Prob. Max-E Prob.
None 48:10 0:01 29:21 0:01 45:73 0:02 26:82 0:03
At most 1 18:89 0:28 13:35 0:30 18:90 0:28 13:93 0:25
At most 2 5:53 0:52 5:53 0:52 4:97 0:60 4:97 0:60
6.2.2 VECM Results for Canada Bank Equation
Usually in specifying VECMs, the lag length, the cointegration rank and any further restrictions
have to be determined. Before further restrictions on VECM, we verify the lag order and the
cointegration rank. For the lag selection, the most common procedure for VAR order selection
is either by sequential testing or by model selection criteria such as: Akaike (AIC), Schwarz
(SC) or Hannan-Quinn (HQ). For each case, we consider the lag order based on the AIC criteria.
The results of the VECM for the two subsamples are presented in Tables 34 and 35. In the
rst subsample (1972-1993) as Amano and van Norden (1995) show, an increase in the price of
energy commodity depreciates the real exchange rate. A 10 per cent increase in energy price
causes 2.9 per cent depreciation of the real exchange rate deated by CPI while it depreciates
the alternative real exchange rate (deated by GDP deator) by 2.2 per cent. This is close to
the 2.3 per cent depreciation e¤ect of a 10 per cent increase in energy price in Amano and van
Nordens work. Therefore, using the new Bank of Canada commodity indices with quarterly
data, we conrm the negative e¤ect of Canadian energy commodities price on the real exchange
rate during 1972-1993.
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Table 34 - VECM Results for qcpi and qgdp - (1972-1993)
qcpi Cof t-Statistic qgdp Cof t-Statistic
ECT -0.05 -1.96 ECT -0.07 -2.63
ene 0.29 -5.59 ene 0.23 -5.08
com -0.45 4.47 com -0.24 2.65
c 0.82 c -0.27
As in Amano and van Norden (1995), in contrast to energy price, there is a positive rela-
tionship for the e¤ect of all non-energy commodities on the real exchange rate. A 10 per cent
increase in non-energy commodity price causes 4.5 per cent appreciation in the real exchange
rate deated by CPI while it appreciates the alternative real exchange rate (deated by GDP
deator) by 2.4 per cent. Amano and van Nordens estimation for this e¤ect is 8.1 per cent.
Our estimation of the speed of adjustment is 0.05 for the qcpi case which is close to theirs of
0.038.
Table 35 - VECM Results for qcpi and qgdp - (1994-2014)
qcpi Cof t-Statistic qgdp Cof t-Statistic
ECT -0.16 1.98 ECT -0.11 1.87
ene -0.10 3.46 ene -0.12 3.98
com -0.63 11.74 com -0.65 12.56
Trend 0.0005 0.85 Trend -0.001 3.19
c 4.62 c 4.58
Table 35 presents the results for the second subsample (1994-2014). As Issa et al. (2006,
2008) show, an increase in the price of energy or commodity price appreciates the real exchange
rate. Therefore, we conrm a switch in the sign of energy in the Canada Bank Equation. For
the qcpi (or qgdp) equation, the coe¢ cient of energy changes from 0.29 (or 0.23) in the rst
subsample (1972-1993) to -0.10 (or -0.12) in the second subsample (1994-2014). As in Choudhri
and Schembri (2014), we conrm the presence of a trend in the second subsample.
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6.3 Extension of Canada Bank Equation
After Amano and van Norden (1995), to improve the Canada Bank Equation, di¤erent studies
have extended their work in three directions: rst by extending data, second by adding some
other fundamentals to the original equation and third, by considering the historical change
in the composition of Canadian commodity exports (production). We satisfy all these three
issues in our analysis. First, our quarterly data covers an extended period, 35 years (1980-
2014). Second, beside energy and non-energy commodity prices, we test the possibility of
bringing other fundamentals such as government spending and productivity to the Canada
Bank Equation. And third, instead of the old BCPI with xed-weight index of commodity
prices, we use the new BCPI which is constructed by applying the Chain Fisher Index method
to update production weights on an annual basis, and contains a broader set of commodities.
To our knowledge, this is the rst study using this new index for extending the Canada Bank
Equation. The results based on the old BCPI are biased because of their xed-weight index of
commodity prices, with weights that were updated once a decade which ignore the dynamic of
export (production) composition.
6.3.1 Cointegration Tests
For the full sample (1980-2014), after comprehensive investigation, we conrm the cointegration
of real exchange rate with productivity and government spending di¤erentials and non-energy
commodity price. We do not consider the energy commodity index, since its e¤ect on the
real exchange rate switches in sign. Following the Johansen cointegration test, the maximum
eigenvalue and trace tests for the cointegration rank are performed and are summarized in
Table 36. At 5 per cent critical value, both tests conrm one cointegration vector among real
exchange rate, productivity and government spending di¤erentials and non-energy commodity
price.
We apply two robustness checks. First, instead of real exchange rate deated by CPI, we
rerun the Johansen cointegration test with the alternative exchange rate which is deated by
the GDP deator. As Table 36 shows, the result for the robustness test does not change and we
reconrm the conintegration in the base case. Second, we double check the cointegration by the
Engle-Granger Cointegration Test. Table 37 presents the results, the null hypothesis of this test
is the lack of cointegration among variables. The test rejects the null for both alternatives of
the real exchange rate; therefore, we reconrm the cointegration of four variables: real exchange
rate, productivity and government spending di¤erentials, and non-energy commodity price.
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Table 36 - The Johansen Cointegration Tests (1980-2014)
qcpi; com; g; y2 qgdp; com; g; y2
No. of CE(s) Trace Prob. Max-E Prob. Trace Prob. Max-E Prob.
None 73:44 0:00 33:85 0:03 86:37 0:00 46:09 0:00
At most 1 39:58 0:10 25:82 0:25 40:27 0:08 19:99 0:24
At most 2 19:79 0:23 11:45 0:46 20:28 0:21 11:58 0:45
At most 3 8:33 0:22 8:33 0:22 8:69 0:19 8:69 0:19
Table 37 - Engle-Granger Cointegration Test (1980-2014)
Dep Tau-Stat Prob z-Stat Prob Dep Tau-Stat Prob z-Stat Prob
com -5.41 0.00 -43.89 0.00 com -5.87 0.00 -69.93 0.00
qcpi -5.48 0.00 -48.75 0.00 qgdp -5.68 0.00 -53.55 0.00
y2 -5.04 0.01 -43.45 0.01 y2 -4.58 0.04 -36.06 0.04
g -4.20 0.10 -30.65 0.10 g -6.12 0.00 -79.30 0.00
Note: Dep is Dependent Variable
6.3.2 VECM Results for the Extension of Canada Bank Equation
Table 38 reports the results for VECM analysis. The coe¢ cient for non-energy commodity
index is -0.35. A 10 per cent increase in non-energy commodity index causes 3.5 per cent
appreciation of the Canadian dollar. This estimate is within the range of the results of Rogo¤
and Chen (2003). On the other hand, the coe¢ cient is close to our results discussed above
in section 6.2.2 for the update of the Canada Bank Equation, where we consider energy and
non-energy commodity prices as the only two fundamentals.
For robustness check, instead of real exchange rate deated by CPI, we rerun the VECM
with the alternative real exchange rate (deated by GDP deator) and get a similar coe¢ cient
(-0.47). As Table 38 illustrates, an increase of 10 per cent in productivity di¤erentials between
the US and Canada (a negative supply shock for Canada) causes 15.6 and 15.3 per cent de-
preciation of the real exchange rate based on CPI and the real exchange rate based on a GDP
deator, respectively. This is in line with the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis. For the govern-
ment spending di¤erentials, a 10 per cent increase in this variable (a negative demand shock for
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Canada) causes 3.5 and 4.7 per cent appreciation of the real exchange rate and the alternative
real exchange rate, respectively. These results can be explained by the twin-decit argument
discussed above. Therefore, we conrm the results of Gautheir and Tessier (2002), and Chan-
thapun (2010), regarding the e¤ect of productivity and government spending di¤erentials on
the Canadian real exchange rate against the US dollar.
Table 38 - VECM Results for qcpi and qgdp - (1980-2014)
qcpi Cof t-Statistic qgdp Cof t-Statistic
ECT -0.32 -3.77 ECT -0.49 -4.76
y2 1.56 12.26 y2 1.53 16.36
g -0.73 4.05 g -0.73 5.45
com -0.35 8.83 com -0.47 16.08
Trend -0.001 8.01 Trend -0.002 20.98
c 2.30 c 2.85
Tables 39 and 40 present the results for the DOLS and FMOLS Cointegrating Equations;
the results are very similar to each other and very close to our VECM result in Table 38.
Table 39 - DOLS Cointegrating Equation (1980-2014)
qcpi Cof (DOLS) P-Value (DOLS) qgdp Cof (DOLS) P-Value (DOLS)
y2 1.69 0.00 y2 1.57 0.01
g -0.75 0.01 g -0.72 0.00
com -0.39 0.01 com -0.49 0.01
Trend -0.0017 0.00 Trend -0.0029 0.02
c 2.51 0.01 c 2.96 0.01
Note: Automatic leads and lags specication (lead=0 and lag=1 based on SIC criterion, max=13)
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Table 40 - FMOLS Cointegrating Equation (1980-2014)
qcpi Cof (FMOLS) P-Value (FMOLS) qgdp Cof (FMOLS) P-Value (FMOLS)
y2 1.74 0.00 y2 1.63 0.01
g -0.79 0.01 g -0.76 0.01
com -0.39 0.01 com -0.50 0.00
Trend -0.0018 0.00 Trend -0.0030 0.02
c 2.51 0.01 c 2.98 0.01
Table 41 and 42 compare the DOLS and FMOLS Cointegrating Equations for the two
subsamples. From sample one (1980-1993) to sample two (1994-2014), we observe an increase
and decrease in the e¤ect of non-energy commodity price and productivity di¤erentials on real
exchange rate, respectively.
Table 41 - FMOLS Cointegrating Equation for the Two Subsamples
qcpi * Cof P-Va qgdp* Cof P-Va qcpi** Cof P-Va qgdp** Cof P-Va
y2 1.71 0.01 y2 1.74 0.00 y2 1.51 0.00 y2 1.42 0.00
g -0.84 0.02 g -0.76 0.02 g -0.82 0.01 g -0.89 0.02
com -0.35 0.00 com -0.45 0.00 com -0.52 0.01 com -0.59 0.02
Trend -0.002 0.02 Trend -0.002 0.00 Trend -0.001 0.00 Trend -0.002 0.01
c 2.31 0.01 c 2.74 0.00 c 3.18 0.01 c 3.38 0.00
Note: * and ** show the rst and second subsamples, 1980-1993 and 1994-2014, respectively.
Table 42 - DOLS Cointegrating Equation for the Two Subsamples
qcpi * Cof P-Va qgdp* Cof P-Va qcpi** Cof P-Va qgdp** Cof P-Va
y2 1.65 0.00 y2 1.73 0.01 y2 1.44 0.00 y2 1.3 0.02
g -0.71 0.05 g -0.71 0.04 g -0.65 0.02 g -0.71 0.02
com -0.36 0.01 com -0.47 0.00 com -0.50 0.01 com -0.57 0.00
Trend -0.002 0.03 Trend -0.002 0.02 Trend -0.001 0.01 Trend -0.002 0.02
c 2.40 0.00 c 2.83 0.01 c 3.04 0.00 c 3.25 0.00
Note: * and ** show the rst and second subsamples, 1980-1993 and 1994-2014, respectively.
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6.4 Update of Clarida and Gali
To identify di¤erent types of shocks, Clarida and Galí (1994) use a theoretical two-country
framework based on the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model to construct a VAR specication
with three variables: the change of real GDP di¤erential (y1), the change of real exchange
rate computed using consumer price index (qcpi), and the change of CPI di¤erentials (p).
Therefore, st , 
d
t and 
m
t represent the supply, demand and monetary shocks, respectively.
Clarida and Gali (1994) show the variables are I(1); but not cointegrated; therefore, they
proceed with the rst di¤erences analysis. They show that the real demand shocks explain the
bulk of the variation in the real Canada-US exchange rate. In our case, p for the two subsamples
and the full sample is I(0). This justies the rst di¤erences analysis.140
6.4.1 SVAR Identication Methodology
In the long run, the open macro model of Clarida and Galí (1994) is triangular. Therefore, only
supply shocks inuence the relative output levels in the long run, while supply and demand
shocks may impact the real exchange rate in the long run. Based on the decomposition theorem
of Wold, we can write the structural model in the following form:141
xt = A0t + A1t 1 + ::: =
1X
i=0
Ait i = A(L)t (49)
where t =
264 
s
t
dt
mt
375 and xt =
264 y1qcpi
p
375 :
y1; qcpi and p represent the di¤erential of real GDP, the real exchange rate based on CPI,
and the CPI di¤erentials, all in log. For simplication, the variance of the structural shocks is
normalized to E(tt) = I , the identity matrix.
The following autoregressive vector is estimated:
140For all SVAR and SVECM analysis, we use JMulTi software from Lutkepohl and Kratzing (2004).
141For simplication, the constant is removed.
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xt = 1xt 1 + :::+ qxt q + et (50)
where et is an estimated vector of residuals, q is the number of lags, and E(etet) =
P
: Then
we get the following moving average representation:
xt = et + C1et 1 + ::: =
1X
i=0
Ciet i = C(L)et (51)
The reduced form residuals are related to those of the structural model by:
et = A0t (52)
Solving Equations 50,52 and 53, we can show that the matrix of long term e¤ects of the
reduced form, C(1), is related to the matrix of long term e¤ects of the structural from, A(1),
as follows:
A(1) = C(1)A0 (53)
To explain their theoretical model, Clarida and Gali (1994) impose three restrictions on the
matrix A(1) :
A(1) =
264 a11 0 0a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33
375 (54)
The rst, second, and third columns of A(1) represent the impact of supply shocks, demand
shocks, and monetary shocks, respectively, on the real GDP di¤erential (rst row), the real
exchange rate (second row), and the price level di¤erential (third row). Real demand shocks
and monetary shocks do not have long term e¤ects on the GDP di¤erential; this is illustrated
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by the zeros in the rst row. In long run, monetary shocks do not impact the real exchange
rate. This is shown by the zero in the second row.
For di¤erent shocks, the theoretical predictions of Clarida and Gali are: rst, a positive
supply shock in a country depreciates its currency. This is against the Balassa-Samuelson
Hypothesis which predicts a currency appreciation after a positive supply shock. Second, in
short and long run, a positive demand shock appreciates the currency. Third, a positive demand
or monetary shock increases the CPI of the country, but it decreases with a positive supply
shock. Fourth, the currency depreciates with a monetary shock in the short run. Fifth, a
positive supply, demand or monetary shock in the short run increases the output relative to
the other country. We rerun the model of Clarida and Gali for the full sample (1980-2014), the
two subsamples (1980-1993) and (1994-2014). Then, we test the robustness of the results with
alternative variables for productivity di¤erentials (y2) and real exchange rate (qgdp).
6.4.2 Impulse Response Analysis
Although the impulse responses are an important tool to describe the relations between the
variables in a VAR or VECM, they have some drawbacks. First, they are not unique as, based
on any VAR or VECM, we can compute di¤erent set of impulse responses. Therefore, to get
a unique impulse response, in addition to data, we need some extra information which can
be derived from economic theory. Second, missing important variables in SVAR or SVECM
analysis leads to wrong impulse responses.
Following Clarida and Gali (1994) which is built on the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model;
we investigate the impulse response to the structural demand and supply shocks. In this model,
a supply shock which improves the US output relative to the Canadian output is predicted to
result in a real depreciation of the US dollar, which is against the Ballasa-Samuelson Hypothesis.
Clarida and Gali (1994) test the model for the real exchange rate of the US against four
currencies of: Germany, the UK, Japan and Canada for quarterly data from 1972 Q3 to 1992
Q4 which almost covers our rst subsample. For the e¤ect of a supply shock on the real
exchange rate, their impulse responses support their theoretical model for Canada and Japan
while the results for the UK and Germany are in line with the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis,
which rejects their theoretical model.
As the rst column of Figure 9 shows, similar to the results of Clarida and Gali (1994)
for Canada and Japan, in the rst subsample (1980-1993) and the full sample (1980-2014), a
positive supply shock to the US (a negative one to Canada) causes an undershoot in the real
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exchange rate, deprecation in the US dollar and appreciation in the Canadian currency. This
is in line with the theoretical model of Clarida and Gali (1994) and is against the Balassa-
Samuelson Hypothesis.
In contrast, in the second subsample (1993-2014) similar to the results of Clarida and Gali
(1994) for Germany and the UK, a positive supply shock to the US (a negative one to Canada)
causes an overshoot in the real exchange rate, appreciation in the US dollar and depreciation
in the Canadian currency, which conrms the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis. Therefore, we
observe a change in the pattern of the e¤ect of supply shock on real exchange rate of the US
and Canada from the rst subsample to the second one.
For the demand shock, according to the model of Clarida and Gali (1994), a demand shock
in favour of US output should result in a real appreciation of the US dollar. The impulse
responses for the four countries in Clardia and Gali (1994) are in line with their prediction for
their model. As the second column of Figure 9 presents, in our two subsamples and the full
sample, a positive demand shock to the US (a negative one to Canada) causes an increase in the
real exchange rate which means appreciation of the US dollar and depreciation of the Canada
dollar. Therefore, our impulse responses of the e¤ect of demand shock on real exchange rate of
Canada t remarkably closely the prediction of the model.
6.4.3 Variance Decomposition
In Table 43, we report the results of conditional variance of the change in the log of real exchange
rate at various horizons into the fraction of the variance due to unforecastable structural supply,
demand and monetary shocks. For the full sample and the two subsamples, in line with Clarida
and Gali (1994), the variations in the real exchange rate are dominated by the demand shocks.
As is evident from Table 43, the convergences are rapid and around 80 and 10 per cent of
the variations of the real exchange rate are caused by demand and supply shocks, respectively.
In the second subsample (1994-2014), we observe a stronger role for the monetary shock in
explaining the variation of exchange rate. After 20 quarters, the monetary shock explains 5 per
cent of the variance of the real exchange rate in the rst subsample and the full sample while,
in the second subsample, the e¤ect of monetary shock increases to 16 per cent.
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Table 43 - Variance Decomposition of qcpi- The Base Model (y1;qcpi;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014 1980-2014
Horizon y1 qcpi p y1 qcpi p y1 qcpi p
1 0.03 0.97 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00
5 0.11 0.84 0.05 0.05 0.81 0.14 0.11 0.84 0.05
10 0.11 0.84 0.05 0.08 0.77 0.15 0.11 0.84 0.05
15 0.11 0.84 0.05 0.08 0.76 0.16 0.11 0.84 0.05
20 0.11 0.84 0.05 0.08 0.76 0.16 0.11 0.84 0.05
6.4.4 Robustness Check of Variance Decomposition
For the robustness check, we consider three alternatives: in the rst one, instead of relative
real GDP per capita, we use the alternative representative of productivity di¤erential, relative
CPI/ PPI. In the second one, instead of the real exchange rate based on CPI, we consider the
alternative real exchange rate which is based on GDP deators; and in the third one, we apply
the rst and second cases at the same time. The results in Table 44 conrm the base case in
Table 43. Similarly to the results of Clarida and Gali, we conrm the dominated role of the
demand shock in explaining the variance of the real exchange rate. As in Table 43, here in all
versions of the robustness tests we observe a stronger role for the monetary shock in the second
subsample. Regarding the alternative representation of productivity, as Table 44 suggests, by
substituting relative CPI/ PPI instead of relative real GDP per capita, in the second subsample,
the role of supply shock increases from 8 to 27 per cent.
Table 44 - Variance Decomposition - Robustness Check
1-Variance Decomposition of qcpi- Robustness Check Model 1: (y2;qcpi;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014 1980-2014
Horizon y2 qcpi p y2 qcpi p y2 qcpi p
1 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.24 0.76 0.00 0.13 0.87 0.00
5 0.12 0.82 0.06 0.25 0.58 0.17 0.12 0.82 0.06
10 0.12 0.82 0.06 0.28 0.55 0.17 0.12 0.82 0.06
15 0.12 0.82 0.06 0.27 0.54 0.19 0.12 0.82 0.06
20 0.12 0.82 0.06 0.27 0.54 0.19 0.12 0.82 0.06
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2-Variance Decomposition of qgdp- Robustness Check Model 2: (y1;qgdp;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014 1980-2014
Horizon y1 qgdp p y1 qgdp p y1 qgdp p
1 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00
5 0.09 0.87 0.04 0.04 0.84 0.12 0.09 0.87 0.04
10 0.09 0.87 0.04 0.08 0.78 0.14 0.09 0.87 0.04
15 0.09 0.87 0.04 0.08 0.78 0.14 0.09 0.87 0.04
20 0.09 0.87 0.04 0.08 0.77 0.15 0.09 0.87 0.04
3-Variance Decomposition of qgdp- Robustness Check Model 3: (y2;qgdp;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014 1980-2014
Horizon y2 qgdp p y2 qgdp p y2 qgdp p
1 0.07 0.93 0.00 0.19 0.81 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00
5 0.10 0.83 0.07 0.21 0.63 0.16 0.11 0.82 0.07
10 0.10 0.83 0.07 0.25 0.58 0.17 0.11 0.79 0.10
15 0.10 0.83 0.07 0.25 0.58 0.17 0.12 0.79 0.09
20 0.10 0.83 0.07 0.25 0.58 0.17 0.12 0.79 0.09
6.4.5 Adding Non-Energy Commodity Price to Clarida and Galis Analysis
We modify the model of Clarida and Gali in a commodity exporting country by adding the non-
energy commodity price index to the VAR. The VAR model includes the price of non-energy
commodities, the real GDP di¤erential, the real exchange rate, and the CPI di¤erential. Thus,
we assume a structural model responsive to four types of shocks: non-energy commodity price
shocks; supply shocks; real demand shocks, and monetary shocks. The rst di¤erences of the
variables are considered in the estimated stationary VAR, and the postulated matrix, can be
written as follows:
t =
266664
ct
st
dt
mt
377775 ; xt =
266664
com
y1
qcpi
p
377775 ; A(1) =
266664
a11 0 0 0
a21 a22 0 0
a31 a32 a33 0
a41 a42 a43 a44
377775 (55)
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As in Clarida and Gali, the identication restrictions are assigned in the levels of the vari-
ables. Therefore, no shock except a shock to the non-energy commodity price can have an
impact on the non-energy commodity price in the long run (the three zeros in the rst row of
A(1)). In Equation 56, the rest zeros in A(1) are assigned as in the model of Clarida and Gali
in equation 55.
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition For a commodity exporting country
such as Canada, by adding a non-energy commodity shock, we update the model of Clarida
and Gali. Figure 10 presents the real exchange rate responses to commodity price, supply
and demand shocks. For the two subsamples and the full sample, a shock to commodity price
appreciates the Canadian currency. The e¤ect of commodity price on the Canadian dollar
increases from -0.003 in the rst subsample to -0.025 in the second subsample.
For the supply shock, our results in Figure 10 are very similar to those in Figure 9. For the
rst subsample and the full sample, we conrm the theoretical model of Clarida and Gali (1994)
which is against the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis. For the second subsample, in contrast to
the base case in Figure 9, the real exchange rate response of a supply shock rejects the Balassa-
Samuelson Hypothesis. Therefore, for the robustness case in Figure 10, in the two subsamples
and the full sample, a positive supply shock in the US (a negative one in Canada) depreciates
the US dollar and appreciates the Canadian Dollar. For the demand shock, the results for the
two subsamples and the full sample in Figure 10 are very similar to the base case in Figure 9.
As in the base case in Figure 9, a demand shock in favour of the US output should result in
a real appreciation of the US dollar. This again conrms the theoretical model of Clarida and
Gali (1994).
Table 45 presents the contribution of various shocks to the variance of the real exchange
rate. By adding commodity price index to the analysis, we update the work of Clarida and
Gali in a commodity exporting country such as Canada. The results of Clarida and Gali do
not change signicantly. The demand shock is still the main source of the variance in the
exchange rate. Comparing Tables 43 and 45, by adding the non-energy commodity price to our
base case, in the rst subsample, supply shock is still the second contributor (after the demand
shock) to the variance of the real exchange rate. This changes in the second subsample and
the full sample where the non-energy commodity price shock is ranked second in explaining the
variance of the real exchange rate. In the second subsample and the full sample, non-energy
commodity price shocks explain 28 and 19 per cent of real exchange rate variance, respectively.
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Table 45 - Variance Decomposition of qcpi- The Base Model (com;y1;qcpi;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014 1980-2014
H com y1 qcpi p com y1 qcpi p com y1 qcpi p
1 0.07 0.02 0.91 0.00 0.28 0.02 0.69 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.00
5 0.06 0.10 0.79 0.05 0.28 0.03 0.69 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.78 0.01
10 0.06 0.10 0.79 0.05 0.28 0.03 0.69 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.78 0.01
15 0.06 0.10 0.79 0.05 0.28 0.03 0.69 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.78 0.01
20 0.06 0.10 0.79 0.05 0.28 0.03 0.69 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.78 0.01
For the robustness checks, we consider three alternatives: in the rst one, instead of relative
real GDP per capita, we use the alternative representative of supply shock, relative CPI/ PPI.
In the second one, instead of the real exchange rate based on CPI, we consider the real exchange
rate based on GDP deators; and in the third one, we consider the rst and second cases at the
same time. The results which are in Table 46 partially conrm our results in Table 45. In the
rst case of the robustness check in Table 46 where we only change the variable representing
productivity di¤erentials (supply shock) to its alternative, in the rst subsample (1972-1994), we
almost conrm our results in Table 45. However, for the full sample (1972-2014) and especially
for the second subsample (1994-2014), we observe a decrease in the e¤ect of demand shock and
increase in the impact of supply and commodity price shocks. Although in both cases, the
demand shock is still the greater contributing force to the variance of the real exchange rate.
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Table 46 - Variance Decomposition - Robustness Check
1-Variance Decomposition of qcpi- Model 1: (com;y2;qcpi;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014 1980-2014
H com y2 qcpi p com y2 qcpi p com y2 qcpi p
1 0.03 0.18 0.77 0.00 0.29 0.38 0.33 0.00 0.19 0.29 0.52 0.00
5 0.03 0.17 0.74 0.06 0.32 0.34 0.29 0.05 0.19 0.30 0.50 0.01
10 0.03 0.17 0.74 0.06 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.07 0.19 0.30 0.50 0.01
15 0.03 0.17 0.74 0.06 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.07 0.19 0.30 0.50 0.01
20 0.03 0.17 0.74 0.06 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.07 0.19 0.30 0.50 0.01
2-Variance Decomposition of qgdp- Model 2: (com;y1;qgdp;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014 1980-2014
H com y1 qgdp p com y1 qgdp p com y1 qgdp p
1 0.07 0.01 0.92 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.70 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.00
5 0.07 0.09 0.81 0.03 0.29 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.77 0.00
10 0.07 0.09 0.81 0.03 0.29 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.77 0.00
15 0.07 0.09 0.81 0.03 0.29 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.77 0.00
20 0.07 0.09 0.81 0.03 0.29 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.77 0.00
3-Variance Decomposition of qgdp- Model 3: (com;y2;qgdp;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014 1980-2014
H com y2 qgdp p com y2 qgdp p com y2 qgdp p
1 0.03 0.13 0.84 0.00 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.00 0.20 0.23 0.57 0.00
5 0.04 0.12 0.79 0.05 0.21 0.31 0.34 0.14 0.21 0.24 0.55 0.00
10 0.04 0.12 0.79 0.05 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.21 0.24 0.55 0.00
15 0.04 0.12 0.79 0.05 0.20 0.33 0.32 0.15 0.21 0.24 0.55 0.00
20 0.04 0.12 0.79 0.05 0.20 0.33 0.32 0.15 0.21 0.24 0.55 0.00
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6.4.6 Adding Energy and Non-Energy Commodity Prices to Analysis of Clarida
and Gali
For the two subsamples, we modify the model of Clarida and Gali in a commodity exporting
country by adding the non-energy commodity and energy price indices to the VAR.142 The
VAR model includes the price of energy, the price of non-energy commodities, the real GDP
di¤erential, the real exchange rate, and the CPI di¤erential. Thus, we assume a structural
model responsive to ve types of shocks: energy price shock; non-energy commodity price
shock; supply shock; real demand shock, and monetary shock. The rst di¤erence of each
variable are considered in the estimated stationary VAR, and the postulated matrix can be
written as follows:
t =
26666664
et
ct
st
dt
mt
37777775 ; xt =
26666664
ene
com
y1
qcpi
p
37777775 ; A(1) =
26666664
a11 0 0 0 0
a21 a22 0 0 0
a31 a32 a33 0 0
a41 a42 a43 a44 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 a55
37777775 (56)
As in Clarida and Galí (1994), the identication restrictions are assigned in the levels of the
variables. Therefore, no shock except a shock to the energy price can have an impact on the
energy price in the long run (the four zeros in the rst row of A(1)). On the other hand, the
shocks to the price of energy are the only ones which a¤ect the price of non-energy commodities
(the three zeros in the second row). This is justied by the fact that energy is an important
input into the production of many commodities, and may thus a¤ect their long term price. In
Equation 57, the rest zeros in A(1) are assigned as in the model of Clardia and Gali in Equation
55.
Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition Figure 11 presents the real exchange
rates responses to energy price, commodity price, supply, demand and exchange rate shocks. As
we review in the literature above, Amano and van Norden (1995) is the rst study which uses
energy and non-energy commodity prices separately for Canada, and shows their di¤erent e¤ect
142We do not consider the full sample, since the energy price coe¢ cient switches sign from the rst to the
second subsamples.
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on the Canadian Dollar: an increase in energy price and non-energy commodity price depreciates
and appreciates Canadian dollar, respectively. This is done for monthly data covering 1973 to
1992 which is very close to our rst subsample. For our rst subsample (1980-1993), we conrm
the results of Amano and van Norden but in the second subsample we observe a change in the
e¤ect of energy price on real exchange rate which is in line with Issa et al. (2006, 2008) who
show the change in the sign of energy price in the Canada Bank Equation in 1993.143
For the supply shock, our results in Figure 11 are very similar to Figure 10 for the two
subsamples and conrm the theoretical model of Clarida and Gali (1994) which is against the
Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis. Therefore, a positive supply shock in the US (a negative one
in Canada) depreciates the US dollar and appreciates the Canadian Dollar. For the demand
shock, the results for the two subsamples in Figure 11 are very similar to the impulse responses
of demand shocks in Figures 9 and 10. A demand shock in favour of the US output should
result in a real appreciation of the US dollar. This again conrms the theoretical model of
Clarida and Gali (1994).
Tables 47 and 48 present the contribution of various shocks to the variance of the real
exchange rate and its alternative. Updating the work of Clarida and Gali in a commodity and
energy exporting country such as Canada, by adding commodity and energy price indices to
the analysis, the results of Clarida and Gali do not change signicantly. In three out of four
cases in Tables 47 and 48, the demand shock is Still the main source of the variance in the
exchange rate.
Table 47 - Variance Decomposition of qcpi- (ene;com;y1;qcpi;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014
Horizon ene com y1 qcpi p ene com y1 qcpi p
1 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.86 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.04 0.55 0.00
5 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.66 0.08 0.31 0.20 0.04 0.45 0.00
10 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.65 0.09 0.31 0.19 0.04 0.44 0.01
15 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.65 0.09 0.31 0.19 0.04 0.44 0.01
20 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.65 0.09 0.31 0.19 0.04 0.44 0.01
Comparing the results for the two subsamples, in Table 47 where we use the real exchange
rate based on CPI, the e¤ect of energy price increases from 4 to 32 per cent. The same pattern
143We should note that here the shock is to the change of price.
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is true for the alternative real exchange rate, qgdp. As Table 48 presents, the contribution of
energy price in explaining the variance of real exchange rate increases from 3 per cent in the
rst subsample to 42 per cent in the second subsample. In the second subsample where we
use qgdp as the real exchange rate, the energy price e¤ect is greater than the demand shock
contribution.
Table 48 - Variance Decomposition of qgdp- (ene;com;y1;qgdp;p)
1980-1993 1994-2014
Horizon ene com y1 qgdp p ene com y1 qgdp p
1 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.31 0.20 0.02 0.47 0.00
5 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.68 0.06 0.42 0.17 0.02 0.38 0.01
10 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.67 0.07 0.42 0.17 0.03 0.37 0.01
15 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.67 0.07 0.42 0.17 0.03 0.37 0.01
20 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.67 0.07 0.42 0.17 0.03 0.37 0.01
In the following section, we use the full sample and investigate the determinants of uctua-
tions of the real exchange rate between the US and Canada when we consider the cointegration
relationship.
6.5 SVECM Identication Methodology
For the full sample (1980-2014), in section 6.3.1, the cointegration tests conrm the existence
of only one cointegrated vector among the four variables: real exchange rate, non-energy com-
modity price, productivity di¤erentials and government di¤erentials. Therefore, we estimate
the following VECM:
266664
comt
y2t
g
qcpit
377775 =
q 1X
i=1
 i
266664
comt i
y2t i
g
qcpit i
377775+ 
26666664
comt 1
y2t 1
g
qcpit 1
t
37777775+ + et (57)
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where com; y2; g; qcpi; all in log, are non-energy commodity price index, productivity di¤er-
entials, government spending di¤erentials and real exchange rate based on the CPI, respectively.
The model is estimated with one lag on quarterly data over 1980-2014. Then, we need to apply
the identication methodology. King et al. (1991) develop an identication methodology that
allows for a structural interpretation of a cointegrated VAR. The reduced-form VECM can be
inverted to obtain the following MA representation:
xt = et + C1et 1 + ::: =
1X
i=0
Ciet i = C(L)et (58)
where et is a (nx1) vector of innovations. We want to identify the following structural model:
xt =  0t +  1t 1 + ::: =
1X
i=0
 it i =  (L)t (59)
where both the structural shocks, t and  i matrices are unknown.
As section 6.3.1 conrms, there is one cointegration vector among our four variables: real
exchange rate, non-energy commodity price, di¤erentials of productivity and government spend-
ing. Therefore, with three fundamentals, the stochastic trend in the real exchange rate can be
expressed as a linear combination of the three other stochastic trends. By applying the long run
restrictions, we can identify three permanent shocks. In contrast to VAR models, in structural
VAR models the order of the variables matters and in the context of long run restrictions the
variables are put in decreasing order of long run exogeneity. Here, with four I(1) variables and
one cointegration relation, we need to impose three constraints. The long run matrix of the
structural shocks,  (L); is as follows:
 (L) =
266664
 0 0 0
  0 0
   0
   0
377775 (60)
Where * is the non restricted number. With four variables and one cointegration vector,
we face three restrictions. The rst two zeros in the rst row of Equation 61 are the rst two
restrictions which conrm that the non-energy commodity price index is not a¤ected in the
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long run by permanent shocks to output and government spending. Therefore, the non-energy
commodity price index is the most exogenous variable in the long run and is dependent on
extraction technology, transport cost and political environment in the main exporting countries
and on other factors on the global level. The third constraint (the rst zero in the second row of
Equation 61) implies that only non-energy commodity price shocks and supply shocks can have
a long run impact on the output di¤erential. Thus, technology shocks that improve e¢ ciency
in commodity production are allowed to have a permanent impact on output. The short run
dynamics are unrestricted and the other long run relations are estimated freely.
With the exception of the order of the output di¤erential and government spending, these
constraints are consistently are based on Rogo¤s (1992) theoretical model which was applied
by Rogers (1999) to identify structural VARs. In this model, supply shocks do not a¤ect gov-
ernment spending (demand side) in the long run. Therefore, the demand shocks may inuence
the supply side. But, as Gautheir and Tessier (2002) argue, this indirect e¤ect on the supply
side is small in comparison to the purely supply shocks. Furthermore, this alternative order-
ing is similar to the argument of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980): the positive correlation of the
government spending with GDP in following output in long run. This means that the richer
countries are more likely have higher government spending. We run the VECM for both real
exchange rates, deated with CPI and GDP deator. Equations 62 and 63 are the long run
matrix of the structural shocks,  (L), for qcpi and qgdp, respectively:
For qcpi Equation :  (L) =
266664
0:0561 0 0 0
 0:003 0:0149 0 0
 0:0009  0:0045 0:0112 0
 0:0148  0:0201  0:0084 0
377775 (61)
For qgdp Equation :  (L) =
266664
0:0571 0 0 0
 0:0031 0:0150 0 0
 0:0004  0:0041 0:0104 0
 0:0223  0:0200  0:0077 0
377775 (62)
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6.5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
For both real exchange rate and its alternative, the impulse responses of the Canadian real
exchange rate to the structural shocks are presented in Figure 12. For the real exchange rate
deated by CPI, a positive non-energy commodity price shock has a permanent appreciation
e¤ect on the Canadian real exchange rate relative to the US dollar, as shown in Figure 12. This
result is in line with the terms of trade theory of the real exchange rate. An overshooting e¤ect
in response to the non-energy commodity price shock is also evident. The overshoot behaviour
occurs in the second quarter, and it is stabilized after ten quarters. Normalising the rst
column of Equation 62 on the real non-energy commodity price implies a long run elasticity,
of the Canadian real exchange rate to the real non-energy commodity price, of 0.26. This
estimate is greater than Chanthapuns (2010) result, 0.14, and is smaller than that of Chen and
Rogo¤ (2003) which lies between 0.04 and 0.40. For the alternative real exchange rate which
is deated by the GDP deator, the overshoot behaviour is reduced, and normalising the rst
column of Equation 63 on the real non-energy commodity price implies a long run elasticity, of
the Canadian real exchange rate to the real non-energy commodity price, of 0.39.
The second row of Figure 12 presents the real exchange rate responses to a supply shock
for both alternatives of real exchange rates, qcpi and qgdp. In the short run, we observe an
overshooting behaviour and in the long run, following a positive supply shock to the US (a
negative one to Canada), the Canadian dollar depreciates. For the qcpi (or qgdp), normalising
the second column of Equation 62 (or 63) on the supply shock implies a long run elasticity of the
Canadian real exchange rate to the supply shock price of 1.34 (or 1.33). The result in the long
run supports the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis which suggests a real currency appreciation
following a positive supply shock.
For the government spending shock, the Canadian currency appreciates following a shock
that increases aggregate demand in the US relative to Canada as shown in Figure 12 (for both
cases of real exchange rate, qcpi and qgdp). This result can be explained by the twin-decit
argument discussed above. For the qcpi (or qgdp), normalising the third column of Equation
62 (or 63) on the government spending shock implies a long run elasticity of the Canadian real
exchange rate to the government spending shock of -0.75 (or -0.74). The last row in Figure 12
shows the impulse response of the exchange rate shock. This shock has a transitory e¤ect (that
is zero in the long run) on the real exchange rate. For the qcpi and qgdp equations, the impulse
response of exchange rate shock takes 16 and 8 quarters to go to zero, respectively.
6.5.2 Variance Decomposition for SVECM
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Table 49 presents the contribution of the various shocks to the variance of the real exchange rate.
These results are quite di¤erent from those we nd in the case without cointegration (SVAR).
Here, the impact of productivity shock is the dominant factor in explaining the variation of the
real exchange rate. The second contributor is the non-energy commodity price. Together, these
two variables explain around 80 per cent of real exchange rate variance, and their role increases
to 90 per cent in long run. Table 49 also presents the results where we use the alternative
exchange rate (qgdp). The results are robust even for the alternative exchange rate. Again,
the variables which explain the bulk of real exchange rate variations are non-energy commodity
price and productivity di¤erentials. In contrast to the qcpi case, in long run, the e¤ect of non-
energy commodity price is a little greater than the inuence of the supply shocks.
These results reconrm the results of Amano and van Norden (1995) who nd that com-
modity prices are the key long run determinant of the Canadian real exchange rate. On the
other hand, our results are in line with the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis which relies heavily
on productivity di¤erentials in driving the real exchange rate. Our result for contribution of
productivity di¤erential on variance of real exchange rate in the long run (57 per cent) is very
similar to that of Gauthier and Tessier (2002) of 61 per cent. In contrast to Chanthapun (2010)
who assigns around 75 per cent of variation of real exchange rate to the demand shocks, we
show a very a low e¤ect of demand shock on the variance of the real exchange rate. One of the
issues with Chanthapun (2010) is that he uses a general commodity index on the global level
not the Canadian commodity index price.
Table 49 - Variance Decomposition of qcpi and qgdp (1980-2014)
Horizon com y2 g qcpi Horizon com y2 g qgdp
1 0.28 0.33 0.00 0.39 1 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.42
5 0.32 0.51 0.01 0.16 5 0.41 0.44 0.01 0.14
10 0.32 0.56 0.03 0.09 10 0.46 0.43 0.03 0.08
15 0.32 0.57 0.05 0.06 15 0.48 0.43 0.04 0.05
20 0.32 0.57 0.06 0.05 20 0.49 0.43 0.05 0.03
40 0.32 0.57 0.08 0.03 40 0.50 0.42 0.06 0.02
6.5.3 Robustness Check
Following Rogers (1999) and Alexius (2005), we allow the government spending shock to a¤ect
output, but the productivity does not a¤ect government spending in the long run. This changes
177
the ordering in our SVECM from (com; y2; g; qcpi) to (com; g; y2; qcpi). Then with the new
restriction, we run the VECM. Equations 64 and 65 are the long run matrix of the structural
shocks,  (L), for qcpi and qgdp, respectively:
For qcpi Equation :  (L) =
266664
0:0561 0 0 0
 0:0009 0:0121 0 0
 0:0030  0:0055 0:0138 0
 0:0148  0:0004  0:0218 0
377775 (63)
For qgdp Equation :  (L) =
266664
0:0571 0 0 0
 0:0004 0:0112 0 0
 0:0031  0:0055 0:0139 0
 0:0223 0:0002  0:0215 0
377775 (64)
For both real exchange rates (qcpi and qgdp), the impulse responses of the Canadian real
exchange rate to the structural shocks are presented in Figure 13 which are very similar to
the base case in Figure 12. For the qcpi case, a positive non-energy commodity price shock
has a permanent appreciation e¤ect on the Canadian real exchange rate relative to the US
dollar. This result is in line with the terms of trade theory of the real exchange rate. As
in the base case, in the second quarter, an overshooting e¤ect in response to the non-energy
commodity price shock is also evident and is stabilized after ten quarters. Normalising the rst
column of Equation 64 on the real non-energy commodity price implies a long run elasticity,
of the Canadian real exchange rate to the real non-energy commodity price, of 0.26. This
estimate is greater than Chanthapuns (2010) result of 0.14 and is within the range of Chen
and Rogo¤ (2003). For the qgdp case, the overshoot behaviour is reduced, and normalising
the rst column of Equation 65 on the real non-energy commodity price implies a long run
elasticity, of the Canadian real exchange rate to the real non-energy commodity price, of 0.39.
Therefore, comparing the base and the robustness check cases, by switching the order of supply
shock and government spending shock, nothing changes in long run elasticity of the Canadian
real exchange rate to the real commodity price.
In contrast to the base case, here the most exogenous variable after non-energy commodity
price is the government spending not the productivity. The second row in Figure 13 presents
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the real exchange rate behaviour for the government spending shock. In both qcpi and qgdp
equations, we observe an overshoot which is much more than the base case, then real exchange
rate appreciates and for qcpi (or qgdp), after 10 (or 8) quarters, it stabilizes at -0.004 (or
0.0002). For the qcpi (or qgdp), normalising the second column of Equation 64 (or 65) on the
government spending shock implies a long run elasticity of the Canadian real exchange rate to
the government spending shock price of -0.033 (or 0.017).
For the supply shock, as shown in the third row of Figure 13, for both alternatives of the
real exchange rate, qcpi and qgdp, following a positive supply shock to the US (a negative one
to Canada), the Canadian dollar depreciates. In the short term, such as in the base case, there
is an overshoot, but it is much smaller. For the qcpi (or qgdp), normalising the third column
of Equation 64 (or 65) on the supply shock implies a long run elasticity of the Canadian real
exchange rate to the supply shock price of 1.57 (or 1.54). The result in the long run supports the
Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis which suggests a real appreciation following a positive supply
shock. The fourth row of Figure 13 shows the impulse responses of the exchange rate shocks.
It is the very similar to the base case. The e¤ect of these shocks on the real exchange rate is
transitory (and zero in the long run). For the qcpi and qgdp equations, the impulse responses
of exchange rate shocks takes 16 and 8 quarters to go to zero, respectively.
Table 50 reports the Variance Decomposition of the real exchange rate (qcpi) and its alter-
native (qgdp): In comparison to the base case in Table 49, the results are not changed. Over 90
per cent of variance in real exchange rate is still explained by non-energy commodity price and
productivity di¤erentials where the latter is the dominant one. Again to test the robustness of
our results, instead of qcpi, we use the alternative real exchange rate, qgdp. Similar to the base
case in Table 49, we observe an increase (or decrease) in the e¤ect of non-energy commodity
price (or productivity di¤erentials) on the variance of the real exchange rate.
Table 50 - Robustness Check-Variance Decomposition of qcpi and qgdp (1980-2014)
Horizon com g y2 qcpi Horizon com g y2 qgdp
1 0.28 0.06 0.27 0.39 1 0.29 0.04 0.25 0.42
5 0.32 0.09 0.44 0.15 5 0.41 0.06 0.40 0.13
10 0.32 0.05 0.54 0.09 10 0.46 0.03 0.44 0.07
15 0.32 0.03 0.58 0.07 15 0.48 0.02 0.45 0.05
20 0.32 0.03 0.60 0.05 20 0.49 0.02 0.46 0.03
40 0.32 0.01 0.64 0.03 40 0.50 0.01 0.47 0.02
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6.5.4 Alternative Specication of the SVECM
This section provides an alternative specication to the SVECM considered in the last section.
In the last section, among all variables (com; y2; g; gcpi), we assume the non-energy commodity
price index is the most exogenous variable. Therefore, in long run, none of the variables can
inuence non-energy commodity price. However, because of the great size of the US economy,
it may a¤ect the non-energy commodity prices on the global level, thus one may expect that
a productivity shock that raises the US output has a spillover e¤ect to lower the real price of
commodities permanently. To test this argument, we separate the productivity di¤erential of
the US and Canada to productivity of the US (y2(usa)) and productivity of Canada (y2(ca)).
The VECM is:
26666664
y2t(usa)
comt
y2t(ca)
g
qcpit
37777775 =
q 1X
i=1
 i
26666664
y2t i(usa)
comt i
y2t i(ca)
g
qcpit i
37777775+ 

26666666664
y2t 1(usa)
comt 1
y2t 1(ca)
gt 1
qcpit 1
t
37777777775
+ + et (65)
Therefore, our new SVECM contains of y2(usa); com; y2(ca); g, and qcpi with one cointe-
gration vector among our ve I(1) variables.144 The long run matrix of the structural shocks,
 (L); is as follows:
 (L) =
26666664
 0 0 0 0
  0 0 0
   0 0
    0
    0
37777775 (66)
After running the VECM with restrictions in Equation 67, we get the long run matrix of
the structural shocks,  (L), for qcpi and qgdp, as follows:
144The Johansen test conrms one cointegration relationship for these ve variables.
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For qcpi Equation :  (L) =
26666664
0:0108 0 0 0 0
0:0290 0:0483 0 0 0
0:0057 0:0060 0:0139 0 0
 0:0056 0:0019 0:0033 0:0103 0
 0:0135  0:0083 0:0217  0:0064 0
37777775 (67)
For qgdp Equation :  (L) =
26666664
0:0100 0 0 0 0
0:0258 0:0502 0 0 0
0:0055 0:0060 0:0139 0 0
 0:0044 0:0019 0:0031 0:0102 0
 0:0152  0:0135 0:0200  0:0072 0
37777775 (68)
Figure 14 presents the impulse responses of real exchange rates (qcpi and qgdp) to the follow-
ing ve shocks: US supply, commodity price, Canada supply, government spending di¤erential
and real exchange rate shocks. For the US supply shock (as shown in Figure 14) for both
alternatives of the real exchange rate, qcpi and qgdp, following a positive supply shock to the
US, the Canadian dollar depreciates. In the short term, we observe an overshooting behaviour.
For the qcpi (or qgdp), normalizing the rst column of Equation 68 (or 69) on the US supply
shock implies a long run elasticity of the Canadian real exchange rate to the US supply shock
price of 1.25 (or 1.52) which supports the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis.
For real exchange rate and its alternative (qcpi and qgdp) cases, a positive non-energy
commodity price shock has a permanent appreciation e¤ect on the Canadian real exchange rate
relative to the US dollar, as shown in Figure 14. This result is in line with the terms of trade
theory of the real exchange rate. Normalizing the second column of Equations 68 (or 69) on the
real non-energy commodity price implies a long run elasticity of the Canadian real exchange
rate to the real non-energy commodity price of 0.17 (or 0.26). After the non-energy commodity
price shock, the real exchange rate, qcpi (or qgdp) is stabilized in 16 (or 12) quarters.
As shown in Figure 14, for both alternatives of real exchange rates, a positive supply shock
to Canada appreciates the Canadian dollar. Normalizing the third column of Equation 68 (or
69) on the Canada supply shock implies a long run elasticity of the Canadian real exchange
rate, qcpi (or qgdp), to the Canada supply shock of 1.56 (or 1.43) which supports the Balassa-
Samuelson Hypothesis. For the government spending shock, the Canadian currency appreciates
following a shock that increases aggregate demand in the US relative to Canada, as shown in
Figure 14 (for both cases of real exchange rate of qcpi and qgdp). This result can be explained
by the twin-decit argument discussed above. For the qcpi (or qgdp), normalising the fourth
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column of Equation 68 (or 69) on the government spending shock implies a long run elasticity
of the Canadian real exchange rate to the government spending shock price of -0.61 (or -0.70).
Figure 14 shows the impulse responses of the exchange rate shock. It is the very similar to
Figures 12 and 13, the base case and robustness check, respectively. The e¤ect of the shock on
the real exchange rate is transitory (and zero in the long run).
Table 51 presents the Variance Decomposition of qcpi and qgdp: In contrast to the base
case in Table 49, for the long run, we observe a decrease of role of non-energy commodity
price in explaining the variance of real exchange rate from 32 to 8 per cent and from 50 to 19
per cent in the qcpi and qgdp equations, respectively. For the e¤ect of supply shock, here we
decouple the productivity di¤erential into the US and the Canadian supply shock. For the qcpi
(or qgdp) equation, as shown in Table 51, the US supply shock explains 29 (or 31) per cent of
real exchange rate variance and the Canada supply shock explains 58 (or 44) per cent of real
exchange rate variance.
Table 51 - Robustness Check-Variance Decomposition of qcpi and qgdp (1980-2014)
Horizon y2(usa) com y2(ca) g qcpi y2(usa) com y2(ca) g qgdp
1 0.54 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.18 0.58 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.24
5 0.47 0.05 0.41 0.01 0.06 0.52 0.09 0.31 0.01 0.07
10 0.39 0.06 0.49 0.02 0.04 0.42 0.13 0.37 0.03 0.05
15 0.35 0.07 0.52 0.03 0.03 0.38 0.15 0.40 0.04 0.03
20 0.33 0.07 0.54 0.03 0.03 0.35 0.17 0.41 0.04 0.03
40 0.29 0.08 0.58 0.04 0.01 0.31 0.19 0.44 0.05 0.03
7 Another Commodity Exporting Country Australia
Australia is a commodity exporting country with a exible exchange rate and integrated in the
global economy. It can be assumed to be a small open economy with commodity export as
the bulk of its export. As the literature conrms, the Australian dollar is a good candidate
for a commodity currency. To investigate the e¤ect of di¤erent shocks on the variance of real
exchange rate in both cases, with or without cointegration, we rerun the SVAR and SVECM
for quarterly data from 1982 Q3 to 2014 Q4.
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7.1 Analysis of Clarida and Gali (SVAR)
Similar to the SVAR analysis for Canada, we consider a VAR specication with the three
variables: the change of real GDP di¤erential (y1), the change of real exchange rate computed
using consumer price index (qcpi), and the change of CPI di¤erentials (p). As Clarida and
Gali (1994), we focus on long run restriction. That is, only supply shocks are expected to
inuence the relative output levels in long run, while supply and demand shocks may inuence
the real exchange rate in the long run. To better investigate the evolution of the real exchange
rate dynamic of Australia against the US dollar, we divide our full sample (1982-2014) to two
subsamples, the rst and second subsamples, 1982-1998 and 1998-2014, respectively.
7.1.1 Impulse Responses Analysis
Following Clarida and Gali (1994) built on the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model, we inves-
tigate the impulse response to the structural demand and supply shocks. As the rst column
of Figure 15 shows, for the two subsamples and the full sample, a positive supply shock to
the US (a negative one to Australia) causes an overshoot in the real exchange rate, appreci-
ation in the US dollar and depreciation in the Australian currency. This is in line with the
Balassa-Samuleson Hypothesis, and is against the theoretical model of Clarida and Gali (1994).
However, this is similar to the results of Clarida and Gali (1994) for Germany and the UK. In
contrast our results for Canada, in our Australian ndings, the pattern is not changed in the
two subsamples.
As the second column of Figure 15 presents, in the two subsamples and the full sample,
a positive demand shock to the US (a negative one to Australia) causes an overshoot in the
real exchange rate and similarly to Canada, we observe appreciation of the US dollar and
depreciation of the Australian dollar. Therefore, our impulse responses of the e¤ect of demand
shock on the real exchange rate of Australia are similar to those of Canada and in line with the
prediction of the model of Clarida and Gali (1994).
7.1.2 Variance Decomposition
In Table 52, we report the results of conditional variance of the change in the log of real exchange
rate of Australia against the US dollar (deated by CPI) at various horizons into the fraction of
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the variance due to structural supply, demand and monetary shocks. In line with Clarida and
Gali (1994), the variations in the real exchange rate are dominated by the demand shocks. As
Table 52 reports, the productivity and monetary shocks totally explain just 4, 1 and 3 per cent
of variation of the real exchange rate, in the rst and second subsamples and the full sample,
respectively.
Table 52 - Variance Decomposition of Real Exchange Rate - The Base Case (Australia)
1982-1998 1998-2014 1982-2014
Horizon y1 qcpi p y1 qcpi p y1 qcpi p
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
5 0.04 0.91 0.05 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.03 0.96 0.01
10 0.04 0.91 0.05 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.03 0.96 0.01
15 0.04 0.91 0.05 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.03 0.96 0.01
20 0.04 0.91 0.05 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.03 0.96 0.01
7.1.3 Robustness Check for the Variance Decomposition
For the robustness test, similar to the case of Canada, we consider three cases. As Table 53
presents, in the rst one, instead of relative real GDP per capita as the variable describing
the supply shock, we use the alternative representation of supply shock, relative CPI/ PPI.
Although we observe an increase in the e¤ect of supply shock, for the three periods, the main
contributor to the variance of the real exchange rate of Australia is still the demand shock. In
the second robustness test, instead of real exchange rate deated by CPI, we use the alternative
real exchange rate which is deated by a GDP deator. Results are very similar to the base
case. The alternative real exchange rate conrms the results of the base case in as shown in
Table 52. Finally, in the third robustness test, we modify the SVAR by using the alternative
real exchange rate and the alternative supply shock. We conrm that the demand shock still
explains the bulk of variance in Australian real exchange rate.
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Table 53 - Variance Decomposition -Robustness Check (Australia)
1-Variance Decomposition of qcpi- Robustness Check Model 1: (y2;qcpi;p)
1982-1998 1998-2014 1982-2014
Horizon y2 qcpi p y2 qcpi p y2 qcpi p
1 0.07 0.93 0.00 0.12 0.88 0.00 0.11 0.89 0.00
5 0.07 0.89 0.04 0.14 0.86 0.00 0.11 0.88 0.01
10 0.07 0.89 0.04 0.14 0.86 0.00 0.11 0.88 0.01
15 0.07 0.89 0.04 0.14 0.86 0.00 0.11 0.88 0.01
20 0.07 0.89 0.04 0.14 0.86 0.00 0.11 0.88 0.01
2-Variance Decomposition of qgdp- Robustness Check Model 2: (y1;qgdp;p)
1982-1998 1998-2014 1982-2014
Horizon y1 qgdp p y1 qgdp p y1 qgdp p
1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
5 0.04 0.92 0.04 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.97 0.01
10 0.04 0.92 0.04 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.97 0.01
15 0.04 0.92 0.04 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.97 0.01
20 0.04 0.92 0.04 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.02 0.97 0.01
3-Variance Decomposition of qgdp- Robustness Check Model 3: (y2;qgdp;p)
1982-1998 1998-2014 1982-2014
Horizon y2 qgdp p y2 qgdp p y2 qgdp p
1 0.05 0.95 0.00 0.11 0.89 0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00
5 0.05 0.91 0.04 0.12 0.88 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
10 0.05 0.91 0.04 0.12 0.88 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
15 0.05 0.91 0.04 0.12 0.88 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
20 0.05 0.91 0.04 0.12 0.88 0.00 0.10 0.90 0.00
7.1.4 Adding Commodity Price to Analysis of Clarida and Gali
For Australia, we modify the model of Clarida and Gali in a commodity exporting country by
adding the Australian commodity price index to the VAR. The VAR model includes the price of
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commodities, the real GDP di¤erential, the real exchange rate, and the CPI di¤erential. Thus,
we assume a structural model responsive to four types of shocks: commodity price shocks;
supply shocks; real demand shocks, and monetary shocks.
Impulse Response Figure 16 presents the real exchange rate (qcpi) responses to commodity
price, supply and demand shocks. For the two subsamples and the full sample, a shock to
commodity price appreciates the Australian currency. This is in line with the theoretical models
which describe the relationship between terms of trade and real exchange rate. From the rst
to the second subsample, the notable di¤erence from the case of Canada is that the impact of
the commodity price on the Australian dollar decreases from -0.050 to -0.005. For the response
of the real exchange rate to the supply shock, in the case of Canada, we reject the Balassa-
Samuelson Hypothesis and conrm the theoretical model of Clarida and Gali (1994); while for
Australia, as Figure 16 presents, we conrm the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis and reject the
model of Clarida and Gali. For the demand shock, the results for the two subsamples and the
full sample in Figure 16 are very similar to the base case in Figure 15.
Variance Decomposition Table 54 reports the contribution of various shocks to the variance
of the Australian real exchange rate when we add commodity price to the model of Clarida and
Gali. Similar to Canada, the dominant contributor to the variance of real exchange rate is still
the demand shock. In the rst subsample, the commodity price shock explains 32 per cent of
the real exchange rate variance. This goes down to 16 and 9 per cent in the second subsample
and the full sample, respectively. The total contribution of supply and monetary shocks shifts
from 10 per cent in the rst subsample to 7 and 4 per cent in the second subsample and the
full sample, respectively.
Table 54 - Variance Decomposition of qcpi- The Base Case with Commodity Price
(Australia) (com;y1;qcpi;p)
S1 S2 S3
H com y1 qcpi p com y1 qcpi p com y1 qcpi p
1 0.36 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.90 0.01
5 0.33 0.06 0.58 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.78 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.87 0.01
10 0.32 0.06 0.58 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.77 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.87 0.01
15 0.32 0.06 0.58 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.77 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.87 0.01
20 0.32 0.06 0.58 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.77 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.87 0.01
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Note: S1, S2 and S3 are the two subsamples and the full sample, 1982-1998, 1998-2014 and
1982-2014, respectively.
Robustness Check for Variance Decomposition Table 55 shows the three robustness
tests for the Australian SVAR with commodity price. In the rst robustness check, we use the
alternative representative of supply shock (y2): As the rst row of Table 55 presents, we get very
similar results to the base case in Table 54. In fact, the demand shock is the main contributor
to the variance of the real exchange rate of Australia in the three samples. We only observe an
increase in the e¤ect of supply shock for the second subsample and the full sample.
In the second robustness test, as the second row of Table 55 shows, instead of qcpi, we
use the alternative real exchange rate (qgdp). The results are very similar to the base case in
Table 54. In the third robustness test which is illustrated in the third row of Table 55, we
simultaneously apply the rst and second cases. We use the alternative variables for supply
shock (y2) and real exchange rate (qgdp) and conrm the results in the base case in Table 54.
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Table 55 - Variance Decomposition - Robustness Check- The Base Case with Commodity
Price (Australia)
1-Variance Decomposition of qcpi- Model 1: (com;y2;qcpi;p)
S1 S2 S3
H com y2 qcpi p com y2 qcpi p com y2 qcpi p
1 0.30 0.06 0.64 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.73 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.76 0.00
5 0.30 0.06 0.63 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.65 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.72 0.02
10 0.29 0.06 0.63 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.64 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.72 0.02
15 0.29 0.06 0.63 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.64 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.72 0.02
20 0.29 0.06 0.63 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.64 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.72 0.02
2-Variance Decomposition of qgdp- Model 2: (com;y1;qgdp;p)
S1 S2 S3
H com y1 qgdp p com y1 qgdp p com y1 qgdp p
1 0.37 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.00
5 0.34 0.05 0.58 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.66 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.85 0.02
10 0.34 0.05 0.58 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.66 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.85 0.02
15 0.34 0.05 0.58 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.66 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.85 0.02
20 0.34 0.05 0.58 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.66 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.85 0.02
3-Variance Decomposition of qgdp- Model 3: (com;y2;qgdp;p)
S1 S2 S3
H com y2 qgdp p com y2 qgdp p com y2 qgdp p
1 0.30 0.04 0.65 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.73 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.76 0.01
5 0.31 0.04 0.64 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.65 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.72 0.02
10 0.31 0.04 0.63 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.65 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.72 0.02
15 0.31 0.04 0.63 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.65 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.72 0.02
20 0.31 0.04 0.63 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.65 0.01 0.12 0.14 0.72 0.02
Note: S1, S2 and S3 are the two subsamples and the full sample, 1982-1998, 1998-2014 and
1982-2014, respectively.
188
7.2 Cointegration Analysis (SVECM)
For Australia, after applying the proper unit root and cointegration tests, as shown in Tables
56 and 57, we establish a cointegration relationship between the real exchange rate, commodity
price, and relative productivity and government spending. Following the Johansen cointegration
test, the maximum eigenvalue and trace tests for the cointegration rank are performed and
are summarized in Table 56. At 5 per cent critical value, both tests conrm one cointegration
vector among the real exchange rate, non-energy commodity price, productivity and government
spending di¤erentials. We double check the cointegration by the Engle-Granger Cointegration
Test. Table 57 presents the results, the null hypothesis of this test is the lack of cointegration
among variables. The test rejects the null.
Table 56 - Johansen Cointegration Tests - Australia (1982-2014)
qcpi; com; g; y1
No. of CE(s) Trace Prob. Max-E Prob.
None 62.47 0.00 31.15 0.02
At most 1 31.31 0.12 21.06 0.07
At most 2 10.24 0.61 6.13 0.77
At most 3 4.11 0.39 4.11 0.39
Table 57 - Engle-Granger Cointegration Test - Australia (1982-2014)
Dependent Tau-Stat Prob z-Stat Prob
com -4.65 0.01 -42.49 0.01
qcpi -4.40 0.02 -39.28 0.00
y1 -4.74 0.02 -28.62 0.06
g -4.35 0.03 -20.14 0.26
Table 58 presents the results for VECM analysis. The coe¢ cient for commodity price is -0.51
which is close to -0.35, the coe¢ cient of commodity price in our version of the Canada Bank
Equation. A 10 per cent increase in the Australian commodity index causes 5.1 per cent appreci-
ation of the Australian dollar. As Table 58 illustrates, an increase of 10 per cent in productivity
di¤erentials between the US and Australia (a negative supply shock to Australia) causes 26 per
cent appreciation of the Canadian currency which is against the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis.
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For the government spending di¤erentials, a 10 per cent increase in US government spending
relative to Canada (a negative demand shock for Canada) causes 4.3 per cent appreciation of
the Canadian dollar. As Table 58 shows, we rerun the VECM analysis with alternative real
exchange rate (qgdp). The results are similar to the base case.
Table 58 - VECM Results for qcpi and qgdp - (1982-2014)
qcpi Cof t-Statistic qgdp Cof t-Statistic
ECT -0.10 -4.02 ECT -0.09 -5.06
y1 -2.60 -4.19 y1 -2.9 -5.87
g 0.43 3.80 g 0.54 4.90
com -0.51 -8.15 com -0.64 -8.87
c 2.87 12.52 c 2.85 12.93
Tables 59 and 60 present the results for the DOLS and FMOLS Cointegrating Equations,
the results are very similar to each other and very close to our VECM result in Table 58.
Table 59 - DOLS Cointegrating Equation (1982-2014)
qcpi Cof (DOLS) P-Value (DOLS) qgdp Cof (DOLS) P-Value (DOLS)
y1 -2.77 y1 -2.62 0.03
g 0.60 g 0.54 0.00
com -.0.56 com -0.52 0.01
c 2.77 c 2.68 0.00
Note: Automatic leads and lags specication (lead=0 and lag=1 based on SIC criterion, max=13)
Table 60 - FMOLS Cointegrating Equation (1982-2014)
qcpi Cof (FMOLS) P-Value (FMOLS) qgdp Cof (FMOLS) P-Value (FMOLS)
y1 -2.32 0.02 y1 -1.73 0.01
g 0.44 0.03 g 0.57 0.00
com -0.53 0.01 com -0.52 0.02
c 2.75 0.00 c 2.66 0.00
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7.2.1 Impulse Responses Analysis
Here, with four I(1) variables and one cointegration relation, we need to impose three con-
straints. The long run matrix of the structural shocks,  (L); is as follows:
 (L) =
266664
 0 0 0
  0 0
   0
   0
377775 (69)
where * is the non-restricted number. As in the SVECM analysis for Canada in section 6.5,
with four variables and one cointegration vector, we face three restrictions. The rst two zeros
in the rst row of Equation 70 are the rst two restrictions which conrm that the commodity
price index is not a¤ected in the long run by permanent shocks to output and government
spending. Therefore, commodity price index is the most exogenous variable in the long run
and is dependent on extraction technology, transport cost, political environments in the main
exporting countries and other factors on the global level. The third constraint (the rst zero in
the second row of Equation 70) implies that only commodity price shocks and supply shocks
can have a long run impact on the output di¤erential. Thus, technology shocks that improve
e¢ ciency in commodity production are allowed to have a permanent impact on output. The
short run dynamics are unrestricted and the other long run relations are estimated freely.
Equations 71 and 72 are the long run matrix of the structural shocks,  (L), for qcpi and qgdp,
respectively:
For qcpi Equation :  (L) =
266664
0:0804 0 0 0
 0:0022 0:0061 0 0
0:0001  0:0049 0:0122 0
 0:0436  0:0322 0:0116 0
377775 (70)
For qgdp Equation :  (L) =
266664
0:0792 0 0 0
 0:0021 0:0060 0 0
 0:0001  0:0043 0:0119 0
 0:0449  0:0287 0:0130 0
377775 (71)
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For both real exchange rate (qcpi) and its alternative (qgdp), we present the impulse re-
sponses of the Australian real exchange rate to the structural shocks in Figure 17. For the
qcpi case, after an undershoot and then an overshoot in the short run, a positive commodity
price shock has a permanent appreciation e¤ect on the Australian real exchange rate relative
to the US dollar. This result is in line with the terms of trade theory of the real exchange
rate. Normalising the rst column of the equation on the real commodity price implies a long
run elasticity of the Australian real exchange rate to the real commodity price of -0.54. This
is twice the e¤ect of the commodity price on the Canadian real exchange rate in section 6.5.1.
For the qgdp case, after a commodity price shock, we observe mild undershoot and overshoot
in the short run. Normalising the rst column of the equation on the real commodity price
implies a long run elasticity, of the Australian real exchange rate to the real commodity price,
of -0.56.
The second row of Figure 17 presents the real exchange rate response to a supply shock
for both alternatives of real exchange rates, qcpi and qgdp. In the short run, we observe an
undershooting behaviour and in the long run, following a positive supply shock to the US (a
negative one to Australia), the Australian dollar appreciates. For the qcpi (or qgdp), normalising
the second column of Equations 71 and 72 on the supply shock implies a long run elasticity
of the Australian real exchange rate to the supply shock price of -5.27 (or -4.78). The result
rejects the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis which suggests a real currency appreciation following
a positive supply shock. The Australian currency depreciates following a government spending
shock, that increases aggregate demand in the US relative to Australia, as shown in Figure 17
(for both cases of real exchange rate of qcpi and qgdp). For the qcpi (or qgdp), normalising
the third column of Equations 71 (or 72) on the government spending shock implies a long run
elasticity of the Australian real exchange rate to the government spending shock of 0.95 (or
1.09). The last row in Figure 17 shows the impulse response of the exchange rate shock. This
shock has a transitory e¤ect on the real exchange rate that is zero in the long run. For the
qcpi and qgdp equations, the impulse response of exchange rate shock takes 10 quarters to go
to zero.
7.2.2 Variance Decomposition
As Table 61 presents, similar to the SVECM analysis for Canada, the two main shocks which ex-
plain the real exchange of Australia against the US dollar are commodity price and productivity
shocks. For Australia, in contrast to Canada, commodity price shock is the rst contributor of
explaining variance of real exchange rate; its e¤ect is almost twice of the productivity shock. As
shown in Table 61, we test the robustness of this SVECM analysis by alternative real exchange
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rate (qgdp). The results conrm our ndings.
Table 61 - Variance Decomposition of qcpi and qgdp - Australia (1982-2014)
Horizon com y1 g qcpi Horizon com y1 g qgdp
1 0.55 0.42 0.02 0.01 1 0.60 0.37 0.03 0.00
5 0.55 0.38 0.07 0.00 5 0.63 0.30 0.06 0.00
10 0.57 0.36 0.06 0.01 10 0.65 0.29 0.06 0.00
15 0.59 0.36 0.05 0.00 15 0.66 0.28 0.06 0.00
20 0.59 0.35 0.05 0.01 20 0.66 0.28 0.06 0.00
For quarterly Australian data from 1982 Q3 to 2006 Q3, Chanthapun (2010) considers three
permanent factors that may explain the long run variability and dynamics of these commodity
currencies: real commodity prices, productivity di¤erentials and demand-side factors. Using
the econometric framework of Pagan and Pesaran (2008), Chanthapun conrms that the main
sources of uctuations in the real exchange rates for Australia are the relative supply shocks.
In contrast to our results, these results do not show a major role for commodity price in
explaining the variance of the Australian real exchange rate. As for the Canadian case, and
unlike our study, Chanthapun has used a global commodity price index for each country its
own commodity price index.
8 Conclusion
For Canada as a developed commodity exporting country, this chapter contributes to two types
of literature: the literature of long run equilibrium relationship between real exchange rate and
fundamental variables and the Variance decomposition of real exchange rate literature. For the
long run relationship between the real exchange rate of Canada and fundamentals, we update
the Canada Bank Equation by three modications: rst, our quarterly data covers an extended
period, 35 years (1980-2014). Second, in addition to the commodity price indices of energy
and non-energy, we bring other fundamentals such as government spending and productivity
di¤erentials to the Canada Bank Equation. Third, to our knowledge, this is the rst time that
the new Canada commodity price indices are used to check the robustness of the Canada Bank
Equation. In contrast to the old data set used by Amano and van Norden (1995) which was a
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xed weight index of commodity prices, the new one is contains a broader set of commodities
and the production weights are annually updated; therefore it considers the dynamic of the
composition of commodity production in Canada.
For the pre 1993 period (rst subsample), we conrm the ndings of Amano and van Nor-
den, the empirical results conrm that the energy and non-energy commodity prices a¤ect the
Canadian dollar in di¤erent ways. An increase in non-energy commodity price appreciates the
Canadian currency while an increase in energy price depreciates it. For the post 1993 period
(second subsample), we run the Canada Bank Equation and conrm the switch in the sign of
the energy price coe¢ cient on the US-Canada real exchange rate. Switching the sign of the
energy price in the Canada Bank Equation is coincident with the transformation of Canada
from an oil importing to an oil exporting country.
In the next step for the full sample (1982-2014), after extensive investigation for the di¤erent
fundamentals, we get to a new version of the Canada Bank Equation consisting of three ex-
planatory variables: non-energy commodity price index, productivity and government spending
di¤erentials. We do not consider the energy commodity price for the full sample, since its e¤ect
switches around 1993. For Australia, we introduce an equation similar to the Canadian one.
Comparing the real exchange rate responses to di¤erent shocks in Canada and Australia,
we observe di¤erent reactions for demand and supply shocks, but the same pattern for a com-
modity price shock. For the e¤ect of productivity di¤erential shocks on the real exchange rate,
for Canada, the empirical results of the cointegration analysis support the Balassa-Samuelson
Hypothesis while in the Australian case, it does not. For the demand shock, an increase in gov-
ernment spending in Canada depreciates the Canadian currency while such a shock in Australia
appreciates the Australian currency. Comparing the VECM results for Canada and Australia
as two developed commodity exporting countries, the e¤ect of the Canadian non-energy com-
modity price index on the Canada-US real exchange rate is close to the e¤ect of the Australian
commodity price index on the Australia-US real exchange rare. These results are conrmed by
extensive robustness tests. The di¤erences in the error correction term in these two countries
are interesting; for Canada, it is -0.32 while it is -0.10 for Australia. Therefore, the time to
dissipate 50 per cent of a shock is two and six quarters for Canada and Australia, respectively.
Furthermore, based on long run cointegration relationship, we build the SVECM analysis.
For Canada, the two sources of real exchange rate uctuations are productivity di¤erential and
non-commodity price with the productivity di¤erential as the main contributor. Similarly, for
Australia, the same two fundamentals explain most of the real exchange rate, but in the Aus-
tralian case, the main contributor in explaining the variance of real exchange rate is commodity
price. We apply di¤erent robustness tests; these results do not change.
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The other part of this chapter updates and tests the analysis of Claria and Gali. We study
the sources of real exchange rate uctuations in Canada and Australia in the last three decades
using a SVAR model. As do Claria and Gali (1994), we consider three types of macroeconomic
shocks  supply, demand, and nominal shocks and identify their impact on the Canadian
and Australian real exchange rates. After extensive robustness tests for di¤erent samples, we
conrm the stylized fact of Claria and Gali (1994): demand shocks explain a signicant share
of the variation in real exchange rate in these two countries.
A notable di¤erence between Canada and Australia in the SVAR analysis is the increase
in the e¤ect of monetary shock in the Canadian case from the pre 1993 period to the post
1993 one, but we do not observe any signicant changes in the e¤ect of monetary shock on
the Australian real exchange rate in the two Australian subsamples. Possibly Canada is more
inuenced by expansion of capital markets in our second subsample (1993-2014).
Our SVECM analyses conrm that if there is a long run relationship between the real
exchange rate and fundamentals, then the SVAR models, such as that of Clarida and Gali
(1994) which apply the rst di¤erences of data, fail to present some characteristics of the model.
The SVAR and SVECM approaches are di¤erent in the sense that, in the latter, we do consider
the cointegration relationship between variables while, for the former we do not. However, they
are similar in applying long run restrictions in the process of identifying structural shocks. It
seems that in Canada and Australia, by excluding the cointegration relationship between the
real exchange rate and its fundamentals, the productivity shocks are not any more the major
source of movement of real exchange rates.
These results suggest some implications for economic policy and the theoretical literature
of real exchange rate determination. First (if they can obtain some reliable predictions of
the future values of the fundamentals) our new version of the Bank of Canada Equation and
the Australian one can be helpful in guiding policy makers to the future direction of the real
exchange rate. Second, in contrast to the SVAR literature which followed Clarida and Gali
(1994), the productivity di¤erential shock is an important factor especially when we establish a
long run cointegrating relationship between the real exchange rate and fundamental variables.
Third, the empirical results for the e¤ect of productivity di¤erential in Canada support the
Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis while those in Australia do not. However, we should emphasize
that the exchange rate equations in this chapter for Canada and Australia are built on a long
run empirical relationship, and are not proper for studying the short and medium run.
Perhaps in future, including the short term variables (such as interest rates) and other ex-
planatory factors (such as risk premium) to our long run Canada Bank Equation may cause
an improvement in the equation. For Australia, although our long run equation passes exten-
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sive robustness tests, still it is premature to be introduced as the Reserve Bank of Australia
Equation.
Other avenues for future research may be as follows: rst, to test of the out-of-sample
forecasting of our equations in Canada and Australia; do these equations beat a random walk?
Second, to investigate the nature of the demand shocks in the SVAR analysis of the framework
of Clarida and Gali; to what extend these shocks are linked to scal shocks. Third, to search
for new explanatory fundamentals, especially variables which describe the dynamic of the US
dollar against the other major currencies. Fourth, for Canada, we use the new BCPI data set
which are built on the base of the composition weights of commodities production in Canada,
so it would be good to construct a data set with weights of composition of commodities which
Canada exports as well.
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Part V
Conclusion
As introduced in chapter one, this thesis provides a better understanding of the dynamic of real
exchange rates in developed and developing commodity exporting countries. For the former,
we investigate the dynamic of real exchange rates of Canada and Australia and for the latter,
we focus on ve oil exporting countries in the Middle East.
We consider in chapter two a sample of ve oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf,
namely: Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Their currencies are pegged to
the US dollar; therefore, any uctuation of the US dollar against the Euro and Yen could be
a destabilizing factor which hurts their economies. In addition, the weak synchronization of
the business cycles these ve countries with that of the US increases the cost of maintaining a
peg exchange rate regime to the US dollar. Therefore, these countries need to adopt another
exchange rate regime which helps them to dampen the incoming shocks to their economics
more e¢ ciently. The best candidate is a exible exchange rate regime with Ination Targeting,
which is what the developed commodity exporting countries follow. However, the Middle East
oil exporting countries are years behind in having the prerequisites for Ination Targeting such
as proper institutions, communication strategies, and an independent central bank. In the
meantime, our proposal in chapter two may provide a medium term solution and a smooth
path during this transition period.
Focusing on scal policy volatility, this chapter contributes to the literature of monetary
policies in the commodity exporting countries by considering other possible anchors within the
Ination Targeting framework. We simulate the nominal and real oil prices of the Middle East
oil exporting countries in local currencies under di¤erent counterfactual nominal exchange rate
regimes. We conduct a set of counterfactual experiments and empirically simulate government
decits/ surpluses and government consumption expenditure under a hypothetical peg to a
basket (containing oil price, the US Dollar, Yen and the Euro) and compare this simulation
with whatever exchange rate regime each country actually followed in the period under study.
We nd that the real oil price in domestic currency is linked to government expenditure and
scal balance as a share of GDP; and we nd that when departing from the current exchange
rate regime (peg to the US dollar), we may observe a less volatile economy.
Based on the results of our counterfactual experiments in this chapter, we recommend for
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these ve countries a gradual shift from the current exchange rate regime to this basket of oil
price, the US dollar, Euro and Yen. In the medium term, this recommendation and a self-
insurance policy, in the form of oil funds, may be helpful; however, for the long term, focusing
on the political economy, they should promote institutions and a Chilean style of scal policy
(conservative assumption of oil price) and expand their non-oil exports.
A number of issues that we do not consider in this chapter are worthy of being pursued
in further research. First, we assign equal weights to each of these three currencies but in
future research, the weights of the various currencies in the basket may reect the currency
composition of trade. Second, a basket with variable weights (for oil price, US dollar, Yen and
Euro) which are regularly updated may limit the volatility of scal policy even more. Third, in
practice, applying a band around the basket peg may allow authorities to use monetary policy
to support scal policy in satisfying internal objectives. Fourth, in all our simulations, to get the
real oil price in local currency, we use the actual ination. However, there is a major di¢ culty
in performing this kind of counterfactual analysis with reduced form coe¢ cients the Lucas
critique applies. There is bound to be a behavioural response to any new kind of monetary
policy regime, which means that the counterfactual analysis may be misleading. Therefore, in
future research, considering ination as an endogenous variable may be helpful.
In the third chapter, we determine the equilibrium exchange rate (using BEER) of these
ve countries which are major oil exporters. We employ a new data set for the real e¤ective
exchange rate of these countries which is updated annually and covers the period from 1980
to 2011. We estimate the BEER series based on both single country (Johansen and ARDL)
and panel cointegration techniques. In the time series analysis, the ARDL procedure shows
cointegration for Qatar with the same explanatory variables, which is very close to our ndings
in the panel analysis. Given the limited length of the sample (32 years) and low power of
individual country by country unit root and cointegration tests, estimating separate equations
for each country (time series) does not provide us with precise results. Therefore, to increase
the e¢ ciency of the estimators, we employ panel analysis. We apply the pooled mean-group
(PMG) of Pesaran et al. (1999) and four more panel estimators for the robustness check.
Taking into account the whole set of regression results based on di¤erent panel estimators
and annual data, this study shows a signicant e¤ect of real oil price and productivity di¤er-
entials on the real e¤ective exchange rates of these countries. The estimated long run relation
between the real e¤ective exchange rates and fundamentals is economically and statistically
signicant. In particular, a 10 per cent increase in real oil price causes a 1.9 per cent appreci-
ation of the real e¤ective exchange rates, which is consistent with theoretical predictions and
with previous studies for commodity (oil) exporting countries such as: Cashin et al. (2004) for
commodity exporting countries; Coudert et al. (2011) for a group of oil exporting countries;
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Koranchelian (2005) for Algeria; and Dauvin (2013) for ten oil exporting countries. Further-
more, the productivity deferential elasticity is 0.10 which is consistent with the results in the
related literature such as those of MacDonald and Ricci (2004) for South Africa and Lee et al.
(2008) for 48 countries over the period of 1980-2004.
The BEERs of Qatar, Kuwait, and (to some extent) the UAE, follow their real e¤ective
exchange rates. From 2000, with the increase in oil price, the BEERs appreciate while the real
exchange rate of Oman and Saudi Arabia decline. Therefore, the Saudi Arabian and Omani
currencies get undervalued while the currency of the UAE is overvalued. In 2011, the currencies
of the other two countries, Kuwait and Qatar, are almost in equilibrium.
Focusing on equilibrium exchange rate, our results conrm that these countries are not
prepared for a currency union. In order to establish a currency union, many political and
economic prerequisites must be satised. Reviewing the lessons of the Euro experience, political
convergence and harmonized institutions are the essential ingredients of a currency union. In
the case of the Euro, there was a deep desire for political unication which was followed by
establishment of the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European
Parliament. On the other hand, the European central bank is built on the existence of proper
institutions and convergence in political and economic reform, which is a very slow process. The
political relationship among these oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf is fragile and even
sometimes hostile. Therefore, the plan for a currency union in 2010 was premature and has
already failed. They have a long way ahead to satisfy the political homogeneity of a common
currency.
For the equilibrium exchange rate, which is the focus of this third chapter and one of the
economic prerequisites for currency union, our results show that before any step toward the
establishment of a monetary union in these countries, the divergence in the fair value of their
currencies should be removed. As was the focus of the second chapter, these countries should
move away from their current currency peg to the US dollar towards a basket of appropriate
currencies and oil price to decouple their currencies from the US dollar as a major oil importer.
For future research, for the robustness check, we can apply other methods of determination of
equilibrium exchange rate such as FEER.
Allocating chapters two and three to the real exchange rate of developing commodity ex-
porting countries, in chapter four, we investigate the dynamic of real exchange rates for two
developed commodity exporting countries: Canada and Australia. These countries have inde-
pendent central banks and the proper institutions to implement exible exchange rate regime
and ination targeting. The research in this chapter can shed light on the nature of real ex-
change rate in these developed commodity exporting countries. On the other hand, the results
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in this chapter should help the ve developing oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf to
see where they will be in the long term, how they should shift to competitive banking system,
adopt new legal framework and also their challenges in future.
In the fourth chapter, employing a new data set of Canadian commodity price indices, we
revisit the Canada Bank Equation and introduce a new version with more fundamentals. From a
monetary policy perspective, we must identify the forces which inuence the real exchange rate.
Di¤erent forces inuencing a currency may need di¤erent monetary responses. For example, if
there is an increase in global demand for Canadian commodities, this is a pressure linked to
fundamentals. In this case, apart from some shifts between traded and non-traded factors, the
monetary authorities do not need to do much. Another case may be the appreciation of the
Canadian dollar because of the depreciation of the US dollar against all major currencies. In
this case, an expansionary monetary policy in Canada may limit the reduction of the foreign
demand for Canadian goods and services. Finally, a proper monetary reaction to uctuations
of the Canadian dollar which is rooted in non-fundamentals and speculative factors is necessary
to protect the domestic economy by neutralizing these forces.
This chapter contributes to the literature of long run equilibrium relationship between real
exchange rate and fundamental variables and the variance decomposition of real exchange rate
literature. For the former, we update the Canada Bank Equation by three modications: rst,
our quarterly data covers an extended period, 35 years (1980-2014). Second, in addition to
the commodity price indices of energy and non-energy, we include other fundamentals such
as government spending and productivity di¤erentials. Third, to our knowledge, this is the
rst study that uses the new Canada commodity price indices to check the robustness of the
Canada Bank Equation. In contrast to the old data set used by Amano and van Norden
(1995) which was a xed weight index of commodity prices, the new one contains a broader
set of commodities and the production weights are annually updated; therefore it considers the
dynamic of the composition of commodity production in Canada. We apply similar analysis for
Australia and introduce a cointegration relationship between real exchange rate of Australia
and its fundamentals. We should emphasize that these exchange rate equations present long
run relationship; they are not aimed at explaining short term variations in the exchange rates.
For the pre-1993 period (rst subsample) in the Canadian data, we conrm the ndings
of Amano and van Norden (1995). Our empirical ndings show that the energy and non-
energy commodity prices a¤ect the Canadian dollar in di¤erent ways. An increase in non-
energy commodity price appreciates the Canadian currency while an increase in energy price
depreciates it. For the post-1993 period (second subsample), we conrm the switch in the sign
of the energy price coe¢ cient on the US-Canada real exchange rate. Switching the sign of the
energy price in the Canada Bank Equation is coincident with the transformation of Canada
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from an oil importing to an oil exporting country.
Comparing the real exchange rate impulse responses to di¤erent shocks in Canada and
Australia, we observe di¤erent reactions for demand and supply shocks but the same pat-
tern for a commodity price shock. For the e¤ect of a productivity di¤erential shock on the
real exchange rate, for Canada, the empirical results of the cointegration analysis support the
Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis; while in the Australian case, they do not. For a demand shock,
an increase in government spending in Canada depreciates the Canadian currency while such
a shock in Australia appreciates the Australian currency. Comparing the VECM results for
Canada and Australia as two developed commodity exporting countries, the e¤ect of the Cana-
dian non-energy commodity price index on the Canada-US real exchange rate is close to the
e¤ect of the Australian commodity price index on the Australia-US real exchange rate and is
in line with the results of Chen and Rogo¤ (2003) for Australia. These results are conrmed by
extensive robustness tests. The di¤erences in the error correction term in these two countries
are interesting; for Canada, it is -0.32; while it is -0.10 for Australia. Therefore, the time to
dissipate 50 per cent of a shock is two and six quarters for Canada and Australia, respectively.
For the variance decomposition of real exchange rate literature, we investigate the SVECM
frameworks to decompose the variance of the real exchange rate of Canada and Australia. The
productivity di¤erential and commodity price are the two contributors to the variance of the
real exchange rates of Australia and Canada. However, in Canada, the main contributor to
variance of the real exchange rate is productivity di¤erential; while in Australia, it is commodity
price. Extensive robustness checks conrm these ndings.
Furthermore, based on the SVAR analysis of Clarida and Gali (1994), we consider three types
of macroeconomic shocks supply, demand, and nominal shocks and identify their impact
on the Canadian and Australian real exchange rates. We conrm that, as in the literature,
demand shock is the dominant force in explaining the variance of the real exchange rates
of both countries. In Canada, this result does not change even by adding the energy and
non-energy commodity price shock to the SVAR framework. For Australia, even by bringing
commodity price to the analysis, the dominance of demand shock in explaining the variance of
real exchange rate is unchanged.
Two notable points in the SVAR analysis are: rst, for the monetary shock in the SVAR
framework, comparing the pre-1993 to post-1993 periods, we observe a signicant increase in
the e¤ect of monetary shock on variance of the real exchange rate of Canada but not Australia.
Possibly Canada is more inuenced by expansion of capital markets in our second subsample
(1993-2014). Second, in the SVAR analysis where we apply the rst di¤erences of data, some
characteristics of the models are ignored. In both countries, by excluding the cointegration rela-
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tionship between the real exchange rate and its fundamentals, as SVAR does, the productivity
shocks are no longer the major source of movement of real exchange rates. The approaches of
SVAR and SVECM are di¤erent in the sense that, in the latter, we consider the cointegration
relationship between variables while, in the former, we do not. However, they are similar in
applying long run restrictions in the process of identifying structural shocks.
Our new equations for Canada and Australia contribute to our understanding of the dynamic
of exchange rates in these two developed commodity exporting countries and for the ongoing
debate about the place of the exchange rate regime in monetary policy. Our equations point
to three forces inuencing the real exchange rates of these countries: commodity price index in
each country; the CPI of both countries against the US; productivity and government spending
di¤erentials relative to the US. Plugging any information or predictions regarding the future
of these factors into our proposed equations for Australia and Canada, may provide us with
the future dynamic of real exchange rates of these countries; consequently monetary authorities
may better execute proper policies.
For future work, we suggest several research avenues. First, including short term variables
(such as interest rates) and other explanatory factors (such as risk premium) to our long run
Canada Bank Equation may cause an improvement in the equation. Second, in the Meese
and Rogo¤ (1983) framework, the out-of-sample forecasting of our equations in Canada and
Australia may be tested to nd if it can beat a random walk. Third, investigating the nature
of the demand shocks in the SVAR analysis of the framework of Clarida and Gali to nd to
what extent they are linked to scal shocks. Fourth, searching for new explanatory fundamen-
tals, especially variables which describe the dynamic of the US dollar against the other major
currencies, because these factors are not directly captured in the equation. Fifth, for Canada,
we use the new BCPI data set which is built on the base of the composition weights of com-
modities production in Canada; so, as Orr (1999) points out, for real exchange rate analysis, it
would be more appropriate to construct a data set with weights of composition of commodities
which Canada exports. Sixth, in Canada, in addition to conventional oil wells, there are huge
oil sand mines. With the increase in oil price in the last decade, protable oil extraction from
oil sands has already started. If the oil price passes a certain threshold, then this may bring
non-linearity to the relationship between the real exchange rate and oil price. Seventh, in our
analysis, any increase in commodity price is treated the same but a more clear modelling of
real exchange rate dynamics may distinguish between a negative commodity supply shock and
a positive demand shock both of which raise commodity prices. Eighth, as noted by Rossi
(2006), parameter instability can be a major problem in economic time series modelling. The
evolution of our proposed equations may be better represented by time varying analysis. Ninth,
for the decomposition of structural shocks in SVECM framework, we apply the method of King
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et al. (1991), it would be interesting to check other alternative methods such as that of Gonzalo
and Ng (2001), and that of Pagan and Pesaran (2008).
The intention of this thesis is to contribute usefully to the elds of the real exchange rate
of developed or developing commodity exporting countries and international nance; and to
inspire further research.
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Figures 
Figure 1- Nominal Oil Price in US Dollar Versus Real Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index, 1988--2012 
 
 
Figure 2 -- Inflation in some of the Persian Gulf Oil Exporting Countries, 1980-2011 
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Figure 3- Correlations Between Government Spending and GDP, 1960-1999 
 
Figure 4- Correlations between Government Spending and GDP, 2000-2009 
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Figure 5 - Nominal Average Annual Oil Price in US $ (1980-2011) 
 
 
Figure 6 - Real Effective Exchange Rates, 1980--2011, (Index: 2007=100) 
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Figure 7 - Productivity Differentials (Relative to Main Trading Partners) in Logs 
Figure 8 - REER and BEER based on PMG or FMOLS and DOLS (1980-2011) 
Note: The REERs and BEERs are in log and demeaned. The coefficients for the DOLS and FMOLS 
methods are very close; therefore, their BEER values are almost identical. (Index: 2007=100) 
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Figure 9 – Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi) to Supply and Demand Shocks 
Note: Supply and Demand shocks are shock to Δy₁ and Δqcpi, respectively. 
 
Figure 10 - Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi) to Com, Supply and Demand Shocks 
Note: Non-energy commodity, Supply and Demand shocks are shock to Δcom,Δy₁ and Δqcpi, 
respectively. 
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Figure 11 - Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi) to Energy, Com, Supply and Demand Shocks 
Note: Energy, Non-Energy commodity, Supply and Demand shocks are shock to Δene, Δcom, Δy₁ and 
Δqcpi, respectively. 
Figure 12 - Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi,qgdp) to Different Shocks (1980-2014) 
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Figure 13 - Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi,qgdp) to Different Shocks 
 
 
Figure 14 - Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi,qgdp) to Different Shocks (In the alternative case) 
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Figure 15 - Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi) to Supply and Demand Shocks (Australia) 
 
Figure 16 - Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi) to Com, Supply and Demand Shocks 
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Figure 17 - Responses of Real Exchange Rate (qcpi;qgdp) to Different Shocks (1982-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
